Os Conspiradores na Acusação

"boustani-et.-al.-indictment-ednyredacted"" boustani-et-al.-indictment-ednyredacted "
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JMK: MS A/MEB/M AM/S OD/DFJMK: MS A / MEB / AM / S OD / DF
F. #2016R00695F. # 2016R00695

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTTRIBUNAL DISTRITAL DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.DISTRITO ORIENTAL DE NEW YORK.


-X-X


UNITED STATES OF AMERICAESTADOS UNIDOS DA AMERICA
- against -- contra -
JEANBOUSTANI,JEANBOUSTANI,
_ also known as “Jean Boustany,”_ também conhecido como "Jean Boustany"
MANUEL CHANG.MANUEL CHANG.

ANDREW PEARSE,ANDREW PEARSE,
SURJAN SINGH andSURJAN SINGH e
DETELINA SUBEVA,DETELINA SUBEVA,

FILEDARQUIVADO
IN CLERK'S OFFICEESCRITÓRIO DO CLERO
U.8.U.8. DISTRICT COURT EDMYDIS trito TRIBUNAL EDMY

DEC 192018 A19 de dezembro de 2018 A


BROOKLYN OFFICEESCRITÓRIO DE BROOKLYN

NDICTAIENTNDICTAIENTE

.No..Não.

(T, 18, USC,§§ 371, 981(a)(1)(C),(T, 18, USC, §§ 371, 981 (a) (1) (C),
982(a)(1), 982(a)(2), 982(b)(1), 1349,982 (a) (1), 982 (a) (2), 982 (b) (1), 1349,
1956(h) and 3551 et seq,: T. 21, USC,1956 (h) e 3551 e seguintes, T. 21, USC,
§ 853(p);§ 853 (p); T. 28, USC, § 2461(c))T. 28, USC, § 2461 (c))

Defendants.Réus.

■X■ X

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:O GRANDE JURY CHARGE:

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUÇÃO

At all times relevant to this Indictment, unless otherwise indicated:Em todos os momentos relevantes para esta denúncia, salvo indicação em contrário:

I. The Defendants and Relevant Entities and IndividualsI. Os Réus e Entidades e Pessoas Relevantes

1. The Republic of Mozambique was a sub-Saharan African nation.1. A República de Moçambique era uma nação subsaariana africana.

2. 'Proindicus SA (“Proindicus”), Empresa Mo§ambicana de Atum, SA (“EMATUM”) and Mozambique Asset Management (“MAM”) were companies owned, controlled and overseen by the Government of Mozambique that performed functions that the Government of Mozambique treated as its own, and were thus “instrumentalities” of a foreign government within the meaning of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), Title2. “ Proindicus SA (“ Proindicus ”), Empresa Moçambicana de Atum, SA (“ EMATUM ”) e Moçambique Asset Management (“ MAM ”) eram empresas detidas, controladas e supervisionadas pelo Governo de Moçambique que desempenhavam funções que os O governo de Moçambique tratou como seus próprios, e eram assim “instrumentos” de um governo estrangeiro dentro do significado do Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), título

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15, United States Code, Section 78dd~l(f)(l)(A).15, United States Code, Seção 78dd-l (f) (l) (A). The companies were created to undertake three maritime projects in Mozambique for and on behalf of Mozambique.As empresas foram criadas para realizar três projetos marítimos em Moçambique para e em nome de Moçambique. Proindicus was to perform coastal surveillance, EMATUM was to engage in tuna fishing and MAM was toO Proindicus deveria realizar a vigilância costeira, a EMATUM deveria participar na pesca do atum e a MAM build and maintain shipyards.construir e manter estaleiros.

3, The defendant MANUEL CHANG was a citizen of Mozambique and Mozambique's Minister of Finance, CHANG was thus a “foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(f)(l)(A).3, O réu MANUEL CHANG era um cidadão de Moçambique e ministro das Finanças de Moçambique, CHANG era, portanto, um “funcionário estrangeiro” dentro do significado da FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 78dd-l (f) (l) ( UMA).

6. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was involved in obtaining the Mozambican government's approval of the Proindicus project.6. Co-Conspirador 1 moçambicano, um indivíduo cuja identidade é conhecida pelo Grande Júri, esteve envolvido na obtenção da aprovação do projecto Proindicus pelo governo moçambicano.

7. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 2, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was a relative of a senior official of Mozambique.7. Co-Conspirador 2 moçambicano, um indivíduo cuja identidade é conhecida pelo Grande Júri, era um parente de um alto funcionário de Moçambique.

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8. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was a senior official in Mozambique's Ministry of Finance and a director of EMATUM.8. Co-Conspirador 3 moçambicano, um indivíduo cuja identidade é conhecida pelo Grande Júri, era um alto funcionário do Ministério das Finanças de Moçambique e um director da EMATUM. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3 was thus a “foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(f)(l)(A),O Co-Conspirador 3 moçambicano era assim um “oficial estrangeiro” dentro do significado da FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 78dd-l (f) (l) (A),

9. Privinvest Group was an Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (“UAE”)- based holding company consisting of numerous subsidiaries (collectively, “Privinvest”), including Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL, Abu Dhabi MAR (“ADM”), Logistics International and Palomar Capital Advisors and Palomar Holdings Ltd. (collectively, “Palomar”), On its website, Privinvest described itself as “one of the largest global shipbuilding groups for naval vessels, fuel-cell submarines, supeiyachts, offshore constructions and associated services.”9. O Grupo Privinvest era uma holding baseada em Abu Dhabi, Emirados Árabes Unidos (“EAU”), consistindo de várias subsidiárias (coletivamente, “Privinvest”), incluindo Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL, Abu Dhabi MAR (“ADM”), Logistics International e Palomar Capital Advisors e Palomar Holdings Ltd. (coletivamente, "Palomar"), Em seu site, a Privinvest descreveu-se como "um dos maiores grupos mundiais de construção naval para navios, submarinos de célula de combustível, supersachts, construções offshore e serviços associados".

10. The defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, also known as “Jean Boustany,” (“BOUSTANI”) was a citizen of Lebanon and was the lead salesman and negotiator for Privinvest.10. O réu JEAN BOUSTANI, também conhecido como “Jean Boustany” (“BOUSTANI”) era cidadão do Líbano e era o principal vendedor e negociador da Privinvest.

12. Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was hired by Privinvest to develop business with African nations through connections with African government officials.12. Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1, um indivíduo cuja identidade é conhecida pelo Grande Júri, foi contratado pela Privinvest para desenvolver negócios com nações africanas através de conexões com funcionários do governo africano.

13. Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was a principal executive of Privinvest.13. Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, um indivíduo cuja identidade é conhecida pelo Grande Júri, foi um dos principais executivos da Privinvest.

14. Investment Bank 1, the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, was a global investment banking, securities and investment management firm incorporated14. O Banco de Investimentos 1, cuja identidade é conhecida do Grande Júri, era uma empresa global de investimento bancário, de valores mobiliários e de gestão de investimentos incorporada.
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and headquartered in Europe.e sediada na Europa. It conducted its activities primarily through various subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, “Investment Bank1”).Ela conduziu suas atividades principalmente por meio de várias subsidiárias e afiliadas (coletivamente, “Banco de Investimento 1” ). Investment Bank 1 had a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Title 15, United States Code, Section 78) (the “Exchange Act”) and was required to file reports with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act (Title 15, United States Code, Section 78o(d)).O Investment Bank 1 possuía uma classe de títulos registrados de acordo com a Seção 12 do Securities and Exchange Act de 1934 (Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 78) (o “Exchange Act”) e era obrigada a arquivar relatórios junto aos US Securities and Securities. Exchange Commission (“SEC”) nos termos da Seção 15 (d) do Exchange Act (Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 78o (d)). As such, Investment Bank 1 was an “issuer” as that term is used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd~l(a) and 78m(b).Como tal, o Investment Bank 1 era um "emissor", conforme o termo usado na FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 78dd-l (a) e 78m (b).

15. The defendant ANDREW PEARSE was a citizen of New Zealand and was, until approximately September 13,2013, a managing director of Investment Bank 1 and the head of Investment Bank 1 's Global Financing Group.15. O réu ANDREW PEARSE era cidadão da Nova Zelândia e era, até aproximadamente 13 de setembro de 2013, diretor-gerente do Investment Bank 1 e chefe do Global Financing Group do Investment Bank 1. While employed by Investment Ba nk 1, PEARSE was an “employee” and “agent” of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(a).Enquanto empregado pela Investment Ba nk 1, PEARSE era um “empregado” e “agente” de um “emissor” dentro do significado da FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 78dd-l (a). In or about April 2013, PEARSE also began working for the benefit of Privinvest.Em abril de 2013, o PEARSE também começou a trabalhar em benefício da Privinvest.

16. The defendant SURJAN SINGH was a citizen of the United Kingdom and was, until approximately February 16,2017, amanaging director in Investment Bank 1 5 s Global Financing Group.16. O réu SURJAN SINGH era cidadão do Reino Unido e era, até aproximadamente 16 de fevereiro de 2017, diretor-gerente do Global Financing Group do Investment Bank 1 5 s. While employed by Investment Bank 1, SINGH was an .“employee” and “agent” of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(a).Enquanto empregado pelo Investment Bank 1, SINGH era um “empregado” e “agente” de um “emissor” dentro do significado da FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 78dd-l (a).

17. The defendant DETELINA SUBEVA was a citizen of Bulgaria and was, until approximately August 21,2013, avice president in Investment Bank 1 !17. O réu DETELINA SUBEVA era cidadão da Bulgária e era, até aproximadamente 21 de agosto de 2013, vice-presidente do Investment Bank 1! s Global Financing Group, While employed by Investment Bank 1, SUBEVA was an “employee” and “agent” of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code,s Grupo Global de Financiamento, Embora empregado pelo Investment Bank 1, a SUBEVA era um “funcionário” e “agente” de um “emissor” dentro do significado da FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos,
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Section 78dd-l(a).Seção 78dd-l (a). In or about April 2013, SUBEVA also began working for the benefit ofEm abril de 2013, a SUBEVA também começou a trabalhar para o benefício de
Privinvest.Privinvest.

18. Investment Bank 2, the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, was an international investment bank owned by a foreign government, and had offices in New York, London and elsewhere.18. O Investment Bank 2, cuja identidade é conhecida do Grande Júri, era um banco de investimento internacional de propriedade de um governo estrangeiro e tinha escritórios em Nova York, Londres e outros lugares.

19. The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) was an intergovernmental institution that, until in or about March 2016, provided financial assistance and advice to Mozambique.19. O Fundo Monetário Internacional (“FMI”) era uma instituição intergovernamental que, até março de 2016, prestava assistência financeira e consultoria a Moçambique. To receive such assistance, Mozambique agreed, among other things, to limit its borrowing from private lenders.Para receber tal assistência, Moçambique concordou, entre outras coisas, em limitar seus empréstimos de credores privados.
II.II. Terms and DefinitionsTermos e definições

20. A“security” was, among other things, any note, stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, investment contract or participation in any profit-sharing agreement.20. Uma “garantia” era, entre outras coisas, qualquer nota, ação, obrigação, debênture, evidência de endividamento, contrato de investimento ou participação em qualquer acordo de participação nos lucros.

21. A“syndicated loan” was a loan arranged by one or more banks on behalf of a group of21. Um “empréstimo sindicado” era um empréstimo organizado por um ou mais bancos em nome de um grupo de lenders, referred to as a syndicate, who work together to provide funds for a single borrower.credores, referidos como um sindicato, que trabalham juntos para fornecer fundos para um único devedor. ••

22. A“loan participation note” or “LPN” was a fixed-income security that provided the holder with a pro-rata interest in the borrower's payment of interest and principal.22. Uma “nota de participação de empréstimo” ou “LPN” era um título de renda fixa que oferecia ao detentor um interesse proporcional no pagamento de juros e principal do mutuário.

23. A“Eurobond” was an international bond sold in a currency other than the currency of the borrower.23. Um “Eurobond” era um título internacional vendido em uma moeda diferente da moeda do mutuário.

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III.III The Fraudulent SchemeO esquema fraudulento
A. OverviewA. Visão Geral

24. Through a series of financial transactions between approximately 2013 and 2016, Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM borrowed in excess of $2 billion through loans guaranteed by the Mozambican government.24. Através de uma série de transações financeiras entre aproximadamente 2013 e 2016, a Proindicus, EMATUM e MAM tomaram empréstimos de mais de US $ 2 bilhões através de empréstimos garantidos pelo governo moçambicano. The loans were arranged by Investment Bank 1 and Investment Bank 2 and sold to investors worldwide, including in the United States, Over the course of the transactions, the co-conspirators, among other things, conspired to defraud investors and potential investors in the Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM financings through numerous material misrepresentations and omissions relating to, among other things: (i) the use of loan proceeds, (ii) bribe and kickback payments to Mozambican government officials and bankers, (iii) the amount and maturity dates of debt owed by Mozambique, and (iv) Mozambique's ability and intention to pay back the investors.Os empréstimos foram organizados pelo Investment Bank 1 e pelo Investment Bank 2 e vendidos a investidores em todo o mundo, inclusive nos Estados Unidos. Ao longo das transações, os co-conspiradores, entre outras coisas, conspiraram para fraudar investidores e potenciais investidores no Proindicus. , EMATUM e MAM através de numerosas deturpações e omissões materiais relacionadas, entre outras coisas: (i) a utilização dos recursos do empréstimo, (ii) pagamentos de suborno e propina a oficiais e banqueiros do governo moçambicano, (iii) o montante e datas de vencimento de dívida de Moçambique e (iv) a capacidade e intenção de Moçambique de reembolsar os investidores.

