WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?

hD PROPOSAL
Carlos Manuel Duarte- Santos
A Follow Up To My Thesis BSc (Econ) Wales ‘Aberystwyth’ 2004
THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE AS A CASE STUDY IN THE JUS AD BELLUM CONVENTION OF JUST WAR THEORY
BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:
WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?
CONTENTS


I. A Personal Interest 7
II. Just War Theory 11
III. Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) 14
IV. The High Jacking of Mozambique 16
V. The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique 19
VI. Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of The People 23
VII. Rhodesia and South Africa: The Right Intention 25
VIII. Peace Returns to Mozambique and The Region 32
Conclusion 34
Bibliography 36



BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:
WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?

A Personal Interest
The civil war in Mozambique (1976-92) between the liberation movement Renamo and the Frelimo government, was one of the bloodiest and longest civil wars in Africa; with one million dead and three million displaced people - more than half of which were refugees in neighbouring countries, - it was a war that happened because a people were denied the opportunity to be free after almost five centuries of Portuguese influence and rule. The war has also to be seen in the context of the ‘Cold War’ prevailing at the time and how the struggle for power between East and West that is between Communism and Democracy was the cause of yet another innocent bystander in global affairs sinking into fratricidal violence.
My interest in the conflict, and what motivated me to write and to propose a doctoral thesis on its moral justification, is a very personal one.

I was born in the country on 13/10/1940 and was as a student at the Salazar National lyceum in the 50’s, one of many young Mozambicans who held very strong critical views on Portuguese colonialism.

As a result of major problems of a political nature that I encountered with the Portuguese Education Authorities, my parents sent me to South Africa in 1957 at the age of 17 to continue my studies and I became a citizen of that country in the early 1960’s, to avoid military service in Mozambique, where the Portuguese were fighting various Mozambican liberation movements.
Many of my childhood and school friends in Mozambique went on to become leading figures in the various liberation movements, in particular Frelimo. To name but a few they are the former President Chissano, a childhood friend the former minister of information, and chief party ideologue from 1975 to 1991, Dr. Jose Luis Cabaco and many other officials.
Until 1972, I visited the country on numerous occasions and kept in touch with most of my friends. My visits came to an abrupt end in September of that year, when I was detained and “tactically debriefed” at the Machava Jail by the then Portuguese security police PIDE on allegations of anti-Portuguese activities during the 50’s and the 60’s.
Despite the independence of Mozambique in 1975 that gave rise to great expectations of freedom, equality and liberty, I never returned until 1989, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reason for my absence was my knowledge that Frelimo, to whom the country was handed over by Portugal, had transformed itself (as I will argue later in this presentation), from the original pro democracy liberation movement under Eduardo Mondlane into a Marxist Leninist movement under Samora Machel a great admirer of Stalin, after the assassination of Mondlane in Dar- es- Salaam, 1966.
During the above mentioned period I kept in touch with many former Frelimo dissidents, who became to varying degrees members of Renamo, and in the late 70’s early 80’s I assisted the South African security establishment in assessing certain aspects of the civil war, in particular the interpretation of speeches by the Frelimo leadership.

My close friendship with many South African journalists - in particular Al Venter - from whose book I quote extensively also gave me a great insight into the origins of the conflict.
This dissertation, then, is an enquiry into the civil war in Mozambique between Renamo (formerly MNR, Mozambican National Resistance) and Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) as well as the covert participation by South Africa in the conflict. The objective is to ascertain whether there was just cause for the concerned parties to engage in conflict and whether Renamo in the first instance and South Africa in the second instance were justified respectively initiating and engaging in the civil war.
Such an enquiry is important for although The Mozambican Civil war has been well documented, in this instance by Cabrita (2000) , Hall and Young (1997) , Vines (1996) , Newitt (1995) , Venter (1977) et al, where one can clearly follow the origins, causes, conduct and end result of the conflict, no arguments have ever been advanced nor debated – to my knowledge - as to the justification for the conflict itself, or the part played by the main actors as outlined above.
Such debates and assessments are common in the instance of wars between Nations, as exemplified by the recent debate on the legality cum justification for the war on Iraq, but the literature is poor in such discourses pertaining to civil wars. This may well be because just war theory, in its classical formulation, confers legitimacy to engage in (just) war only to state-actors, which is a lacuna not often dealt with . Thus, albeit more as a byproduct of this proposal than as a central aim, I will nonetheless demonstrate how the framework of just war theory – in particular the precepts of jus ad bellum – can easily and fruitfully be applied to warring political communities other than recognized Sovereign States.
In this instance I will assess the character, role and motivation of Renamo - the main protagonist in opposing the dictatorial Frelimo regime on behalf of a large number of Mozambicans - as well as that of South Africa that, albeit covertly, was a major protagonist in supporting the rebel movement.
In assessing whether a war is justified, the traditional yardstick is what has become known as Just War Theory. That I shall examine in the next section, and I will suggest that under the ante bellum circumstances prevailing at the time, the civil war in Mozambique was unavoidable, was conducted by competent authorities, was a measure of last resort, that there was just cause, and that it provided the desired end result.
In addressing a topic as the one of this dissertation, one should be as objective as one can possibly be. Thus, a word on methodology is in order.

I am fully aware that because of my intimate knowledge and occasional involvement in the conflict, it is not an easy task to avoid the trap of subjectivity and will thus rely on an approach of radical empiricism, often used in anthropological research. ‘Unlike traditional empiricism which draws a definite boundary between method and object, radical empiricism denies the validity of such cuts and makes the interplay between these domains the focus of its interest.
Radical empiricism means the acknowledgement of the ethnographer’s [Researcher’s] subjective position rather than the denial of it. Jackson points out that rather than being a scientific method to accurately describe a situation, it is probable that ‘objectivity serves more as a magical token, bolstering our sense of self in disorienting situations’ . This would certainly seem the case in my dissertation.

Just War Theory
Western just war theories as we postulate them today, can be traced as far back in history as Cicero (106-43 BC), who believed in universal standards, having the view that there was a ‘society of mankind [cosmopolitanism] rather than states’ (a view which, as we shall see further on, supports our general theoretical framework).

St. Augustine (354-430 AD) , in turn, proposed that there should be duties of just treatment of prisoners and conquered peoples, saying that mercy should be shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no longer a threat to peace.

Thomas Aquinas, who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory, suggested that there should be three tests for the justification for war, namely: just cause, competent authority and right intention.
Post St. Augustine thinkers, as exemplified by Grotius (1583-1645), looked at just war theories from a secular point of view, and suggested that there are three basic criteria for a war to be just and justified: firstly, that the danger faced by a nation is immediate, secondly that the force used is necessary to adequately defend the nation’s interests and thirdly that the use of force is proportionate to the threatened danger.
Michael Walzer, among so many other contemporary political thinkers who have further refined western just war theories (that are well articulated in the ‘Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’ ), has suggested that just war theory can be divided into four main parts, namely: ante bellum, that concerns the socio economic and political scenario prevailing at the time; jus ad bellum, that concerns the justice and justification for going to war; jus in bello, that refers to the conduct of war; and jus post bellum, that concerns post war peace agreements etc.
As indicated in my introduction, I will now briefly elaborate on the jus ad bellum aspects of western just war theory. According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the rules of jus ad bellum are the responsibility of nations and their heads of government, and it is in this norm that there exists a lacuna in western just war theory that, with particular reference to current events, and the absence of reference to civil wars, has led many contemporary political theorists to suggest that the theory should be upgraded and modernized to keep pace with the accelerating changes in the concepts of war and other bellicose conflicts.
The jus ad bellum convention requires that five basic principles be met:
1. Just Cause, that basically can mean self defense from aggression, the protection of innocents or, as Walzer puts it, ‘simply resistance from aggression’.
2. Proper Authority, meaning that the state has to be recognized by other states and that a declaration to engage in war must be made to the enemy as well as to the citizens of the nation concerned.
3. The Possession of Right Intention, meaning that a war should only be waged for the cause of justice and not for self- interest or aggrandizement.
4. Last Resort, meaning that all other means (i.e. diplomatic efforts or any other reasonable means must be exhausted.)
5. Probability of Reasonable Success, meaning that whatever the aimed result is, in order to address the particular just cause, has at the outset to have a reasonable chance of succeeding.

Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
Frelimo, as will be discussed in the next paragraph, was the liberation movement to whom Portugal, under extreme controversial circumstances, handed over their colony Mozambique and the origins of the organization deserves closer scrutiny.