25. Each of the companies entered into contracts with Privinvest to provide equipment and services to complete the maritime projects.25. Cada uma das empresas firmou contratos com a Privinvest para fornecer equipamentos e serviços para completar os projetos marítimos. The loan proceeds were supposed to be used exclusively for the maritime projects, and nearly all of the borrowed money was paid directly to Privinvest, the sole contractor for the projects, to benefit Mozambique and its people.Os recursos do empréstimo deveriam ser usados ​​exclusivamente para os projetos marítimos, e quase todo o dinheiro emprestado foi pago diretamente à Privinvest, a única contratada dos projetos, para beneficiar Moçambique e seu povo. In reality, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI,m|Na realidade, os réus JEAN BOUSTANI, m |

MANUEL CHANG,MANUEL CHANG,

ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, created the maritime projects as fronts to raise money to enrich themselves and intentionally diverted portions of the loan proceeds to pay at least $200 million in bribes and kickbacks to themselves, Mozambican government officials and others.ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, criaram os projetos marítimos como frentes para arrecadar dinheiro para enriquecer e desviaram intencionalmente parte dos recursos do empréstimo para pagar pelo menos US $ 200 milhões em subornos e propinas a si mesmos, funcionários do governo moçambicano e outras.

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26. The co-conspirators applied only a portion of the loan proceeds towards the maritime projects, In furtherance of the scheme, Privinvest charged inflated prices for the equipment and services it provided, which were then used, at least in part, to pay bribes and kickbacks, After conducting little or no business activity, Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM each defaulted on their loans.26. Os co-conspiradores aplicaram apenas uma parte dos recursos do empréstimo para os projetos marítimos. Em conseqüência do esquema, a Privinvest cobrava preços inflacionados pelos equipamentos e serviços fornecidos, que eram então usados, pelo menos em parte, para pagar subornos. e propinas, Depois de realizar pouca ou nenhuma atividade comercial, Proindicus, EMATUM e MAM foram inadimplentes em seus empréstimos.

B. Relevant Internal Accounting Controls of Investment Bank 1 27. The FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(4), 78(b)(5) and 78ff(a) required issuers to maintain a system of sufficient internal accounting controls and made it illegal to nowingly and willfully circumvent such controls.B. Controles Internos Relevantes de Contabilidade do Banco de Investimento 1 27. FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 78m (b) (2) (B), 78m (b) (4), 78 (b) (5) e 78 (a) exigiu que os emissores mantivessem um sistema de controles contábeis internos suficientes e tornassem ilegal neutralizar esses controles.

28. Investment Bank 1 had internal accounting controls (“internal controls”) that addressed, among other things, the prevention of bribery of and by Investment Bank 1 employees;28. O Investment Bank 1 tinha controles contábeis internos (“controles internos”) que abordavam, entre outras coisas, a prevenção de suborno de e por funcionários do Banco de Investimentos 1; the prevention of money laundering and other financial crimes;a prevenção do branqueamento de capitais e outros crimes financeiros; conflicts of interests;conflitos de interesses; outside employment;emprego externo; and the use of intermediaries in financial transactions, Investment Bank 1 's compliance department exercised primary responsibility for overseeing and enforcing Investment Bank 1 's internal controls.e o uso de intermediários em transações financeiras, o departamento de compliance do Investment Bank 1 exerceu a responsabilidade primária de supervisionar e fazer cumprir os controles internos do Investment Bank 1.
29. Wi thin Investment Bank 1, the group of investment bankers assigned to a specific transaction was called the “deal team.” The defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA were part of the deal team on the Proindicus proj ect and SINGH was a member of the deal team on the EMATUM proj ect.29. O Banco de Investimento Wi thin 1, o grupo de banqueiros de investimento designados para uma transação específica, era chamado de “equipe de negociação”. Os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA faziam parte da equipe de negócios no projeto Proindicus e SINGH era um membro da equipe de negócios no projeto EMATUM. They received regular training on Investment Bank 1 5 s internal controls and were also aware of those internal controls through their involvement in numerous transactions.Eles receberam treinamento regular sobre os controles internos do Banco de Investimentos e também estavam cientes desses controles internos por meio de seu envolvimento em inúmeras transações.

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C. The Proindicus ProjectC. O Projeto Proindicus

30. On or about January 18, 2013, Privinvest entered into a $366 million contract with Proindicus to supply materials and training to protect Mozambique's territorial waters.30. Por volta de 18 de janeiro de 2013, a Privinvest celebrou um contrato de US $ 366 milhões com a Proindicus para fornecer materiais e treinamento para proteger as águas territoriais de Moçambique. On or about February 28, 2013, pursuant to a written loan agreement, Investment Bank 1 agreed to arrange a $372 million syndicated loan to Proindicus, guaranteed by the Republic of Mozambique (the “Proindicus Loan”).Por volta de 28 de fevereiro de 2013, de acordo com um contrato de empréstimo por escrito, o Investment Bank 1 concordou em fazer um empréstimo sindicalizado de US $ 372 milhões ao Proindicus, garantido pela República de Moçambique (o “Empréstimo Proindicus”). The defendant SURJAN SINGH signedO réu SURJAN SINGH assinado
the loan agreement on behalf of Investment Bank 1,o contrato de empréstimo em nome do Investment Bank 1,

^^^^SBco-sigired on behalf of Proindicus and the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee for the loan on behalf of Mozambique, Between approximately June and August 2013, Investment Bank 1 increased the Proindicus Loan by approximately $132 million.A SBco assinou em nome do Proindicus e o réu MANUEL CHANG assinou a garantia do governo para o empréstimo em nome de Moçambique. Entre aproximadamente junho e agosto de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 aumentou o Empréstimo Proindicus em aproximadamente US $ 132 milhões. On or about November 15, 2013, Investment Bank 2 further increased the Proindicus Loan by $118 million, bringing the total loaned amount to $622 million.Por volta de 15 de novembro de 2013, o Investment Bank 2 aumentou ainda mais o Empréstimo Proindicus em US $ 118 milhões, elevando o total do empréstimo a US $ 622 milhões.

Proindicus never conducted significant operations or generated significant revenue and defaulted on its loan payment due on or about March 21, 2017.A Proindicus nunca realizou operações significativas ou gerou receita significativa e não cumpriu o pagamento do empréstimo em 21 de março de 2017.
(1) Brib ery of Mozambican Government Offi cials to Gain Approval for the(1) Suborno de funcionários do Governo moçambicano para obter aprovação para o
Proindicus ProjectProjeto Proindicus

31. Beginning in or about 2011, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, through withHHHH^^^^IHHBI arr ang & db Y Privinvest Co- Conspirator 1, attempted to persuade Mozambican government officials to establish a coastal monitoring system through a contract with Privinvest, Almost immediately, BOUSTANI and^^^^Jj^^regotiated the first round of bribe and kickback payments that Privinvest would have to make for the benefit of Mozambican government officials for the31. A partir de 2011, o arguido JEAN BOUSTANI, por intermédio do HHHH ^^^^ IHHBI e do Y Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1, tentou convencer os funcionários do governo moçambicano a estabelecer um sistema de monitorização costeira através de um contrato com a Privinvest, quase imediatamente, BOUSTANI e ^^^^ Jj ^^ regataram a primeira rodada de pagamentos de suborno e propinas que a Privinvest teria que fazer em benefício dos funcionários do governo moçambicano para o
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project to be approved.projeto a ser aprovado. For example, in furtherance of the scheme, BOUSTANI, and other co-conspirators had the following discussions:Por exemplo, no avanço do esquema, BOUSTANI e outros co-conspiradores tiveram as seguintes discussões:
(a) On or about November 11,2011,wrote to BOUSTANI by email, stating: “To secure that the project is granted a go-ahead by the HoS [Head of State], a payment has to be agreed before we get there, so that we know and agree, well in advance, what ought to be paid and when, Whatever advance payments to be paid before the project, they can be built in the project, and recovered.”(a) Por volta de novembro 11.2011, w rote para Boustani por e-mail, afirmando: “Para garantir que o projeto seja concedido um aval por HOS [Chefe de Estado], o pagamento tem de ser acordado antes de chegarmos lá, para que nós saibamos e concordemos, com antecedência, sobre o que deve ser pago e quando, Quaisquer adiantamentos a serem pagos antes do projeto, eles podem ser construídos no projeto e recuperados ”.
(b) Later on or about the same day, November 11, 2011,(b) Mais tarde ou aproximadamente no mesmo dia, 11 de novembro de 2011,
>y email, stating: “A very important issue which BOUSTANI wrote to needs to be clear: we had various negative experiences in Africa.> y email, afirmando: “Uma questão muito importante para a qual BOUSTANI escreveu precisa ser clara: tivemos várias experiências negativas na África. Especially related to the 'success fees' payments.Especialmente relacionado aos pagamentos das taxas de sucesso. Therefore, we have a strict policy in the Group consisting of not disbursing any 'success fee' before the signature of the Project Contract.” responded (c) On or about November 14, 2011 by email to BOUSTANI, stating: “Fabulous, I agree with you in principle.Portanto, temos uma política rígida no Grupo que consiste em não desembolsar qualquer 'taxa de sucesso' antes da assinatura do Contrato do Projeto. ”Respondeu (c) Em 14 de novembro de 2011 ou por e-mail ao BOUSTANI, declarando:“ Fabuloso, eu concordo com você em princípio. Let us agree and look at project in two distinct moments, One moment is to massage the system and get the political will to go ahead with the project.Vamos concordar e olhar para o projeto em dois momentos distintos. Um momento é massagear o sistema e obter a vontade política de avançar com o projeto. The second moment is the project implementation/execution.O segundo momento é a implementação / execução do projeto. I agree with you that any monies can only be paid after the project signing.Eu concordo com você que qualquer dinheiro só pode ser pago após a assinatura do projeto. This has to be treated separately from the project implementation .Isso deve ser tratado separadamente da implementação do projeto. .. Because for the project implementation there will be other players whose interest will have to be looked after eg ministry of defense, ministry of interior, air force, etc.... in democratic governments like ours people come and go, and everyone involved will want to have his/her share of the deal while in office, because once out of the office it will be difficult, So, it is.. Porque para a implementação do projeto haverá outros atores cujo interesse terá que ser cuidado, por exemplo, Ministério da Defesa, Ministério do Interior, Força Aérea, etc ... em governos democráticos como o nosso povo vem e vai, e todos os envolvidos vai querer ter a sua parte do negócio, enquanto no escritório, porque uma vez fora do escritório será difícil, Então, é

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important that the contract signing success fee be agreed and paid in once-off, upon theimportante que a taxa de sucesso de assinatura do contrato seja acordada e paga de uma só vez, signing of the contract.”assinatura do contrato. ”

32. Soon thereafter, during an email exchange on or about December 28, 2011, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI to $50 million in bribe and kickback payments to Mozambican government officials and $12 million in kickbacks for Privinvest co-conspirators.32. Pouco tempo depois, durante uma troca de e-mail em 28 de dezembro de 2011, os réus JEAN BOUSTANI pagaram US $ 50 milhões em subornos e propinas a funcionários do governo moçambicano e US $ 12 milhões em propinas para co-conspiradores da Privinvest. For example;Por exemplo;
(a) On or about December 28,2011, inresponse to an email from BOUSTANI requesting a bribe and kickback figure,wrote;(a) Por volta de 28 de dezembro de 2011, em resposta a um e-mail do BOUSTANI solicitando um valor de suborno e propina, escreveu; “Fine brother.“Bom irmão. I have consulted and please put 50 million chickens.Eu consultei e por favor coloque 50 milhões de frangos. Whatever numbers you have on your poultry I will add 50 million of my breed,”Quaisquer que sejam os números que você tenha em suas aves, adicionarei 50 milhões da minha raça ”

(b) On or about the same day, BOUSTANI forwarded this email to Privinvest personnel, stating, “50M for them and 12M for [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1] (5%) —> total of 62M on top,” 33. After more than a year of negotiations, on or about January 18,2013, Privinvest and Proindicus signed a $366 million contract for Privinvest to provide a coastal monitoring system to Mozambique.(b) No mesmo dia, BOUSTANI encaminhou este e-mail ao pessoal da Privinvest, informando: “50M para eles e 12M para [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1] (5%) -> total de 62M no topo,” 33. Depois Mais de um ano de negociações, em ou sobre 18 de janeiro de 2013, a Privinvest e a Proindicus assinaram um contrato de US $ 366 milhões para a Privinvest fornecer um sistema de monitoramento costeiro para Moçambique. Five days later, on or about January 23,2013, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI instructed a bank in the UAE to make payments to and Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1. The instructions ordered the bank, in relevant part: “Upon receipt by Privinvest Shipbuilding of a minimum amount of US$ 317,000,000 ... to pay immediately;Cinco dias depois, por volta de 23 de janeiro de 2013, o réu JEAN BOUSTANI instruiu um banco nos Emirados Árabes Unidos a fazer pagamentos ao membro da coalizão moçambicana 1. As instruções ordenaram ao banco, na parte relevante: “Após a recepção pela Privinvest Shipbuilding of um valor mínimo de US $ 317.000.000 ... para pagar imediatamente; a.uma. jm||m||the sum of US$ 5,100,000 ... and b.jm || m || a quantia de US $ 5,100,000 ... e b. [Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1] the sum of US$5,100,000.”The instructions also ordered the bank to pay ^^^^^^^^Hand Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1 an additional approximately $3.4 million each at later dates.[Co-Conspirador de Moçambique 1] a quantia de US $ 5.100.000. ” As instruções também ordenaram ao banco que pagasse aproximadamente US $ 3,4 milhões em datas posteriores.