As a norm, the origins of most African liberation movements are very confusing in that the final ‘product’ is often the sum total of many other groupings, with many diverse opinions and agendas, that for one reason or another - in many instances pure expediency in fighting a common enemy - have amalgamated into a prominent organization. Frelimo is no exception.
The literature on Frelimo is abundant and often confusing. It suffices to say that from the 1920’s some form of protest organizations pleading for better living conditions for Mozambicans came into being and that according to Gibson Frelimo was created by a merger in June 1962 of the three existing Mozambican African nationalist movements Udenamo, Manu and Unami, with Eduardo Mondlane as its first president, a new found unity that was to be very short lived, and Frelimo continued to be beset by continued fierce faction fighting, ideological, ethnic and personal rivalries, assassinations, defections and splits.
Gibson further elaborates that the existence of any unity was largely due to the active concern of president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who had granted Frelimo major bases in his country from which to launch its struggle against the Portuguese and the necessity on the part of Frelimo to justify the extensive material support that they were receiving from the African Liberation Committee and the Organization of African States.
The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam on then 3rd of February1969, precipitated an hysterical sequence of accusations and counter-accusations within Frelimo and Tanzanian officials, such as a possible CIA involvement as well as the dreaded Portuguese Security police PIDE, but as Cabrita suggests ‘the full circumstances surrounding Mondlane’s assassination shall only be known when Tanzania discloses the findings of its investigations conducted with the help of Scotland Yard and Interpol’.
For a short period after the assassination, a three man Presidential Council comprising the vice president Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and the military commander Samora Machel led the movement for a short period that was highlighted by numerous purges within the organization . By 1969, Simango and many other high ranking officials had been expelled from the party, and Samora Machel with Marcelino dos Santos as his deputy assumed the party leadership.
Samora Machel was a revolutionary who was not only dedicated to throwing the Portuguese out of Mozambique but also radically changing the society and is reported to have said at the time that’ Of all the things we have done, the most important-the one that history will record as the principal contribution of our generation-is that we understand how to turn a armed struggle into a revolution; that we realized that it was essential to create a new mentality to build a new society.’
Following independence in 1975, Machel as the first president of Mozambique called for Frelimo to organize itself into a Leninist party, a highly organized single political party and proceeded to put his revolutionary principles into practice. As a Marxist, he called for the nationalization of all private property, industries, commerce, health services, education and the abolishment of religion. His systematic destruction of the traditional fabric of society led eventually led to a bloody and protracted civil war that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The High Jacking of Mozambique. ‘The ante bellum Scenario’
On the 25th April 1974, the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) seized power in Portugal, and the new Portuguese Government burdened with the human and financial costs of their colonial wars, one of the main causes for their revolution, decided to relinquish its colonies.
As aptly recorded by Hall and Young the new regime in Portugal, then headed by general Spinola, almost immediately started negotiations with the main Mozambican liberation movement Frelimo, and in May of 1974 a senior member of the junta, general Costa Gomes, visited Mozambique, appealing to Frelimo for a cease fire and to enter negotiations to end the war.
The Portuguese proposed that the people of the colony would choose some kind of arrangement between the ‘extremes of independence and the status quo at a planned referendum’. It was the intention of the Portuguese government to grant a great deal of autonomy to the colony, while still maintaining ties with the ‘motherland’ within a framework of ‘Lusophonic Commonwealth’ comprising all former colonies. This view was not shared by the left wing senior army officers in Portugal, led by Major Mello Antunes that had close ideological ties with Frelimo.
It is further recorded that Frelimo saw no need to compromise its demand for full independence under its sole leadership, without any referendum or other popular consultation on the country’s future, and refused to concede a ceasefire until their demands were met,
‘Indeed, increasingly aware of the contradictory currents within the Portuguese government over decolonization, Frelimo stepped up the war ,calibrating the exercise of military pressure with a negotiating strategy which sought simultaneously to weaken the Spinola faction and to strengthen the left wing one that was favorable to their own position’.
The continuation of the conflict eventually led to further formal and informal negotiations between the parties, which in turn led to a cease fire on the 8th September 1974, with the Portuguese side still committed to a referendum and unwilling to concede to Frelimo’s demands, which comprised their legitimacy as the sole representative of the peoples of Mozambique, the recognition of the people’s right to complete independence and the immediate transfer of power to Frelimo.

It is important to note that while the negotiations that led to the cease fire were taking place, there were a number of secret meetings in Dar es Salaam between Frelimo and the left wing elements of the Portuguese regime, this time led by Mario Soares (at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs and soon to be Prime Minister) after the demise of General Spinola, Major Antunes and Almeida Santos a well known left wing Portuguese lawyer with longstanding connections with Mozambique and Frelimo, where a secret protocol was signed recognizing Frelimo as the sole legitimate and authentic representatives of Mozambique .
The events mentioned above laid the foundations for the final negotiations that took place in Lusaka on 5-7 September 1974, in which Portugal ceded to all Frelimo’s demands. By the end of September 1974, the Portuguese government and Frelimo signed the Lusaka Accord, allowing the transfer of power to Frelimo without prior elections. On the 25th of June 1975, Mozambique became an independent one party State, with Frelimo as the sole legal party led by Samora Moises Machel.

As I argued in 1978, ‘Mozambique was sold to a militarily defeated Frelimo by the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, made easy by the withdrawal of troops from Mozambique which were replaced by Portuguese communist-orientated battalions’, that aided and abetted Frelimo’s illegal transition to power, well documented in Al Venter’s ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ .
The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique.
‘The Just Cause’
From the outset, the new Mozambican government showed through its actions that it was totally divorced from the ethos envisaged by its founder Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated in 1969. Mondlane’s vision as recorded by his widow Jeanette in 1985, was very much anthropocentric and he would not have agreed with decisions taken after independence, ‘many of them allied to the violation of the idea of the right to individual freedom’, ‘that ideology is not more important than people’ and that he would have opposed the direction taken by the new regime.
What happened in Mozambique was that it shifted from one form of totalitarianism to another and, as Cabrita suggests, ‘ more specifically from Fascism to Leninism’, although history has subsequently informed us that it was very much a Stalinist type of regime.
From day one, Samora Machel who was the head of state and government, the speaker of the parliament, the chief justice and the head of the armed forces, indicated that ‘the new Mozambican regime was prepared to go to great lengths to impose the will of the government by forcing those who refuse those who accept such an imposition and to repress those who oppose such a will’ .
With the introduction of a Marxist Leninist form of government run along the lines of Stalinism, the people soon found themselves in the grip of fear through intimidation, the nationalization of homes, the elimination of private medicine and law practices, private education that was replaced with government schools alike, modeled on the Soviet system of education, and the nationalization of the press under the government control. Frelimo was the State with the Nation taking second place.
Freedom of worship was denied to the people of Mozambique by the banning and closure of all churches and missions. In line with this purge on religion, any form of baptism was prohibited , foreign church missions that for decades had been on the forefront of providing basic education for the masses came under particular heavy attack, their bank accounts being frozen while they were being investigated. It was suggested at the time that the Soviet Union played a major role in these developments.
‘The Jehovah’s Witnesses were particularly singled out as they consistently refused to swear allegiance or indeed to recognize Frelimo as the ruling party’. The biggest looser was the Roman Catholic Church, despite the fact that during the war of independence many of its office bearers were pro Frelimo apologists and were a powerful force for the elimination of colonial principles.
‘Other foreign religious missions under pressure were The Church of the Apostles, an American body, The Church of the Nazarene, the Swiss Mission particularly known for their skills in education, The United Apostolic Church of Zion a powerful Christian organization with millions of adepts in Southern Africa, The Assembly of God and many others.
More disturbing is what President Samora Machel has done to an estimated 50000 political prisoners held in a string of labor camps established in remote areas of northern Mozambique the elimination of opposition parties such as Rev. Uria T. Simango’s Fumo (Front for the Unification of Mozambique), ‘ Who broke from Frelimo in the late 1960’s because it was edging too close to the Soviet camp [this was after the assassination in 1969 of Frelimo’s founder Dr. Eduardo Mondlane when the leadership was taken over by Samora Machel]’ . Joana Simiao, a Sorbonne educated leader of 4 million Makua tribesmen from Central Mozambique, who had remained implacably opposed to Frelimos’ doctrines and many other pro democracy parties and movements were also banned and outlawed.
Of great significance for the majority of the people of Mozambique was the abolishment of the traditional tribal system. According to Venter , Machel decreed that forthwith there would be no tribes in Mozambique, but only Mozambicans ‘which is like telling the Arabs they are no longer Muslims’. Machel further abolished the offices of chieftainships and many tribal heads and their followers resisted the change, went into hiding and became a component of the new resistance to overthrow the new government by force very much in the same way that Frelimo fought Portuguese authority in the decade long guerrilla war of liberation.
Against the background of political parties and movements banned and many of their leaders killed or imprisoned, with civil liberties removed from citizens and a non existent rule of law to afford protection to the citizens, any hope of the dreamed of democratic process was eliminated. The people were in a worst situation when compared with colonial rule and were ruthlessly dealt with when attempting to address their plight, the implementation of all these acts that removed all the freedom from the people was achieved through the use of the new security police (SNASP) created in October 1975, an organization molded along the lines of the KGB in the Soviet Union as I will expound on when I discuss the role of South Africa in the civil war.
I would like to suggest that at the above- mentioned stage of the history of Mozambique; its peoples were denied ‘equality as equality of fair opportunity, liberal equality and democratic equality.’
In a thesis for an MA in politics ‘Civil Wars In Africa, Causes and Effects’ Ahmad Mahmoud suggests that Africa’s civil wars break out due to a set of motives some of which relate to the political and social structures, while others are closely linked with outside intervention in the continent’s internal struggles.
I concur with his assessment, as that was very much the case of the Mozambican civil war under discussion. It broke out firstly as a result of the taking over of power by the undemocratic Frelimo regime, followed shortly afterwards by the establishment of a Marxist Leninist system of government with the social constraints and loss of freedom imposed by such regimes, and the outside influences imposed upon the region by the main cold war rivals namely the USA and the USSR, alongside with their respective allies or sympathizing nations.
In recent correspondence with a friend, I was reminded that ‘A wise professor once commented that governments should not act like the criminals they’re set to protect us from. Legitimacy, accordingly, vanishes once a ruling party becomes a criminal regime and aggresses against the people and property of its jurisdiction’ and had no option but to as a last resort engage in civil war that as mentioned in earlier paragraphs was conducted by the majority of Mozambicans under the Renamo banner.

Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of the People
‘The Proper Authority’
One of the preoccupations of the theorists of Just War Theories from Saint Thomas Aquinas who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory, through to modern thinkers such as Michael Walzer, is the competence of Nations to engage in war. Modern Just War Theory disregards civil wars and hence there is an obvious lacuna that should be addressed.
In the case of civil wars in which normally a section of the population enters into war with the ruling government as a result of the case in this conflict ‘A national grievance where the performance of a government is held to be against the national interest’, I looked at ‘The Libertarian Just War Theory’ to justify the competence of Renamo, ‘The war must be declared by a competent authority, and against a proper enemy. The proper authority to exercise a right of self- defense against an aggressor is the individual whose rights have been violated or his /her designated agent’.
In the fifteen months between the Portuguese revolution of 25 April 1974, and the controversial independence of Mozambique on the 25th of September 1975, there were a number of attempts to put together a viable opposition movement against Frelimo, the most important one at the time was the 7th of September 1974 revolt when dissatisfied Mozambicans led by dissatisfied Portuguese whites, attempted to seize power by taking control of the radio station amid much pomposity and bravado. As Venter aptly puts it: ‘this was nor totally unexpected and a little more determination and perhaps a few moments of courage and a few more single minded individuals might have pulled if off. Especially as Frelimo was strung pretty thin on the ground at that stage their power structure was very much vulnerable to internal dissent’.
As I have elaborated on in the previous paragraph the traumatic events that followed, only reinforced Mozambicans desire to liberate themselves, resulting in many Mozambicans of all origins, color, belief, religion ethnicity and race gathering together in the central Manica and Sofala province of Mozambique, where the various representatives decided to join efforts in order to defeat and remove communism from Mozambique and thus, Renamo (Resistencia National Mocambicana) led by Andre Matade Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo commander, was founded in 1976 Upon his violent death in 1978, Afonso Dhlakama was democratically elected as the new leader of the liberation movement.
There is a general perception that Renamo was not a genuine liberation movement representing many Mozambicans but the creation of the then isolated Jan Smith’s Rhodesian government and that subsequently after Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe gained independence the movement was taken over by South Africa became a tool of alleged destabilization policies towards the Frelimo regime. These perceptions fanned by the writings and observations of, inter alia, (Vines, 1996), (Hall and Young, 1997) and (Newitt, 1995) are not entirely a true reflection of the events and I shall brief deal with the subject in my next chapter.