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(2) Bribery to Gain Mozambique's Government Guarantee for the Proindicus Financing(2) Suborno para obter a garantia do governo de Moçambique para o Financiamento Proindicus

34. At the same time as the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and r ere negotiating bribe payments to cause Mozambican government officials to approve the Proindicus project, BOUSTANI recruited Investment Bank 1 to arrange financing for the project.34. Ao mesmo tempo que os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI e estavam a negociar pagamentos de suborno para fazer com que funcionários do governo moçambicano aprovassem o projecto Proindicus, o BOUSTANI recrutou o Investment Bank 1 para arranjar financiamento para o projecto. During negotiations, bankers at Investment Bank 1 made clear that Investment Bank 1 would only arrange a loan that was at or near market interest rates, with debt that was either directly issued by the Government of Mozambique or guaranteed by the government.Durante as negociações, os banqueiros do Investment Bank 1 deixaram claro que o Investment Bank 1 só conseguiria um empréstimo que estivesse próximo das taxas de juro do mercado, com uma dívida que fosse diretamente emitida pelo Governo de Moçambique ou garantida pelo governo.

35. To further negotiations on the Proindicus project, on or about September 13, 2012, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE traveled to the UAE to meet with the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and ^j|^^^mm||and a close relative of a senior Mozambican government official, among others.35. Para continuar as negociações sobre o projeto Proindicus, em 13 de setembro de 2012 ou por volta dessa data, o réu ANDREW PEARSE viajou para os Emirados Árabes Unidos para se encontrar com os réus JEAN BOUSTANI e um parente próximo de um veterano. Funcionário do governo moçambicano, entre outros.

36. To help obtain Mozambique ' s agreement to Investment B anlc1 's terms, including that any loan be at or near market rates and guaranteed by the Mozambican government, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and|^^H^H^^^m||^m||||enlisted the defendant MANUEL CHANG, Mozambique's Minister of Finance.36. Para ajudar a obter o acordo de Moçambique para os termos do Investimento B 1 , incluindo que qualquer empréstimo seja igual ou próximo das taxas de mercado e garantido pelo governo moçambicano, os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI e. ^^ H ^ H ^^^ m |||||||| alistou o arguido MANUEL CHANG, Ministro das Finanças de Moçambique. On or about December 22, 2012, CHANG wrote a letter to Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, which was forwarded to an employee of Investment Bank 1 (“Investment Bank 1 Employee1”), an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, explaining that “the financing of this project is still constrained by the IMF imposed limitation on the Government for Mozambique to accept commercial credit for commercial projects.Por volta de 22 de dezembro de 2012, CHANG escreveu uma carta à Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, que foi encaminhada a um funcionário do Investment Bank 1 (“Investment Bank 1 Employee 1” ), uma pessoa cuja identidade é conhecida do Grande Júri, explicando que “o financiamento deste projeto ainda é limitado pela limitação imposta pelo FMI ao Governo de Moçambique para aceitar crédito comercial para projetos comerciais. Therefore, we have devised an alternative solution whereby an SPY [Special Purpose Vehicle]... will be formed.”Portanto, planejamos uma solução alternativa pela qual um SPY [Special Purpose Vehicle] [Veículo de Propósito Específico] será formado. ”


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37. On or about December 26, 2012, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI sent an email P re P ara ^ on a meeting Mozambique between employees of Investment Bank 1, Privinvest and Proindicus to negotiate the terms of the transaction.37. Em 26 de dezembro de 2012 ou por volta dessa data, o réu JEAN BOUSTANI enviou um e-mail P re P ara em uma reunião em Moçambique entre os funcionários do Investment Bank 1, Privinvest e Proindicus para negociar os termos da transação. In the email, BOUSTANI emphasized: “But the only imperative matter for [Investment Bank 1] bro is [the defendant MANUEL CHANG's] signature of the guarantee for the loan.”No e-mail, BOUSTANI enfatizou: “Mas a única questão imperativa para o [Banco de Investimento 1] bro é [a assinatura do réu do MANUEL CHANG] de garantia para o empréstimo.”

38. On or about February 28, 2013, the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the guarantee for the Proindicus Loan.38. Em ou sobre 28 de fevereiro de 2013, o réu MANUEL CHANG assinou a garantia para o Empréstimo Proindicus. In or about and between October 2013 and December 2013, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI andalong with others, paid at least $5 million in bribe and kickback payments for the benefit of CHANG from a bank account in the UAE, through the United States, to a bank account in Spain.Em outubro de 2013 e dezembro de 2013, os acusados ​​JEAN BOUSTANI e outros pagaram pelo menos US $ 5 milhões em pagamentos de suborno e propina para o benefício de CHANG de uma conta bancária nos Emirados Árabes Unidos, através dos Estados Unidos, para um banco conta em Espanha.

(3) Conspiracy to Circumvent Investment Bank 1 's Internal Controls and Win Business for Investment Bank1 inConnection with the Proindicus Project.(3) Conspiracy to Circumvent Investment 1's Internal Controls and Win Business para Investment Bank 1 em conexão com o Proindicus Project. Including Paving Bribes to Mozambican Government OfficialsIncluindo subornos de pavimentação para funcionários do governo moçambicano

39. While negotiations over the Proindicus financings proceeded in 2012 and early 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, conspired to circumvent Investment Bank l's internal controls to enrich themselves and win the Proindicus business for Investment Bank 1, including through the payment of bribes to Mozambican government officials.39. Enquanto as negociações sobre os financiamentos do Proindicus prosseguiram em 2012 e início de 2013, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, conspiraram para contornar os controles internos do Investment Bank para enriquecer e ganhar o negócio do Proindicus para Investment Bank 1 , inclusive através do pagamento de subornos a funcionários do governo moçambicano. At the time, PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA were agents acting within the scope of their employment on behalf of Investment Bank 1, with the intent, at least in part, to benefit Investment Bank 1.Na época, PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA eram agentes que atuavam no âmbito do seu emprego em nome do Investment Bank 1, com a intenção, pelo menos em parte, de beneficiar o Investment Bank 1.

40. Investment Bank 1 's internal controls required employees, including the compliance department and the deal team, to evaluate the potential for corruption related to the Proindicus project and the Mozambican government officials who would be involved40. Os controles internos do Banco de Investimento 1 exigiam que os funcionários, incluindo o departamento de conformidade e a equipe de negociação, avaliassem o potencial de corrupção relacionado ao projeto Proindicus e os funcionários do governo moçambicano que estariam envolvidos.
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in running it, Investment Bank 1's review process identified certain red flags concerning the proposed Proindicus transaction at an early stage, On or about March 9,2012, in response to a question from Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 as to whether there was a competitive bidding process that resulted in Privinvest being selected, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI replied by email, copying the defendant SURJAN SINGH, that the selection of Privinvest had not resulted from a competitive bid and that the deal had come about due to “high level connections” between Privinvest and the Mozambican government,Ao executá-lo, o processo de revisão do Investment Bank 1 identificou alguns sinais de alerta sobre a transação Proindicus proposta em um estágio inicial, em ou por volta de 9 de março de 2012, em resposta a uma pergunta do Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 sobre se havia um lance competitivo processo que resultou na escolha da Privinvest, o réu JEAN BOUSTANI respondeu por e-mail, copiando o réu SURJAN SINGH, que a seleção da Privinvest não resultou de uma oferta competitiva e que o negócio surgiu devido a “conexões de alto nível” entre a Privinvest. e o governo moçambicano,

41, Inor about March2012, inanticipation of arranging financing for the Proindicus project, Investment Bank 1 employees began conducting due diligence, or research, on the parties involved in the project.41, Em ou por volta de março de 2012, em antecipação à obtenção de financiamento para o projeto Proindicus, os funcionários do Investment Bank 1 começaram a realizar due diligence, ou pesquisa, sobre as partes envolvidas no projeto. Accordingly, as early as approximately March 12, 2012, Investment Bank 1 employees identified allegations of corruption associated with Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2. On that day, Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 reported to his superior and the defendant SURJAN SINGH that Investment Bank 1 had previously designated Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2 as “an undesirable client, Furthermore, on or about March 13, 2012, Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 began collecting approximately 10 news articles containing potentially derogatory information regarding Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, and exchanged emails with SINGH regarding the information and articles.Da mesma forma, aproximadamente em 12 de março de 2012, funcionários do Investment Bank 1 identificaram alegações de corrupção associadas à Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2. Naquele dia, o Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 relatou ao seu superior e ao réu SURJAN SINGH que o Investment Bank 1 anteriormente designado Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2 como “um cliente indesejável, Além disso, em 13 de março de 2012, o Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 começou a coletar aproximadamente 10 notícias contendo informações potencialmente depreciativas sobre o Privinvest Co- Conspirator 2 e trocou e-mails com SINGH sobre as informações e artigos.

42. Notwithstanding the existence of such red flags, while conducting due diligence on the Proindicus transaction as required by Investment Bank l's internal controls, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA withheld information about the likelihood of corruption connected to the Proindicus transaction from Investment Bank 1 's compliance department.42. Apesar da existência de tais bandeiras vermelhas, enquanto conduziam a devida diligência na transação da Proindicus conforme exigido pelos controles internos do Banco de Investimento, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA retiveram informações sobre a probabilidade de corrupção relacionada à transação da Proindicus. Departamento de Compliance do Investment Bank 1. For instance, in or about November 2012, at the direction of the head of Investment Bank l's compliance department, members of thePor exemplo, em novembro de 2012 ou por volta de novembro de 2012, sob a direção do chefe do departamento de conformidade do Banco de Investimento, os membros do
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Proindicus deal team consulted with a senior executive for Investment Bank 1 *s Europe,A equipe de negócios da Proindicus consultou um executivo sênior da Investment Bank 1 * s Europe, Middle East and Africa (“EMEA”) region (the “EMEA Executive”), an individual whoseOriente Médio e África (“EMEA”) (o “Executivo da EMEA”), um indivíduo cuja identity is known to the Grand Jury, regarding any legal or reputational concerns that theidentidade é do conhecimento do Grande Júri, em relação a quaisquer preocupações legais ou reputacionais Proindicus transaction might raise for the hank.Transação Proindicus pode aumentar para o hank. On or about November 19,2012, PEARSE summarized those discussions in an email he sent to Investment Bank 1 Employee 1, writing that the EMEA Executive “said no to the combination of Mozambique] and your friend [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2], so we need to structure him out of the picture.” Similarly, Investment Bank 1 maintained a report in its due diligence files describing Privinvest Co- Conspirator 2 as a “master of kickbacks,” Despite such information, PEARSE, SINGH and Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 all failed to relay the EMEA Executive's concerns to Investment Bank l's compliance department, and the compliance department failed to pursue its inquiiy further.Por volta de 19 de novembro de 2012, PEARSE resumiu essas discussões em um e-mail que enviou ao Investment Bank 1 Employee 1, escrevendo que o Executivo da EMEA “disse não à combinação de Moçambique” e seu amigo [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2], então precisamos estruturá-lo fora do quadro ”. Da mesma forma, o Investment Bank 1 manteve um relatório em seus arquivos de due diligence descrevendo o Co-Conspirador 2 da Privinvest como um“ mestre de propinas ”, apesar dessas informações, PEARSE, SINGH e Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 todos falharam em transmitir as preocupações do Executivo da EMEA ao departamento de conformidade do Investment Bank, e o departamento de conformidade não prosseguiu com as suas investigações.

43. Furthermore, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA conspired to withhold from Investment Bank 1 's compliance department that Privinvest and Proindicus sought to appoint an individual in Mozambique who had previously been involved in fraudulent conduct to Proindicus's Board of Directors.43. Além disso, os acusados ​​ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA conspiraram para reter do departamento de conformidade do Investment Bank 1 que a Privinvest e a Proindicus procuravam nomear um indivíduo em Moçambique que anteriormente tinha estado envolvido em conduta fraudulenta ao Conselho de Administração do Proindicus. Specifically, even though Investment Bank 1 compliance personnel were responsible for choosing an external firm to perform due diligence on Proindicus's officers and directors, in or about February 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, DETELINA SUBEVA and SURJAN SINGH secretly selected a due diligence firm (“Due Diligence Firm1”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, to research the transaction and pre-screen the individuals identified as directors of Proindicus to secure approval by Investment Bank 1 compliance personnel.Especificamente, embora o pessoal de conformidade do Investment Bank 1 fosse responsável pela escolha de uma firma externa para realizar due diligence nos executivos e diretores da Proindicus, em fevereiro de 2013, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, DETELINA SUBEVA e SURJAN SINGH selecionaram secretamente uma empresa de due diligence (“ Due Diligence Firm 1 ” ), cuja identidade é conhecida do Grande Júri, para pesquisar a transação e pré-selecionar os indivíduos identificados como diretores do Proindicus para garantir a aprovação pelo pessoal de conformidade do Investment Bank 1.

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44. Inor around February 2013, Due Diligence Firm 1 reported to the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA that one of the proposed directors of Proindicus had previously been involved in fraudulent conduct while he was an officer of a Mozambican state-owned company.44. Em Fevereiro de 2013 ou por volta desta data, a Due Diligence Firm 1 reportou aos arguidos ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA que um dos directores propostos da Proindicus tinha estado previamente envolvido em conduta fraudulenta enquanto era funcionário de uma empresa estatal moçambicana. empresa. PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA did not share this information with Investment Bank l's compliance department.PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA não compartilharam essas informações com o departamento de conformidade do Investment Bank. Instead, PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA obtained a replacement group of directors, which included from ^ v * nvest Proindicus Due Diligence Firm 1 for a background investigation on them.Em vez disso, PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA obtiveram um grupo substituto de diretores, que incluiu a partir da vencedora da Proindicus Due Diligence Firm 1 para uma investigação de fundo sobre eles. Due Diligence Firm 1 reported fewer red flags related to the second group of directors.A Due Diligence Firm 1 relatou menos bandeiras vermelhas relacionadas ao segundo grupo de diretores.

45. On or about February 26,2013, having pre-cleared the second group of Proindicus directors and without revealing that two separate groups of directors had been researched, the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA forwarded the names of the second group of proposed directors to Investment Bank l's compliance department for due diligence by the firm that the compliance department had selected (“Due Diligence Firm2”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury.45. Em ou por volta de 26 de fevereiro de 2013, tendo pré-autorizado o segundo grupo de diretores do Proindicus e sem revelar que dois grupos separados de diretores haviam sido pesquisados, o réu DETELINA SUBEVA encaminhou os nomes do segundo grupo de diretores propostos para o Investment Bank. l departamento de conformidade para a devida diligência pela firma que o departamento de conformidade havia selecionado (“Due Diligence Firm 2” ), cuja identidade é do conhecimento do Grande Júri. After reviewing a report from Due Diligence Firm 2, the compliance department approved the new group of directors.Depois de analisar um relatório da Due Diligence Firm 2, o departamento de conformidade aprovou o novo grupo de diretores.

(4) Conspiracy to Remove or Modify Conditions on the Proindicus Loan that Had Been Consistent with Investment Bank 1 *s Internal Controls(4) Conspiração para Remover ou Modificar Condições do Empréstimo Proindicus Consistente com os Controles Internos do Banco de Investimento 1 * s

46. As part of its system of internal controls, Investment Bank 1 imposed conditions that Mozambique would have to meet to receive a loan.46. ​​Como parte do seu sistema de controlos internos, o Banco de Investimento 1 impôs condições que Moçambique teria que cumprir para receber um empréstimo. Some of those conditions, however, earned a risk of exposing the existence of the Proindicus project to the Mozambican public and members of Mozambique's government beyond the circle of government officials who were part of the fraudulent scheme.Algumas dessas condições, no entanto, correram o risco de expor a existência do projecto Proindicus ao público moçambicano e membros do governo de Moçambique para além do círculo de funcionários do governo que faziam parte do esquema fraudulento. To conceal the fraudulentPara esconder o fraudulento
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scheme, avoid scrutiny and help win business for Investment Bank 1, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others,esquema, evitar o escrutínio e ajudar a ganhar negócios para o Investment Bank 1, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, removed some of Investment Bank 1 's conditions for the Proindicus Loan.removeu algumas condições do Investment Bank 1 para o Empréstimo Proindicus.

47, For example, Investment Bank 1 originally had required Proindicus to provide an opinion from the Attorney General of Mozambique concerning the validity of the government guarantee.47, Por exemplo, o Banco de Investimentos 1 originalmente exigira que o Proindicus fornecesse uma opinião do Procurador Geral de Moçambique sobre a validade da garantia do governo. On or about February 18, 2013, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, on behalf of both Privinvest and Mozambique, strenuously objected, explaining to the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA in an email: “[T]he attorney general opinion is not mandatory , , .Por volta de 18 de fevereiro de 2013, o réu JEAN BOUSTANI, em nome da Privinvest e de Moçambique, objetou vigorosamente, explicando ao réu DETELINA SUBEVA em um e-mail: “A opinião do procurador geral não é obrigatória,. I believe that this will not be accepted by Proindicus since its owner wanted to bypass public tender and normal bureaucratic procedures from day 1 by creating a private entity!!Acredito que isso não será aceito pela Proindicus, já que seu dono queria contornar procedimentos burocráticos públicos e normais desde o primeiro dia, criando uma entidade privada !! So they will never accept to inform the attorney general!!Então eles nunca aceitarão informar o procurador geral !! The [Minister of Finance] guarantee is legally covered by a presidential decree,” On or before February 28, 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and SUBEVA, together with others, ultimately removed the requirement from the conditions Investment Bank 1 had imposed.A garantia da [Ministra das Finanças] é legalmente coberta por um decreto presidencial ”Em 28 de fevereiro de 2013 ou antes, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, acabaram removendo a exigência das condições impostas pelo Banco de Investimentos 1. .

48. S imilar ly, on or about February 25, 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURTAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, removed Investment Bank 1 's condition that Mozambique inform the IMF of the loan.48. De igual modo, por volta de 25 de Fevereiro de 2013, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURTAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, removeram a condição do Banco de Investimento 1 de que Moçambique informasse o FMI do empréstimo. PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA replaced that condition with the less stringent requirement that Mozambique represent to investors “that they [were] in compliance with their IMF and World Bank obligations.” In fact, the IMF was not informed of the Proindicus Loan at the time of the transaction.PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA substituíram essa condição pelo requisito menos rigoroso que Moçambique representa para os investidores “de que estavam em conformidade com as obrigações do FMI e do Banco Mundial”. Na verdade, o FMI não foi informado do Empréstimo Proindicus na época. da transação. Indeed, the IMF learned of the transaction only in or about 2016,De fato, o FMI soube da transação apenas em ou por volta de 2016,


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when its exposure contributed to the IMF's decision to ceaseproviding aid and financing toMozambique and caused a severe financial crisis in Mozambique.quando a sua exposição contribuiu para a decisão do FMI de deixar de fornecer ajuda e financiamento a Moçambique e causou uma grave crise financeira em Moçambique.

(5) The Froindicus Loan and Recruiting of Investors in the United States(5) O Empréstimo Froindicus e Recrutamento de Investidores nos Estados Unidos

49. After Investment Bank 1 's compliance department approved the transaction on or about March 20,2013, Investment Bank 1 agreed to arrange a $372 million syndicated loan to Proindicus, guaranteed by the Republic of Mozambique, pursuant to a written loan agreement.49. Depois que o departamento de conformidade do Investment Bank 1 aprovou a transação em 20 de março de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 concordou em fazer um empréstimo sindicalizado de US $ 372 milhões ao Proindicus, garantido pela República de Moçambique, conforme um contrato de empréstimo por escrito. The defendant SURJAN SINGH signed the loan agreement on Bank l,H^^^^^^UH^H^^H||^o-signed of Proindicus and the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee on behalf of Mozambique.O réu SURJAN SINGH assinou o contrato de empréstimo no Banco Mundial, assinou o Proindicus e o réu MANUEL CHANG assinou a garantia do governo em nome de Moçambique.

50. The Proindicus loan agreement provided that all payments by the borrower or the lenders would be paid to Investment Bank 1 's bank account at a New York City-based financial institution (“New York City Bank1”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury.50. O contrato de empréstimo Proindicus previa que todos os pagamentos feitos pelo mutuário ou pelos credores seriam pagos à conta bancária do Investment Bank 1 em uma instituição financeira sediada em Nova York (“New York City Bank 1” ), cuja identidade é conhecido pelo Grande Júri. The loan agreement also required Proindicus to “apply all amounts borrowed by it under the Facility towards the financing of the Project.” Furthermore, the loan agreement prohibited improper payments in connection with the Proindicus project, including payments that would violate the FCPA, the United Kingdom's Bribery Act (“UK Bribery Act”) and the Mozambican Anti-Corruption Law.O contrato de empréstimo também exigia que o Proindicus “aplicasse todos os montantes emprestados por ele no Mecanismo ao financiamento do Projeto”. Além disso, o contrato de empréstimo proibia pagamentos indevidos relacionados ao projeto Proindicus, incluindo pagamentos que violassem a FCPA, os Estados Unidos. Lei de Suborno do Reino Unido (“UK Bribery Act”) e a Lei Anticorrupção de Moçambique.

51. On or about March 21, 2013, Investment Bank 1 transferred the entire proceeds of the loan, less fees totaling approximately $44 million, through a bank account at New York City Bank 1, directly to a bank account held by Privinvest at a bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE (“UAE Bank1”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury.51. Em ou por volta de 21 de março de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 transferiu todo o produto do empréstimo, menos as taxas totalizando aproximadamente US $ 44 milhões, através de uma conta bancária no New York City Bank 1, diretamente para uma conta bancária mantida pela Privinvest em um banco. em Abu Dhabi, Emirados Árabes Unidos (“UAE Bank 1” ), cuja identidade é conhecida do Grande Júri. Investment Bank 1 immediately solicited United States-based investors to participate in the loan, in part byO Investment Bank 1 solicitou imediatamente aos investidores dos Estados Unidos que participassem do empréstimo, em parte

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sending them electronically, among other things, the Proindicns loan agreement and a confidential information memorandum that summarized its terms.enviando-os eletronicamente, entre outras coisas, o contrato de empréstimo do Proindicns e um memorando de informações confidenciais que resumia seus termos.

(6) Proindicus Loan Increase and Bribe and Kickback Payments to PEARSE and SUBEVA(6) Aumento do empréstimo do Proindicus e pagamentos de suborno e propinas para PEARSE e SUBEVA

52. On or about March 28, 2013, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE notified the defendants SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA and others at Investment Bank 1 that Proindicus sought to borrow an additional $250 million from Investment Bank 1.52. Em 28 de março de 2013 ou por volta dessa data, o réu ANDREW PEARSE notificou os réus SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA e outros no Investment Bank 1 que a Proindicus solicitou um empréstimo adicional de US $ 250 milhões do Investment Bank 1.

53. On or about June 13, 2013, the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed, on behalf of Mozambique, a government guarantee for an additional $250 million in borrowing by Proindicus.53. Em 13 de junho de 2013 ou por volta dessa data, o réu MANUEL CHANG assinou, em nome de Moçambique, uma garantia do governo para um adicional de US $ 250 milhões em empréstimos feitos pela Proindicus. One day later, on or about June 14, 2013, Investment Bank 1 and Proindicus amended their loan agreement to permit Proindicus to borrow up to an additional $250 million from Investment Bank 1.Um dia depois, por volta de 14 de junho de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 e Proindicus alteraram seu contrato de empréstimo para permitir que o Proindicus emprestasse até um adicional de US $ 250 milhões do Investment Bank 1.

54. Even though Proindicus had conducted no operations, on or about June 23,2013, Investment Bank l's Credit Risk Management team agreed to loan an additional $100 million to Proindicus based on a memorandum written by the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, representing that Privinvest required additional equipment.54. Embora a Proindicus não tenha realizado operações, em ou perto de 23 de junho de 2013, a equipe de Gestão de Risco de Crédito do Investment Bank concordou em emprestar US $ 100 milhões adicionais ao Proindicus com base em um memorando escrito pelos réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA , juntamente com outros, representando que a Privinvest exigia equipamentos adicionais.

55. On or about June 25, 2013, Investment Bank 1 wired approximately $100 milli on less its fees through New York City Bank 1 to a Privinvest account at UAE Bank 1. Investment Bank 1 marketed and sold portions of the debt to investors, including to an investor in the United States.55. Em ou perto de 25 de junho de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 transferiu cerca de US $ 100 milhões menos suas taxas através do New York City Bank 1 para uma conta da Privinvest no UAE Bank 1. O Investment Bank 1 comercializou e vendeu parte da dívida para investidores, incluindo para um investidor nos Estados Unidos.