Rhodesia and South Africa:
“The Right Intention”
Despite Rhodesia’s internal settlement and a black majority government led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1972 having being democratically elected, Great Britain insisted on facilitating communist oriented freedom movements namely Robert Mugabe’s Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo’s Zanu and Sithole’s Zapu, all of whom had refused to participate in the elections, to eventually come to power in 1980 after the signing of the Lancaster House agreement.
In the interim period, Frelimo came to power, and from 1975, Mugabe had operational bases in Mozambique that facilitated his movement’s terrorist activities in Rhodesia. With the denial of Rhodesia’s access to the port of Beira by the new Mozambican government, Rhodesia facilitated the re-organization and continuation of an anti-Frelimo guerrilla movement that had been created by the former Portuguese security police PIDE/DGS, comprised mainly of the Mozambican Diaspora who had fled their country after the Frelimo takeover. These were to become the core of Renamo’s military after it’s inception in 1976
It is thus reasonable to suggest that Rhodesia’s actions, and continued support for Renamo until 1980, can be construed as an act of self- defense against a foreign country’s aggressive interference in its territorial integrity, and that the Rhodesian government was fully justified in getting involved in the civil war in Mozambique.
Albeit in a covert manner, South Africa also played a major role in the civil war under discussion, decisively affecting the outcome of the war by having covertly assisted Renamo following the Zimbabwean independence in 1980.
Having previously mentioned that many political authors and historians have through their accounts of the war assisted in creating the general impression that the Mozambique Civil War was South Africa’s war, and by implication not a justified conflict, I will briefly elaborate on some of those accounts, that are either dismissive of South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing at the time or totally devoid from the actual facts.
According to Vieira et al. ‘the South African regime knowing that that it was militarily and politically impossible to turn Mozambique into a Bantustan, tried to make the existence and functioning of any kind of organized society enviable. It defined its strategy as the devastation of Mozambique and of its capacity for later recovery’. I would like to suggest that this assessment is incorrect, as South Africa was at the time, as will be discussed later, not particularly concerned about developments in Mozambique as illustrated in an assessment by Ellis and Sechaba that ‘the idea that South Africa feared invidious comparison with Mozambique’s successes ( an important part of Frelimo propaganda, endlessly repeated in the academic literature) seems bizarre, although this does not mean that Frelimo’s victory did not have a symbolic value for young South African blacks’.
One of the most important factors of the civil war in the 1980’s was the South Africans; ‘the precise determinants and objectives of whose foreign policy during this period remain obscure, although some of the more florid explanations are hardly worthy of discussion’ . Coming from such distinguished academics, I find this kind of suggestion intriguing as South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing at the time and in particular in its relationship with Africa was clear-cut and was based on the non-interference in the internal affairs of their neighboring states and one of mutual economic co-operation.
South Africa had always had a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Despite the abhorrent apartheid laws that as far as I recollect were not only being opposed by nationalist movements such as the ANC but also by the powerful internal and multi racial liberal lobby, the country had a whites only multi party form of democracy, was a member of the United Nations, had diplomatic relations with most nations, fought in both world wars on the side of the allied forces and was thus in international law, competent to engage in hostilities with other nations whenever if felt threatened.
It should be noted that Prime Minister John Vorster had been engaged in detente or constructive engagement, with a number of independent African nations in West and East Africa such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zambia etc. the same happened in relations between S.A. and Mozambique when the latter obtained independence from Portugal in 1975.
From Independence Day on 25 September 1975 and in line with South Africa’s foreign policies towards African nations pertaining at the time, the South African government went to great lengths to maintain cordial relations with the new Mozambican government.
Despite Samora Machel’s continued bellicose rhetoric, preaching revolution and liberation not only for his country, but for Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular – which that led at the time of Maputo being jokingly referred to as [The Cape Canaveral of revolution in the sub-continent] - the relationships with South Africa remained good.
As argued by Venter, ‘ much of the goodwill generated between the two countries, has stemmed from premier Vorster’s détente policy and from a mutual acceptance by both nations that while they abhorred each other’s policies, their economic beds had been made for them by others and that they had better continue to lie in them’ , indeed Mozambique was receiving direct and indirect aid from South Africa to the tune of one hundred million US dollars per annum, albeit on a reduced scale, no restrictions were placed on Mozambican miners’ continued employment in the gold mines, the port of Maputo, a major but not only route through which many South African exports and imports were routed continued to be used albeit at a reduced capacity due to the diminishing labour resources available in Mozambique that came about as a result of a major exodus of skilled Portuguese management threatened by the new regime; these and many similar actions are not those of a government bent on destabilizing a neighboring country.
Other than the internal conflict with the ANC, PAC (Pan African Congress) and other similarly communist oriented militant organizations, that conducted a low key resistance conflict against the apartheid regime, South Africa did not consider itself under any significant threat from its neighboring countries.