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56. Throughout 2013 and 2014, using loan proceeds, Privinvest made numerous kickback payments to the defendant ANDREW PEARSE.56. Ao longo de 2013 e 2014, usando os recursos do empréstimo, a Privinvest fez vários pagamentos de propina para o réu ANDREW PEARSE. On or about April 15, 2013, PEARSE opened a bank account at a bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE (“UAE Bank2”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury.Por volta de 15 de abril de 2013, o PEARSE abriu uma conta bancária em um banco em Abu Dhabi, Emirados Árabes Unidos (“UAE Bank 2” ), cuja identidade é conhecida do Grande Júri. Depois que o PEARSE abriu a conta, a Privinvest pagou pagamentos de suborno e propina de mais de US $ 45 milhões das contas do UAE Bank 1 para a conta do PEARSE nos Emirados Árabes Unidos 2. Cada pagamento foi denominado em dólares dos Estados Unidos e cada um foi encaminhado e concluído por meio das contas bancárias correspondentes dos bancos dos Emirados Árabes Unidos em Nova York e passou pelo Distrito Leste de Nova York, da seguinte forma:


Encontro

Montante

Instrução de fio
23 de abril de 2013 US $ 2.500.000 “parcial parcial no contrato de consultoria” 26 de maio de 2013

$ 1,000,000 “parcial parcial no contrato de consultoria”

26 de junho de 2013: US $ 1.000.000, “pacote parcial de contrato de consultoria”

25 de julho de 2013

US $ 1.000.000

“Pym parcial no contrato de consultoria”

1º de setembro de 2013

US $ 1.000.000

“Pym parcial no contrato de consultoria”

25 de setembro de 2013

US $ 15.600.000

“Pagamento de dividendos”

30 de setembro de 2013

US $ 1.000.000

“Pagamento parcial de consultoria
acordo"

23 de outubro de 2013

US $ 7.800.000

“Pym divisor”

31 de outubro de 2013

US $ 1.000.000

“Parcial em contrato de consultoria”

3 de dezembro de 2013

US $ 1.000.000

“Parcial em contrato de consultoria”

23 de dezembro de 2013

US $ 1.000.000

“Parcial em contrato de consultoria”

1º 27 de janeiro de 2014

US $ 1.000.000

“Parcial em contrato de consultoria”


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27 de fevereiro de 2014

US $ 250.000

“Parcial em contrato de consultoria”

3 de junho de 2014

US $ 10.050.000

“Pagamento de dividendos”


57. O réu ANDREW PEARSE compartilhou alguns dos subornos e propinas que recebeu do empréstimo fraudulento com o réu DETELINA SUBEVA. Em ou aproximadamente e entre 12 de junho de 2013 e 27 de outubro de 2013, a PEARSE transferiu um total de aproximadamente US $ 2,2 milhões de contas bancárias que detinha no UAE Bank 2 para uma conta bancária SUBEVA mantida no UAE Bank 2.


D. EMATUM

58. Em ou por volta de 2 de agosto de 2013, a EMATUM celebrou um contrato de aproximadamente US $ 785 milhões com a Privinvest para comprar embarcações, equipamentos e treinamento para criar uma empresa estatal de pesca de atum. Por volta de 30 de agosto de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 concordou em fazer até US $ 850 milhões em empréstimos garantidos por Moçambique à EMATUM (o “EMATUM Loan”). O contrato de empréstimo da EMATUM foi assinado, entre outras pessoas, pelo réu SURJAN SINGH em nome do Investment Bank 1 e | nome da EMATUM. O réu MANUEL CHANG assinou a garantia do governo em nome de Moçambique. Por volta de 11 de setembro de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 emprestou aproximadamente US $ 500 milhões à EMATUM para financiar o projeto EMATUM e, como o Investment Bank 1 se recusou a emprestar fundos adicionais, em 11 de outubro de 2013 ou por volta dessa data,O Investment Bank 2 emprestou aproximadamente US $ 350 milhões para a EMATUM.


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(1) O Fundamentação Fabricada para o Empréstimo EMATUM 59. Em maio de 2013, enquanto o Banco de Investimentos 1 estava aumentando o Empréstimo Proindicus em aproximadamente $ 100 milhões, os réus ANDREW PEARSE,


Eu junto com

DETELINA SUBEVA, JEAN BOUSTANI outros, concordaram com um esquema para Moçambique pedir outros US $ 850 milhões. Uma parte significativa dos fundos adicionais seria canalizada para a Privinvest e depois desviados, pelo menos em parte, para fazer pagamentos adicionais de suborno e propina, pagar lucros inflacionados e fazer pagamentos de empréstimos no Empréstimo Proindicus para impedir a descoberta do esquema fraudulento de co-conspiradores. .

60. Em aproximadamente julho de 2013, o réu ANDREW PEARSE anunciou a outros no Investment Bank 1 que pretendia deixar o banco, mas permaneceu como funcionário do banco de licença até aproximadamente 13 de setembro de 2013. O Investment Bank 1 também colocou o réu DETELINA SUBEVA em licença em ou por volta de 22 de julho de 2013 e a rescindiu em ou sobre 21 de agosto de 2013.

61. Durante o verão de 2013, contrariamente às políticas e procedimentos do Investment Bank 1, os arguidos ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA utilizaram as suas contas de email pessoal para conspirar com funcionários do governo moçambicano e empregados da Privinvest para efetuar um grande empréstimo através do Investment Bank 1 para a EMATUM projeto. Por exemplo, em ou por volta de 4 de julho de 2013, PEARSE usou sua conta de e-mail pessoal para enviar e-mail à SUBEVA e ao réu JEAN BOUSTANI algumas perguntas sobre uma proposta que a PEARSE havia elaborado para criar uma frota de pesca de atum. Em resposta, por volta de 4 de julho de 2013, BOUSTANI respondeu que |||| ^^^^ | ^ || m ||| ^ m ||| ^ | u uu uld “siga adiante as sugestões necessárias para maximizar o financiamento Tamanho."

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62. Até ao final de Julho de 2013, os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI,


ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA


A SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, havia estabelecido os detalhes do projeto EMATUM como pretexto para justificar o montante máximo possível de empréstimos, em vez de atender às necessidades legítimas de pesca do projeto EMATUM. Por exemplo, em 21 de julho de 2013, BOUSTANI enviou uma cópia eletrônica por e-mail PEARSE e SUBEVA em suas contas de e-mail pessoais: “Nós precisamos que suas habilidades em Marshall terminem em 19 de agosto. nós vamos para 800 milhões, então vamos manter uma almofada para o pagamento de juros do Proindicus no ano que vem ”. Mais tarde, na conversa por e-mail , BOUSTANI acrescentou:“ Podemos diminuir os arrastões para 25 e adicionar dois 45 metros. OPVs [barcos trimaranos de estilo militar] com sistemas especiais para 'proteger' os arrastões. Isso é melhor para Andrew? ”PEARSE respondeu por volta de 21 de julho de 2013, para BOUSTANI e SUBEVA, escrevendo, em parte:“ 2 grandes pescarias fazem muito sentido e se vinculam ao Plano Diretor das Pescas! ”

63. Além disso, para evitar a detecção do regime fraudulento em curso, os recorridos JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA também previam a utilização de parte do empréstimo EMATUM para pagar a dívida do projeto Proindicus anterior, em ou perto de 21 de julho de 2013, A SUBEVA escreveu um e-mail para BOUSTANI, PEARSE e declarou: “[Nós] também deveríamos manter um colchão para a Proindicus de US $ 17 milhões para que não precisássemos voltar para o MF [Ministério da Fazenda] e eles estão do nosso lado.”

(2) Conspiracy to Circumvent Investment 1's Internal Controls and Win Business para Investment Bank 1 em conexão com o EMATUM Project. Incluindo subornos de pavimentação para funcionários do governo moçambicano

64. Os arguidos ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e

DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, conspirou para contornar o Investment Bank 1
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controles internos para enriquecer e ganhar negócios para o Investment Bank 1 em conexão com o projeto EMATUM. Assim, embora ainda empregado pelo Investment Bank 1, o PEARSE e a SUBEVA procuraram ocultar o seu envolvimento na criação do projeto EMATUM, utilizando contas de email pessoais e removendo todas as referências a si mesmas a partir de documentos que tinham preparado. Por exemplo:

(a) Em 27 de julho de 2013, ou em resposta a uma solicitação do réu SURJAN SINGH para obter informações sobre a proposta de pesca de atum, o réu ANDREW PEARSE usou sua conta de e-mail pessoal para enviar um e-mail ao réu JEAN BOUSTANI, copiando o réu DETELINA SUBEVA em sua conta de e-mail pessoal, afirmando: “Vamos enviar os dois em breve. Pise bro não apenas encaminhe, mas sim crie novos e-mails e anexe os documentos, [Investment Bank 1] é muito sensível para ver nossos nomes envolvidos, ”

(b) Em 27 de Julho ou por volta do dia 27,2013, a réu DETELINA SUBEVA, através da sua conta de e-mail pessoal, enviou um e-mail referente à proposta de pesca de atum aos arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI e ANDREW PEARSE, endereçando o email para a conta de e-mail pessoal da PEARSE, indicando: “Oi Jean - enviando um pacote informativo de outono para enviar para Surjan [SINGH] em um email limpo (sem meus detalhes de e-mail).” Minutos depois, a SUBEVA enviou documentos intitulados “materiais de viabilidade” e “modelo financeiro” para BOUSTANI e PERA

(c) Em resposta, por volta de 27 de julho de 2013, o réu ANDREW PEARSE usou sua conta de e-mail pessoal para instruir a réu DETELINA SUBEVA em sua conta de e-mail pessoal: “Se você entrar nas propriedades de cada documento, mostra como autor. Você pode querer apagar [os metadados] e reenviar ”os documentos. Mais tarde, o mesmo

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dia, usando as mesmas contas de e-mail pessoais, a SUBEVA enviou um e-mail para PEARSE dizendo: “Tenho certeza que Surj [SINGH] pode higienizar o pior e deletar o autor.”

65. Em Além disso, os acusados ​​JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA criaram propostas concorrentes falsas de empreiteiros para o projeto EMATUM em antecipação a uma investigação do Investment Bank 1 sobre o motivo pelo qual a Privinvest receberia o projeto. Por exemplo, em 31 de julho de 2013, PEARSE enviou um e-mail para BOUSTANI e SUBEVA informando: “Pessoal, abaixo está o argumento que eu acho que nós (ou melhor, o Mutuário) deveríamos apresentar ao [Banco de Investimento 1] na semana que vem. em Maputo .... Os patrocinadores do Mutuário (ie os vários Ministérios, mas principalmente SISE) a mando do Presidente saíram a 4 estaleiros [precisamos de nomes] pedindo propostas para construir uma frota .... Não havia necessidade legal de ter um concurso público, uma vez que as regras de contratação não se aplicam a empresas privadas, mas mesmo assim elas procuraram uma série de propostas,[] SOMENTE a ADM [entidade Privinvest] respondeu com o pacote completo e ofereceu uma solução integrada com vigilância de pesca, centro de comando e barcos. ”BOUSTANI respondeu:“ Digamos que eles entraram em contato com estaleiros sul-africanos e espanhol + português. Sem nomear.

66. Num esforço para assegurar que o Banco de Investimentos 1 providenciaria o Empréstimo EMATUM, o réu SURJAN SINGH incluiu informação de candidatura falsa num memorando que escreveu e enviou ao Investment Bank 1 em agosto de 2013 ou mais para obter a aprovação do Empréstimo EMATUM, falsamente Afirmando que a proposta da Privinvest foi considerada a mais competitiva em comparação com as ofertas de outras três empresas internacionais.

67. Além disso, no início de Agosto de 2013, o réu SURJAN SINGH deslocou-se a Moçambique para liderar o processo de due diligence do Investment Bank 1
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Transação EMATUM. Na continuação do esquema fraudulento, a SINGH e os arguidos ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA forneceram pontos de contacto e sugeriram respostas aos funcionários do governo moçambicano para reuniões de due diligence com o Banco de Investimento 1 num esforço para assegurar que o Banco de Investimentos 1 providenciaria o empréstimo.

68. Os réus ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA, com o conhecimento do réu SURJAN SINGH, também continuaram a esconder seu próprio envolvimento no processo de due diligence, Em ou por volta de 4 de agosto de 2013, a SUBEVA enviou um e-mail ao réu JEAN BOUSTANI, copiando PEARSE, afirmando: “Pise lembra não mencionar Andrew [PEARSE] e eu à equipe do [Investment Bank 1]! Eles não podem saber que estamos envolvidos neste projeto !!!! Se houver um deslize, digamos que ele nos conhece do acordo anterior.

(3) O EMATUM Lo an Agreement e S olicitation of United States Investors

69. Em ou perto de 30 de agosto de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 entrou no
Contrato de empréstimo de US $ 850 milhões com a EMATUM. O contrato de empréstimo da EMATUM foi assinado, entre outros, pelo réu SURJAN SINGH em nome do Investment Bank 1 andHjj em nome da EMATUM. O réu MANUEL CHANG assinou a garantia do governo em nome de Moçambique.

70. O contrato de empréstimo EMATUM previa que todos os pagamentos do mutuário ou dos credores seriam pagos à conta bancária do Investment Bank 1 no New York City Bank 1. O acordo também exigia que a EMATUM “aplicasse todos os valores emprestados por ela ao abrigo do [ Contrato de empréstimo EMATUM] para ... a compra de infra-estrutura de pesca, compreendendo 27 navios, um centro de operações e treinamento relacionado. ”O contrato de empréstimo

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também proibiu pagamentos indevidos em conexão com o projeto, incluindo pagamentos que violariam a FCPA, a Lei de Suborno do Reino Unido e a Lei de Combate à Corrupção de Moçambique.

71. Em 11 de setembro de 2013 ou por volta desta data, o Investment Bank 1 enviou US $ 500 milhões em recursos do empréstimo, menos suas taxas, para a Privinvest. O Investment Bank 1 financiou o Empréstimo EMATUM vendendo notas de participação de empréstimos a investidores nos Estados Unidos e noutros locais. Por e-mail e outros meios electrónicos, o Investment Bank enviou potenciais investidores, incluindo investidores dos Estados Unidos, materiais que incluíam o contrato de empréstimo EMATUM e uma oferta. circular. Como o contrato de empréstimo, a circular de oferta declarou: “Os recursos do Empréstimo serão utilizados pelo Mutuário para o financiamento da compra de infraestrutura de pesca, incluindo 27 navios, um centro de operações e treinamento relacionado e para os propósitos corporativos gerais de Mutuário ”,

72. Com base nas representações do contrato de empréstimo e da circular de oferta, os investidores, incluindo investidores nos Estados Unidos, compraram notas de participação em empréstimos da EMATUM.

73. Apesar das projeções de que a EMATUM geraria receitas anuais de pesca de aproximadamente US $ 224 milhões até dezembro de 2016, praticamente não gerou receitas e, por volta do final de 2017, não realizou operações de pesca. A EMATUM entrou inadimplente em seu pagamento de financiamento com vencimento em ou aproximadamente em 18 de janeiro de 2017.

(4) Subornos e propinas ao réu SURJAN SINGH e funcionários do governo moçambicano

74. O réu SURJAN SINGH também recebeu pagamentos de suborno e propina diretamente da Privinvest por seu papel no esquema fraudulento. Especificamente, por volta de 20 de outubro de 2013, o réu ANDREW PEARSE enviou um e-mail ao réu

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JEAN BOUSTANI com as informações da conta bancária de SINGH no UAE Bank 2, referindo-se a SINGH como “Tio”, e acrescentando: “Se pudermos fazer alguma coisa nesta semana, ele agradeceria” Nesse mesmo dia, por volta de 20 de outubro 2013, BOUSTANI encaminhou o pedido para || H escrever, “Uncle, Surjan. Total de 4 ”

75. Em ou por volta de 23 de outubro de 2013 e 27 de fevereiro de 2014, a Privinvest efetuou aproximadamente seis pagamentos totalizando aproximadamente US $ 4,49 milhões de sua conta bancária no UAE Bank 1 para a conta do banco 2 do EAU SURJAN SINGH. Cada pagamento foi encaminhado através do Contas bancárias correspondentes dos bancos dos EAU em Nova York, a Privinvest fez os seguintes pagamentos de suborno e propina para a SINGH;


Encontro

Montante

Instrução de fio

23 de outubro de 2013 $ 800.000 “pymt on consultancy agreement”
—F-
Novembro 27,2013 $ 800.000 “acordo de consultoria pmt'on”
23 de dezembro de 2013: US $ 800.000 em contrato de consultoria
27 de janeiro de 2014 US $ 800.000 “pyt on consultancy agreement”
28 de janeiro de 2014 $ 799.960 “pyt on consultancy agreement”
27 de fevereiro de 2014: US $ 500.000 em contrato de consultoria

76. Os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI continuaram a coordenar o pagamento de subornos a funcionários públicos moçambicanos. Em 8 de abril de 2014, BOUSTANI enviou um email para ^ J ^ j | fornecendo uma contabilidade de subornos através dos projetos Proindicus e EMATUM e declarando que a Privinvest havia pago “125 [milhões de dólares] para todos por tudo ...” BOUSTANI resumiu a distribuição dos subornos, Co-conspirador moçambicano 1, US $ 15 milhões para
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US $ 7 mil para o réu MANUEL CHANG e US $ 3 milhões para o co-conspirador moçambicano 3, entre outros,

77. Num esforço para esconder a natureza ilegal destes pagamentos, os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI, entidades partidárias e facturas fabricadas para distribuir dinheiro aos funcionários do governo moçambicano. Por exemplo, em 17 de outubro de 2013 ou por volta dessa data, BOUSTANI escreveu um e-mail informando: “Eu preciso de faturas mais rápidas em nome de: Logistics International Abu Dhabi [uma empresa relacionada a Privinvest]. Faturas para tudo meu irmão. Cada um mencionando o assunto (compra de imóveis, etc.). Mesmo para Pantero [o réu MANUEL CHANG], um pequeno jornal diz "honorários de consultoria".

78. Assim, em ou entre 20 de outubro de 2013 e 4 de dezembro de 2013, o réu JEAN BOUSTANI fez com que a Privinvest fizesse pagamentos de suborno de aproximadamente US $ 5 milhões, da conta bancária da Privinvest, através do Distrito Leste de Nova York, para uma conta bancária em nome de uma empresa controlada pelo réu MANUEL CHANG.

E. MAM

(1) MAM Loan Agreement

79. Em 1 de maio de 2014, a MAM e a Privinvest assinaram um contrato de aproximadamente US $ 500 milhões para a Privinvest, entre outras coisas, construir um estaleiro, fornecer embarcações navais adicionais e atualizar duas instalações existentes para atender navios Proindicus e EMATUM.

80. Em 20 de maio de 2014 ou por volta desta data, o Investment Bank 2 e a entidade Privimvest Palomar, atuando através dos réus ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA,

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juntamente com outros, conseguiu um empréstimo sindicado de até US $ 540 milhões para o MAM, garantido pela República de Moçambique (o “Empréstimo MAM”). O Investment Bank 2 solicitou investidores, utilizando, entre outras coisas, o contrato de empréstimo do MAM e um memorando de informações confidenciais que resumia seus termos. Tal como com os empréstimos Proindicus e EMATIIM, o contrato de empréstimo exigia que o empréstimo do MAM fosse utilizado para fins de projeto e pagamentos.

eu

o contrato de empréstimo em nome do MAM e o arguido MANUEL CHANG assinaram a garantia do governo em nome de Moçambique, 81. O contrato de empréstimo do MAM também previa que todos os pagamentos exigidos pelo acordo seriam feitos através de uma conta bancária na cidade de Nova Iorque. uma instituição financeira sediada em Nova York (“New York City Bank 2” ), cuja identidade é do próprio Júri.

82. Em ou entre e aproximadamente entre 23 de maio de 2014 e 11 de junho de 2014, o MAM emprestou aproximadamente US $ 535 milhões do Investment Bank 2, garantido pela República de Moçambique, que o Investment Bank 2 enviou diretamente para a Privinvest através de contas bancárias correspondentes em Nova York Banco da Cidade 2. (2) MAM Suborno e Pagamento de Propinas

83. Uma planilha contábil mantida por aSpl ^ Mrefletida que a Privinvest fez pagamentos de suborno e propina para obter o contrato do MAM. Tais pagamentos incluíram aproximadamente US $ 13 milhões para aproximadamente US $ 5 milhões para o réu MANUEL CHANG, aproximadamente US $ 918.000 para o Co-Conspirador 2 de Moçambique e aproximadamente US $ 1,8 milhão para o Co-Conspirador 3 de Moçambique.

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84. Apesar projetando aproximadamente US $ 63 milhões em receita operacional até o final de seu primeiro ano de operações, MAM gerado praticamente sem receitas e moratória de sua empréstimo pagamento devido em ou por volta de Maio de 23 de, 2016, F . EMATUM Exchange 85. Em ou por volta de 2015, o Proindicus, EMATUM, MAM e Moçambique encontraram problemas no serviço da dívida de aproximadamente 2 mil milhões de dólares que acumularam em 2013 e 2014, incluindo os empréstimos Proindicus, EMATUM e MAM. Ao mesmo tempo, funcionários do governo moçambicano, incluindo investigações recebidas do FMI sobre o uso de alguns dos recursos do empréstimo,

86. Para esconder do público e do FMI a quase falência das empresas do projecto resultante do facto de o produto do empréstimo ser desviado como parte do esquema fraudulento, evitar o inquérito do FMI e ocultar a descoberta do esquema, vários dos co- conspiradores, incluindo os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA propuseram trocar as notas de participação de empréstimos da EMATUM por Eurobonds emitidas diretamente pelo governo moçambicano,

87. Na promoção do esquema fraudulento, em ou entre março de 2015 e maio de 2015, os funcionários do Investment Bank 1, juntamente com os arguidos JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA, organizaram reuniões com funcionários do governo moçambicano para os convencer a reestruturar o empréstimos existentes convertendo-os em Eurobonds. O governo moçambicano pode aceitar a recomendação dos conspiradores e contratou o Banco de Investimento 1 e o Banco de Desinvestimentos 2 para

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realizar a troca e Palomar, que empregou PEARSE e SUBEVA, como consultor para o intercâmbio.

88. Em ou por volta de 9 de março de 2016, o Investment Bank 1 e o Investment Bank 2 anunciaram a troca. Para convencer os investidores a trocar suas notas de participação em empréstimos por Eurobonds, os réus ANDREW PEARSE e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com banqueiros do Investment Bank 1 e do Investment Bank 2, prepararam documentos que foram enviados a investidores, inclusive nos Estados Unidos. para divulgar adequadamente a existência dos Empréstimos Proindicus e MAM ou as datas de vencimento desses empréstimos, Os documentos continham assim informações falsas e enganosas sobre as Eurobonds e a credibilidade de Moçambique.

89. Por volta de 6 de abril de 2016, com base nas informações falsas e enganosas dos co-conspiradores, os investidores EMATUM consentiram com a troca, resultando na troca dos LPNs EMATUM por Eurobonds no mesmo dia.

G. Proindicus. Padrões de Empréstimo EMATUM e MAM

90. Após o intercâmbio EMATUM 2016, em ou entre maio de 2016 e março de 2017, Proindicus, EMATUM e MAM cancelaram os empréstimos, e Proindicus, EMATUM e MAM passaram a perder mais de US $ 700 milhões em pagamentos de empréstimos.

H. Resumo do Suborno e do Pagamento de Despesas 91. Na promoção do esquema fraudulento, numerosos funcionários do governo moçambicano receberam pagamentos de suborno e propina da Privinvest relacionados com os projectos moçambicanos. Especificamente:

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(a) O réu MANUEL CHANG recebeu pelo menos US $ 5 milhões em pagamentos de suborno e propina da Privinvest.

(d) O membro da co-conspiração moçambicana 1 recebeu pelo menos US $ 8,5 milhões em pagamentos de suborno e propina da Privinvest.

(e) O Co-Conspirador 2 de Moçambique recebeu pelo menos $ 9.7 milhões em pagamentos de suborno e propina da Privinvest,

(f) O membro da conspiração 3 moçambicana recebeu pelo menos $ 2 milhões em pagamentos de suborno e propina da Privinvest,

92. O réu JEAN BOUSTANI recebeu aproximadamente US $ 15 milhões do produto do esquema fraudulento da Privinvest. Durante ou entre maio de 2013 e julho de 2014, a Privinvest pagou à BOUSTANI esses fundos em uma série de transferências bancárias, muitas das quais foram pagas por meio de uma conta bancária correspondente em Nova York e passaram pelo Distrito Leste de Nova York.

93. Ainda no âmbito do regime, os arguidos ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUB EVA receberam pagamentos de suborno e propina em conexão com os projectos moçambicanos. Especificamente:

(a) O arguido ANDREW PEARSE recebeu mais de $ 45 milhões em pagamentos de suborno e propina da Privinvest em ligação com os projectos marítimos moçambicanos. Muitos destes pagamentos de suborno e propina foram pagos através de um

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conta bancária correspondente em Nova York e passou por, o Distrito Oriental de Nova York.

(b) O réu SURJAN SINGH recebeu pagamentos de suborno e ldckbaclc totalizando aproximadamente US $ 4,5 milhões da Privinvest. Pelo menos um pagamento de suborno e propina da Privinvest foi pago através de uma conta de correspondente na cidade de Nova York e passou pelo Distrito Leste de Nova York.

(c) O réu DETELINA SUBEVA recebeu pagamentos de suborno e ldckbaclc de pelo menos US $ 2,2 milhões do réu ANDREW PEARSE, COUNT ONE (Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud)

94. As alegações contidas nos parágrafos de um a 93 são reallegadas e incorporadas como se fossem plenamente estabelecidas neste parágrafo.

95. Em ou por volta de 2011 e a data do arquivamento desta acusação, ambas as datas sendo aproximadas e inclusivas, no Distrito Oriental de Nova York e em outros lugares, os acusados ​​JEAN BOUSTANI, MANUEL CHANG, HJHBI O NDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, conspiraram intencionalmente e conscientemente para elaborar um esquema e artifício para defraudar um ou mais investidores e potenciais investidores em Proindicus, EMATUM e MAM, e obter dinheiro e propriedade deles por meio de um ou mais pretextos, representações e promessas materialmente falsas e fraudulentas, e com a finalidade de executar tal esquema e artifício, transmitir e fazer com que sejam transmitidos por meio de comunicação telefônica no comércio interestadual e estrangeiro.