When, in 1976, Mozambique adopted a Marxist-Leninist form of Government, the military threat to S.A. became alarming due to the deployment of Soviet intelligence agencies, weapons such as missiles, fighter aircraft, military advisers and an assorted number of other offensive weaponry. Furthermore, the Frelimo government allowed Umkonto I Swize, the armed wing of the ANC, as well as other liberation movements to have operational bases inside Mozambique, a fact vehemently denied by the authorities; it is ironic that Nelson Mandela, then imprisoned on Roben Island, knew of such assistance as he later recalls in his autobiography, ‘Thousands of our young people that left the country to join our own liberation movement, were trained in our camps in Algeria, Tanzania and Mozambique. There is nothing more encouraging in prison as learning that the people outside are supporting the cause for which you are inside’
Al Venter illustrates the above points by describing what happened in Mozambique after Machel signed an agreement in Moscow in 1976. Inter alia, ‘The Soviet Union would provide military assistance to Mozambique in the form of weapons, equipment, advisers, liaison staff and instructors. The Soviets were also to supply (Extra Military Means) in the case of (External Aggression) [with obvious reference to S.A.]’
By mid 1976, South Africa, as well as most western observers were worried about the military developments in Mozambique as the Indian Ocean was fast becoming a bridgehead for Soviet expansionism in the area , with the Soviet fleet having access to the ports of Maputo, Quelimane, Beira and Nacala, backed by an intelligence service in Maputo totally out of proportion to the normal requirements that are generally accepted within the realm of diplomatic relations between two nations.
Other than the setting up of SNASP, the Mozambican new security police along the lines of the KGB and the GRU, the Soviets, under the leadership of Boris Nikolayvich was responsible for the setting up of an organization to co-ordinate the activities of the underground South Africa communist party and its ally the ANC, South Africa was the last domino in Soviet expansionism in the African sub-continent.
The cold war that was prevailing at the time, led western nations to resort to rhetoric rather than action, and S.A. felt isolated and threatened by events taking place in its neighboring countries: Angola had been handed over by the Portuguese to the communist Agostinho Neto’s MPLA movement, in the same fashion as Mozambique, at the expense of Holden Roberto’s FNLA, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, and FLEC, the freedom movement of the enclave of Cabinda, with the added problem of a strong presence of the Cuban army to prop up the illegal new regime.
South Africa’s involvement in the civil war by actively, albeit covertly supporting Renamo was an act of self-defense and gave further legitimate justification to the conflict. In conclusion, did South Africa’s intervention have the desired effect? In the light of above paragraph’s I would like to suggest that it assisted in restoring democracy in Mozambique, and struck a blow to the Soviet’s presence in the sub-continent and facilitated the ‘Demise of Marxist orientated governments in Southern Africa’ it set the tone for the eventual ‘Formation of a confederation of non-Marxist Southern African Sates soon after South Africa settles with all its population groups,’
The civil war in Mozambique occurred because a nation wanted freedom, but the 17-year event was interconnected with regional and international developments prevailing at the time. Ten years after the conflict ended, South Africa has settled internally, the SADA a powerful regional body dedicated to the socio-economic development of the region involving all Southern African nations is functioning well for the benefit of all, the South African active involvement and the positive results that it helped to bring about are another indication as to the justification for the civil war.

Peace Returns to Mozambique and the Region:
‘The End Result’
We the demise of the Soviet Union on the horizon, I overtly returned to Mozambique in August of 1989, on a visit that - until 1993 - was to be the first of many, and experienced first hand the human and physical devastation that had taken place. In my mind there was often the question: was this civil war, that was not yet ended, justified? During those four years, I traveled extensively in the interior, assisting in what were then the early stages of returning to normality. In the process I met with my friends, many still in Government, and with countless innocent bystanders caught up in the conflict.
My observations, at the time shared by many, were that both Frelimo and Renamo were exhausted by the fighting, and looming political change in South Africa, as well as the end of the Cold War, had improved the international environment for peace.
At the fifth congress of the Frelimo Party held in Maputo during July of 1989, the Mozambican Government abandoned its Marxist Leninist system of governance and replaced it with a 0ne Party Democratic System that immediately drew opposition from the Renamo leadership and widespread consternation among the populace. Frelimo was at all costs trying to hold onto power without the consent of the people.
The one party democracy rationale was made public by Jose Luis Cabaco, Frelimo’s External General Secretary and a childhood friend of mine, who at the time argued:
‘People say we are a one party state. We are not a one party state, we are a one party democracy… it is difficult to explain this to Westerners because the West has such short memories of its own history [democratic history] (…) and are too narrow minded to understand that a one party state is a product of African culture and history and not a product of ideology… those foreign interests, and I am talking about racist colonialist people, are forcing us to have talks with Renamo and treat them as a valid opposition, understand only too well how this would threaten our sovereignty and independence… they do not wish to change the government of Mozambique, they do not even want Renamo to share power, they just want Renamo to be recognized as an opposition which can then be mobilized as a destabilizing force…’ .
The above illustrates the Frelimo political paranoia prevailing at the time. When, as his guest in August of 1989, he tried to explain to me the political scenario confronting his government, I cautioned Cabaco how such views would only prolong the civil war, which it did until a ceasefire that became known as the General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. The effective date for the cease-fire was on the 15th of October 1992 and a UN Peace Keeping Force (ONUMOZ) oversaw the two-year transition period to democracy, leaving the country in early 1995.
Despite many setbacks, which were painstakingly overcome - such as the protracted part of the peace negotiations that led Frelimo to introduce constitutional changes providing for political pluralism and free speech - Mozambique’s first multi party elections were held in 1994. They returned Frelimo and the moderate and reformist president Chissano to power with 56% of the vote, with Renamo attaining a credible 41%, and 3% going to a myriad of minor political parties. In 1998, the country’s first municipal democratic elections in 33 urban areas took place with an almost equal share between Frelimo and Renamo, ensuring that the political opposition will continue to have an important role in Mozambique’s maturing democracy.