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escritos, sinais, sinais, imagens e sons, ao contrário do Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 1343. (Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 1349 e 3551 e segs.) COUNT DOIS (Conspiração para cometer Fraude de Valores) 96, The As alegações contidas nos parágrafos de um a 93 são reallegadas e incorporadas como se fossem totalmente apresentadas neste parágrafo.

97. Em ou sobre e entre 2013 e a data da apresentação desta acusação, ambas as datas sendo aproximadas e inclusivas, no Distrito Oriental de Nova York e em outros lugares, os réus JEAN BOUSTANI, MJJJ MANUEL CHANG, ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, conscientemente e intencionalmente conspiram para usar e empregar um ou mais dispositivos manipuladores e enganosos e invenções, contrariando a Regra 10b-5 das Regras e Regulamentos da omissão de Valores Mobiliários dos Estados Unidos, Título 17, Código de Regulamentos Federais, Seção 240,1 Ob-5, por: (i) empregar um ou mais dispositivos, esquemas e artifícios para defraudar; (ii) fazer uma ou mais declarações falsas de fato relevante e omitir declarar fatos relevantes necessários para fazer as declarações feitas, à luz das circunstâncias em que foram feitas,não enganosa; e (iii) envolver-se em um ou mais atos, práticas e cursos de negócios que funcionariam como fraude e engano para investidores e potenciais investidores da EMATUM, em conexão com a compra e venda de desinvestimentos na EMATUM, direta e indiretamente, por meio de meios e instrumentos do comércio interestadual e das correspondências, contrariamente ao Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 78j (b) e 78ff.

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98. Em apoio à conspiração e para realizar seus objetivos, no Distrito Oriental de Nova York e em outros lugares, os réus JEAN BOUSTANI, ■ Oi MANUEL CHANG, ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, cometeram e causaram estar comprometido, entre outros, com o seguinte;

SOBRETATOS

(a) Por volta de 26 de junho de 2013, a Privinvest enviou aproximadamente US $ 1 milhão dos recursos do empréstimo Proinicic para uma conta bancária que a PEARSE detinha no Banco 2 dos Emirados Árabes Unidos, cujo pagamento passou por uma conta bancária nos Estados Unidos e no leste Distrito de Nova York.

(b) Em ou por volta de 21 de julho de 2013, a SUBEVA escreveu um e-mail para BOUSTANI, PEARSE declarando: “Nós também deveríamos manter um colchão para a Proindicus de US $ 17 milhões para que nós não precisássemos voltar para o MF e eles estão do nosso lado. ”

(c) Em aproximadamente 25 de julho de 2013, a Privinvest enviou aproximadamente US $ 1 milhão dos recursos do Proindicus para uma conta bancária que a PEARSE detinha no UAE Bank 2, cujo pagamento passou por uma conta bancária nos Estados Unidos e no Distrito Leste do Nova york.

(d) Em 1 de setembro de 2013, a Privinvest enviou aproximadamente US $ 1 milhão dos recursos do Proindicus para uma conta bancária que a PEARSE detinha no UAE Bank 2, cujo pagamento passou por uma conta bancária nos Estados Unidos e no Distrito Leste. de Nova York.

(e) Em ou por volta de 11 de outubro de 2013, o Banco de Investimento 2 enviou US $ 350 milhões em recursos do empréstimo EMATUM, menos suas taxas de mais de US $ 37 milhões, para

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Conta bancária do Investment Bank 1 no New York City Bank 1, cujo pagamento passou pelo Distrito Leste de Nova York.

(f) Por volta de 11 de outubro de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 enviou aproximadamente US $ 312 milhões em recursos de empréstimos do EMATUM do New York City Bank 1 para a Privinvest, cujo pagamento passou pelo Distrito Leste de Nova York.

(g) Por volta de 23 de outubro de 2013, uma entidade Privinvest com uma conta bancária nos EAU enviou aproximadamente US $ 800.000 para a conta bancária da SINGH no UAE Bank 2, que passou por uma conta bancária correspondente nos Estados Unidos e pelo Distrito Oriental de Nova york.

(h) Por volta de 24 de Novembro de 2013. ^^^^^^^ | ^ ent BOUSTANI uma factura de $ 400.000 para um “Projecto de Compra de Projecto Imobiliário em Moçambique”, a ser paga na conta bancária de um país com sede nos EAU. terceiro.

(i) Em 26 de novembro de 2013, a Privinvest transferiu US $ 400.000 de seu banco nos Emirados Árabes Unidos por meio de um banco na cidade de Nova York para a conta bancária indicada na fatura mencionada no subparágrafo (h) acima, cujo pagamento foi efetuado. o Distrito Oriental de Nova York.

(j) Em 31 de março de 2014 ou por volta dessa data, a BOUSTANI enviou uma fatura de US $ 1 milhão de uma entidade terceirizada sediada nos EAU para “CONSTRUÇÃO

TRABALHO NA ZONA ECONÔMICA EXCLUSIVA DE MOÇAMBICAN (BEZ) ”(lc) Em ou por volta de 2 de abril de 2014, a Privinvest transferiu US $ 1 milhão de seu banco dos Emirados Árabes Unidos por meio de um banco na cidade de Nova York e pelo Distrito Leste de Nova York. Conta bancária com sede nos EAU especificada na fatura mencionada no subparágrafo (j) acima.

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(l) Em 8 de Abril de 2014, a BOUSTANI emitiu uma factura de 1,75 milhões de dólares para uma “Compra de Projectos Imobiliários em Moçambique.” (m) Em 9 de Abril de 2014, a Privinvest transferiu 1 milhão de dólares do seu banco dos EAU através de um banco na cidade de Nova York e através do Distrito Leste de Nova York para a conta bancária sediada nos EAU especificada na fatura mencionada no subparágrafo (1) acima,

(n) A partir de 28 de maio de 2014, a Privinvest transferiu US $ 976.000 de sua conta bancária sediada nos Emirados Árabes Unidos por meio de um banco na cidade de Nova York e do Distrito Leste de Nova York para a conta bancária indicada na fatura mencionada no parágrafo anterior. (1) acima.

(o) Por volta de 8 de abril de 2014, BOUSTANI enviou um e-mail para gjjjj SB detalhando subornos e propinas Privinvest pago ou destinado a ser pago em conexão com os projetos Proindicus e EMATUM.

(p) Por volta de 14 de março de 2016, mm || e outros co- conspiradores voaram de Londres, Inglaterra para John F, Aeroporto Internacional Kennedy, em Queens, Nova York, para participar de reuniões com investidores sobre a troca da EMATUM notas de participação em empréstimos para Eurobonds,

(q) Em ou perto de 15 de março de 2016, durante uma reunião em New Yorlc juntamente com outros, forneceu informações falsas e enganosas aos investidores relativamente às perspectivas económicas de Moçambique, nível de dívida e a sua capacidade e intenção de cumprir as suas obrigações de dívida EMATUM para induzi-los a troca de notas de participação em empréstimos EMATUM para Eurobonds, (Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 371 e 3551 e seguintes)

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COUNT THREE (conspiração para violar as disposições anti-suborno e de controles internos da FCPA)

99. As alegações contidas nos parágrafos um a 93 são reallegadas e incorporadas como se a estupidez descrita neste parágrafo.

100. Em ou entre janeiro de 2012 e fevereiro de 2017, ambas as datas sendo aproximadas e inclusivas, no Distrito Leste de Nova York e em outros lugares, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, conscientemente e deliberadamente conspiram cometer infracções contra os Estados Unidos, nomeadamente:

(a) Ser funcionário e agente de um emitente, fazer uso, de forma corrupta, das correspondências e meios de instrumentos do comércio interestadual na promoção de uma oferta, pagamento, promessa de pagamento e autorização do pagamento de qualquer dinheiro, oferta, presente prometer dar e autorizar a doação de qualquer coisa de valor a um ou mais funcionários estrangeiros e a uma ou mais pessoas, sabendo que toda ou parte de tal dinheiro e coisa de valor seriam e foram oferecidos, dado, e prometido a um ou mais oficiais estrangeiros, para fins de: (i) influenciar atos e decisões de tal oficial estrangeiro em sua capacidade oficial; (ii) induzir tal funcionário estrangeiro a praticar e omitir atos que violem o dever legal de tal funcionário; (iii) garantir qualquer vantagem indevida;e (iv) induzir tal funcionário estrangeiro a usar sua influência junto a um governo estrangeiro e agências e instrumentos para influenciar e influenciar atos e decisões de tal governo e agências e instrumentalidades, a fim de auxiliar o Banco de Investimentos 1 e outros na obtenção e retendo negócios, para e com e direcionando negócios para, Privinvest, Investment Bank

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1, PEARSE, SINGH, SUBEVA e outros, ao contrário da FCPA, Título 15, Estados Unidos
Código, Seções 78dd ~ l e 78ff; e
(b) Contornar e causar contornar um sistema de controles internos no Banco de Investimento 1, contrariamente ao Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Secções 78m (b) (2) (B), 78m (b) (4), 78m (b) (5) e 78ff (a).

101. Em apoio à conspiração e para realizar seus objetivos, no Distrito Oriental de Nova York e em outros lugares, os réus ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, cometeram e fizeram com que fossem cometidos, entre outros, Os seguintes:

ATOS MAIS EXTENSOS

(a) Em ou aproximadamente 19 de novembro de 2012, PEARSE enviou um email ao Investment Bank 1 Employee 1, afirmando que o EMEA Executive “disse não à combinação de Moçambique] e seu amigo [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2], então precisamos para estruturá-lo fora da imagem.

(b) Em Fevereiro de 2013, PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA encomendaram a Due Diligence Firm 1 para aconselhar potenciais riscos de corrupção e suborno envolvendo membros do governo moçambicano na transação Privinvest prevista, diligência que PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA ocultaram intencionalmente Departamento de Compliance do Investment Bank.

(c) Em ou por volta de 15 de fevereiro de 2013, SINGH e SUBEVA forneceram uma lista dos diretores da Proindicus para a Empresa de Due Diligence 1 para pré-selecionar os diretores potenciais,

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(d) Em ou perto de 21 de junho de 2013, PEARSE, SINGH e SUBEVA apresentaram um memorando à equipe de Gestão de Risco de Crédito do Investment Bank 1 que descreveu falsamente por que o Empréstimo Proindicus estava sendo aumentado e não informou ao Banco de Investimentos 1 que o empréstimo proposto O aumento estava sendo usado para fazer pagamentos de suborno e propina aos co-conspiradores, incluindo funcionários do governo moçambicano.

(e) Em ou por volta de 8 de julho de 2013, a Privinvest efetuou um pagamento de US $ 1 milhão de sua conta bancária nos EAU para uma conta bancária em Portugal para o benefício da UJI que passou por uma conta bancária correspondente no New York City Bank 1 e Distrito Leste de Nova York, (f) No dia 27 de julho de 2013, PEARSE enviou um e-mail de sua conta de e-mail pessoal para a SUBEVA em sua conta de e-mail pessoal, informando: a) Entre nas propriedades de cada documento, mostra como autor. Você pode querer excluir e reenviar os documentos.


(g) Em ou por volta de 4 de agosto de 2013, a SUBEVA, usando sua conta de e-mail pessoal, enviou um e-mail para PEARSE em sua conta de e-mail pessoal que declarou: “[A] s prometido abaixo: 'script' para o DD diligência] reunião com a senhora do Ministério das Pescas. Essas perguntas foram respondidas muito bem antes, portanto, deve garantir uma reunião muito produtiva de baixo risco. Sobrepõe-se bem à lista do [Investment Bank 1]. ”


(h) Por volta de 4 de agosto de 2013, a SUBEVA enviou um email para ^ | p roviding informações para uma reunião de due diligence com o Banco de Investimento 1 marcada para o dia seguinte.


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(i) Por volta de 5 de agosto de 2013, a SUBEVA utilizou sua conta de e-mail pessoal para enviar a PEARSE em sua conta de e-mail pessoal outro roteiro de due diligence, que, explicou, “é útil ir para S ele deve estar preparado para lidar com as questões do DD [due diligence] sobre concorrência, planos de exportação e por que a ADM [Abu Dhabi MAR] faz parte da lista. ”

(j) No dia 5 de agosto de 2013, aproximadamente, a SINGH viajou para Moçambique e liderou a equipe de negociação do Investment Bank 1, conduzindo a devida diligência para a transação EMATUM LPN,

(lc) Por volta de 11 de setembro de 2013, o Investment Bank 1 enviou aproximadamente US $ 500 milhões em recursos do empréstimo EMATUM, menos suas taxas, para a Privinvest, cujo pagamento passou por uma conta bancária correspondente no New York City Bank 1 e no Distrito Leste de New Iorque.