Conclusion
In the introduction to this dissertation, I indicated that in order to assess the justification for the civil war in Mozambique, I looked as a yardstick to the generally accepted conventions of traditional just war theory, that I have explained in an earlier paragraph. In particular, I looked at the jus ad bellum conventions of just war theory.
My rationale is that I see no difference between a war between states and a war between peoples within a state, if both can be regarded as bounded political communities, possessing legitimate and widely accepted authority, and following ethical principles in the pursuit of warfare. Nonetheless, I have yet to come across a similar perspective applied, in particular, to civil conflicts such as that of Mozambique. Authors have dabbled with the application of just war theory to secessionist movements, and also to terrorist or guerrilla movements, but to my knowledge there is no literature attempting to consider whether or not civil wars were justly initiated/justified (jus ad bellum), nor whether they were justly conducted (jus in bello).
In trying to answer whether the Mozambican conflict, in its tremendous magnitude as a human tragedy but also as a political shift in the southern African socio-political arena, was justified from such a tradition of thought, I hope to have also given a modest and incipient contribution to stimulate such a needed analysis of civil conflicts. I hope that they will not forever remain outside the pale and purview of some sort of ethical framework.
As we have seen in the sections above, the essential criteria of jus ad bellum – just cause, proper authority, right intention and end result – can all be applied to the civil war that shook my country for so long, and its key players. The method is thus justified – but what of the war itself?
Peace appears to be firmly established, with no political violence since 1994. There has been a return to the rule of law, the freedoms of worship, speech and movement. The rights to private ownership, of free enterprise and of where and how to educate one’s children have been restored. Despite all the suffering and grief associated with the 17-year war, there was always hope that some day the principles of freedom, equality and liberty would be attained, and they have.
In the light of the aforementioned sequence of events, I would suggest that under all the circumstances that I have expounded, and particularly according to the criteria of jus ad bellum, the civil war in Mozambique was justified.
Bibliography:

Calvert, Peter ‘Revolution and International Politics’ 2nd. Ed. Cassell Imprint London 1996.
Cabrita, Joao M. ‘Mozambique, the Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Palgrave, Hampshire 2000.
D’Oliveira, John. ‘Vorster the Man’, Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.
Ellis, S. and Tsepo Sechaba ‘Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile’, James Currey, London 1995.
First, Ruth. ‘South West Africa’, Penguin Books Ltd. Middlesex, 1963.
Fordham, Paul. ‘The Geography of African Affairs’, Penguin Books Ltd. Middlesex, 1965.
Gibson, Richard. ‘African Liberation Movements’, Oxford University Press, 1972.
Gunther, John. ‘Inside Africa’, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955.
Hall, Margaret and Tom Young. ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’, Hurst &Co. London, 1997.
Harrison, David. ‘The White Tribe of Africa’, University of California Press Los Angeles, 1981.
Kapchenko, N. et al. ‘Principles of Lenin’s Foreign Policy’, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow 1970.
Mandela, Nelson. ‘Long Walk to Freedom’, BCA London, 1995.
Mondlane, Eduardo. ‘The Struggle for Mozambique’, Penguin Books Ltd. Middlesex, 1969.
Newitt, Malyn. ‘A History of Mozambique’, C. Hurst &Co. London 1995.
Newsum, H.E. and Olayiwola Abergurin. ‘United States Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa’, Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 1987.
Paul, John. ‘Mozambique, Memoirs of a Revolution’, Penguin Books Ltd. Middlesex England, 1975.
Rawls, John. ‘A Theory of Justice’, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Shinola, Hidiaki ‘ Re-Examining Sovereignty’ St. Martins’ Press Inc. New York 2000.
Spinola, Antonio de. ‘Portugal and the Future’, Perskor Publishers, Johannesburg, 1974.
USSR Central Committee. ‘Lenin’s Ideas and Cause are Immortal’, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 1970.
Venter, Al J. ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’, Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.
Valls, Andrew. "Can Terrorism be Justified?" in Andrew Valls, Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. 65-79
Vieira, S., W.G. Maren, I. Wallerstein (eds.) ‘How Fast the Wind? Southern Africa, 1975-2000’, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc, 1992.
Vines, Alex. ‘RENAMO, From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?’, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York 1996.
von Clausewitz, Carl. ‘On War’, Woodsworth Editions Ltd, England 1997.
Waltz, Kenneth N. ‘Man The State and War’, Columbia University Press Chichester England, 2001 (Originally Published in 1959).
Walzer, Michael. ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ Harper Collins Publishers, 1992. (First Published in 1977).