(l) Por volta de 23 de outubro de 2013, a Logistics International enviou uma transferência eletrônica de US $ 1.175 milhões para uma conta bancária moçambicana para o benefício. Que o pagamento passou por uma conta bancária correspondente no New York City Bank 1 e no Distrito Leste de Nova York,

(m) Em ou perto de 15 de maio de 2014, depois de receber um email de um membro do Banco de Investimento 1, a equipe do negócio solicitou que ele fornecesse a verificação dos detalhes da conta bancária da EMATUM para o PEARSE, que respondeu: “ Eu estou tentando me apossar do tio [SINGH], Não tenho uma chamada pise até que eu tenha falado com ele e conformado wot o [palavrão] isso é sobre, ”

(n) No mesmo dia, 15 de maio de 2014, após falar com SINGH, PEARSE escreveu um e-mail para | H ^ | HHand BOUSTANI, informando: “O tio é

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resolvendo isso, há alguma exigência estúpida do Reino Unido. ,,, De qualquer forma eu disse a ele para dizer [um funcionário do Banco de Investimentos 1 que fez o pedido inicial], que ela é demitida se ela não se comportar no futuro! ”(Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 371 e 3551 e seep) COUNTFOUR (Conspiração para Cometer Lavagem de Dinheiro)

102. As alegações contidas nos parágrafos de um a 93 são reallegadas e incorporadas como se fossem plenamente estabelecidas neste parágrafo.

103. Em ou por volta de 2013 e a data do arquivamento desta denúncia, sendo ambas as datas aproximadas e inclusivas, no Distrito Oriental de Nova York e em outros lugares, os réus JEAN BOUSTANI, MANUEL

[ANDREW PEARSE,

CHANG, |

SURJAN SINGH e DETELINA SUBEVA, juntamente com outros, conscientemente e intencionalmente conspiram para transportar, transmitir e transferir instrumentos monetários e fundos para um ou mais lugares fora dos Estados Unidos, um ou mais lugares dentro dos Estados Unidos, e para um ou mais lugares dentro dos Estados Unidos de um ou mais locais fora dos Estados Unidos, (a) com a intenção de promover o exercício de uma ou mais atividades ilegais especificadas, a saber; (i) uma violação da FCPA, Título 15, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 78dd-l e 78ff; (ii) ofensas contra uma nação estrangeira envolvendo suborno de funcionário público ou apropriação indébita, roubo e apropriação indébita de fundos públicos por e em benefício de um funcionário público, em violação da lei moçambicana, conforme definido no Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos. , Seção 1956 (c) (7) (B) (iv); (iii) fraude eletrônica,em violação do Título 18, United States Code, Section 1343; e (iv) fraude na venda de valores mobiliários, em violação do Título 15, Estados Unidos.

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Código, Seções 78j (b) e 78ff (coletivamente, as “Atividades Ilegais Especificadas”), ao contrário do Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 1956 (a) (2) (A); e (b) sabendo que os instrumentos monetários e fundos envolvidos no transporte, transmissão e transferência representavam o produto de alguma forma de atividade ilegal, e sabendo que tal transporte, transmissão e transferência foi concebido no todo e em parte para ocultar e disfarçar o natureza, localização, fonte, propriedade e controle do produto de uma ou mais atividades ilegais especificadas, a saber: as Atividades Ilegais Especificadas, contrárias ao Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 1956 (a) (2) (B) (i ).

(Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 1956 (h) e 3551 e segs.)

ALEGAÇÃO DA FALTA CRIMINAL
COMO CONTAR UM

104. Os Estados Unidos, por meio deste, notificam os réus acusados ​​no Primeiro Trimestre que, após a condenação por tal crime, o governo buscará a caducidade de acordo com o Título 18, United States Code, Seção 982 (a) (2), que exige qualquer pessoa condenada por tal crime, a perder qualquer propriedade que constitua ou seja derivada de produtos obtidos direta ou indiretamente como resultado de tal crime.

105. Se qualquer um dos bens acima descritos, como resultado de qualquer ato ou omissão dos réus:
(a) não pode ser localizado no exercício da devida diligência;
(b) tenha sido transferida, vendida ou depositada em um terceiro;
(c) foi colocado fora da jurisdição do tribunal;
(d) foi substancialmente diminuído em valor; ou

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(e) foi misturado com outra propriedade que não pode ser dividida sem dificuldade; é a intenção dos Estados Unidos, de acordo com o Título 21, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 853 (p), como incorporado pelo Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 982 (b) (1), buscar a confiscação de qualquer propriedade. dos réus até o valor da propriedade perdedora descrita nesta alegação de confisco.

(Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 982 (a) (2) e 982 (b) (1); Título 21, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 853 (p))

ALEGAÇÃO DA FALTA CRIMINAL
COMO CONTAR DUAS E TRÊS

106. Os Estados Unidos, por meio deste, notificam os réus acusados ​​nas Contagens Dois e Três de que, após a condenação por tais crimes, os Estados Unidos buscarão a cassação em conformidade com o Título 18, United States Code, Seção 981 (a) (1). ) (C) e o Título 28, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 2461 (c), que exige que qualquer pessoa condenada por tais infrações confira qualquer propriedade, real ou pessoal, constituída ou derivada de produtos obtidos direta ou indiretamente como resultado de tais ofensas.

107. Se qualquer um dos bens acima descritos, como resultado de qualquer ato
ou omissão dos arguidos:
(a) não pode ser localizado no exercício da devida diligência;
(b) tenha sido transferida, vendida ou depositada em um terceiro;
(c) foi colocado fora da jurisdição do tribunal;
(d) foi substancialmente diminuído em valor; ou


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(e) tem se misturado com outras propriedades que podem ser divididas sem dificuldade;

é intenção dos Estados Unidos, de acordo com o Título 21, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 853 (p), buscar a confiscação de qualquer outra propriedade dos acusados ​​até o valor da propriedade perdedora descrita nesta alegação de confisco, (Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 981 (a) (1) (C); Título 21, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 853 (p); Título 28, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 2461 (c))

ALEGAÇÃO DA FALTA CRIMINAL
QUANTO CONTAR QUATRO

108, Os Estados Unidos, por meio deste, notificam os réus acusados ​​no Conde Quatro de que, após a condenação por tal delito, o governo buscará a caducidade de acordo com o Título 18, United States Code, Seção 982 (a) (1), que exige qualquer pessoa condenada por tal crime a perder qualquer propriedade, real ou pessoal, envolvida em tal ofensa, ou qualquer propriedade rastreável a tal propriedade.

109. Se qualquer um dos bens acima descritos, como resultado de qualquer ato
ou omissão dos arguidos:
(a) não pode ser localizado no exercício da devida diligência;
(b) tenha sido transferida, vendida ou depositada em um terceiro;
(c) foi colocado fora da jurisdição do tribunal;
(d) foi substancialmente diminuído em valor; ou
(e) foi misturado com outra propriedade que não pode ser
dividido sem dificuldade;


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é a intenção dos Estados Unidos, de acordo com o Título 21, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 853 (p), como incorporada pelo Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 982 (b) (1), buscar a confiscação de qualquer outra propriedade. dos réus até o valor da propriedade perdedora descrita nesta alegação de confisco, (Título 18, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seções 982 (a) (1) e 982 (b) (1); Título 21, Código dos Estados Unidos, Seção 853 (p)) ■

"DEBORAH L, CONNOI
CHEFE, LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO E
RECUPERAÇÃO DE ATIVOS,
DIVISÃO CRIMINAL

NOS. DEPARTAMENTO DE JUSTIÇA


DANIEL S, KAHN
CHIEF, FCPA UNIT,

SEÇÃO DE FRAUDE,

DIVISÃO CRIMINAL

DEPARTAMENTO DE JUSTIÇA DOS EUA


46

Matthew S. Amatruda e MarkK Bini, Assistente TJ.S. Procuradores (718) 254-7012, Margaret A. Moeser, Sean O'Donnell, David Fuhr, Procuradoria do Departamento de Justiça dos EUA, (202) 353-2467


Caso l: 18-cr-00681-WFK Documento 10 Arquivado em 01/03/19 Página 47 de 47 PagelD #: 305

"boustani-et.-al.-indictment-ednyredacted"
Case l:18-cr-00681-WFK Document 10 Filed 01/03/19 Page 1 of 47 PagelD #: 259
JMK: MS A/MEB/M AM/S OD/DF
F. #2016R00695
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

-X

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- against -
JEANBOUSTANI,
_ also known as “Jean Boustany,”
MANUEL CHANG.
ANDREW PEARSE,
SURJAN SINGH and
DETELINA SUBEVA,
FILED
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
U.8. DISTRICT COURT E.D.M.Y.
DEC 19 2018 A

BROOKLYN OFFICE
NDICTAIENT
.No.
(T, 18, U.S.C.,§§ 371, 981(a)(1)(C),
982(a)(1), 982(a)(2), 982(b)(1), 1349,
1956(h) and 3551 et seq,: T. 21, U.S.C.,
§ 853(p); T. 28, U.S.C., § 2461(c))
Defendants.
■X
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:
INTRODUCTION
At all times relevant to this Indictment, unless otherwise indicated:
I. The Defendants and Relevant Entities and Individuals
1. The Republic of Mozambique was a sub-Saharan African nation.
2. ' Proindicus S.A. (“Proindicus”), Empresa Mo§ambicana de Atum, S.A. (“EMATUM”) and Mozambique Asset Management (“MAM”) were companies owned, controlled and overseen by the Government of Mozambique that performed functions that the Government of Mozambique treated as its own, and were thus “instrumentalities” of a foreign government within the meaning of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), Title
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15, United States Code, Section 78dd~l(f)(l)(A). The companies were created to undertake three maritime projects in Mozambique for and on behalf of Mozambique. Proindicus was to perform coastal surveillance, EMATUM was to engage in tuna fishing and MAM was to build and maintain shipyards.
3, The defendant MANUEL CHANG was a citizen of Mozambique and Mozambique’s Minister of Finance, CHANG was thus a “foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(f)(l)(A).
6. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was involved in obtaining the Mozambican government’s approval of the Proindicus project.
7. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 2, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was a relative of a senior official of Mozambique.
2
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8. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was a senior official in Mozambique’s Ministry of Finance and a director of EMATUM. Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3 was thus a “foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(f)(l)(A),
9. Privinvest Group was an Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (“UAE”)- based holding company consisting of numerous subsidiaries (collectively, “Privinvest”), including Privinvest Shipbuilding S.A.L., Abu Dhabi MAR (“ADM”), Logistics International and Palomar Capital Advisors and Palomar Holdings Ltd. (collectively, “Palomar”), On its website, Privinvest described itself as “one of the largest global shipbuilding groups for naval vessels, fuel-cell submarines, supeiyachts, offshore constructions and associated services.”
10. The defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, also known as “Jean Boustany,” (“BOUSTANI”) was a citizen of Lebanon and was the lead salesman and negotiator for Privinvest.
12. Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was hired by Privinvest to develop business with African nations through connections with African government officials.
13. Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, was a principal executive of Privinvest.
14. Investment Bank 1, the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, was a global investment banking, securities and investment management firm incorporated
3
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and headquartered in Europe. It conducted its activities primarily through various subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, “Investment Bank 1”). Investment Bank 1 had a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Title 15, United States Code, Section 78) (the “Exchange Act”) and was required to file reports with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act (Title 15, United States Code, Section 78o(d)). As such, Investment Bank 1 was an “issuer” as that term is used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd~l(a) and 78m(b).
15. The defendant ANDREW PEARSE was a citizen of New Zealand and was, until approximately September 13,2013, a managing director of Investment Bank 1 and the head of Investment Bank 1 ’s Global Financing Group. While employed by Investment Ba nk 1, PEARSE was an “employee” and “agent” of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(a). In or about April 2013, PEARSE also began working for the benefit of Privinvest.
16. The defendant SURJAN SINGH was a citizen of the United Kingdom and was, until approximately February 16, 2017, a managing director in Investment Bank 1 5 s Global Financing Group. While employed by Investment Bank 1, SINGH was an .“employee” and “agent” of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-l(a).
17. The defendant DETELINA SUBEVA was a citizen of Bulgaria and was, until approximately August 21, 2013, a vice president in Investment Bank 1 ! s Global Financing Group, While employed by Investment Bank 1, SUBEVA was an “employee” and “agent” of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code,
4
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Section 78dd-l(a). In or about April 2013, SUBEVA also began working for the benefit of
Privinvest.
18. Investment Bank 2, the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, was an international investment bank owned by a foreign government, and had offices in New York, London and elsewhere.
19. The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) was an intergovernmental institution that, until in or about March 2016, provided financial assistance and advice to Mozambique. To receive such assistance, Mozambique agreed, among other things, to limit its borrowing from private lenders.
II. Terms and Definitions
20. A “security” was, among other things, any note, stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, investment contract or participation in any profit-sharing agreement.
21. A “syndicated loan” was a loan arranged by one or more banks on behalf of a group of lenders, referred to as a syndicate, who work together to provide funds for a single borrower. •
22. A “loan participation note” or “LPN” was a fixed-income security that provided the holder with a pro-rata interest in the borrower’s payment of interest and principal.
23. A “Eurobond” was an international bond sold in a currency other than the currency of the borrower.
5
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III. The Fraudulent Scheme
A. Overview
24. Through a series of financial transactions between approximately 2013 and 2016, Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM borrowed in excess of $2 billion through loans guaranteed by the Mozambican government. The loans were arranged by Investment Bank 1 and Investment Bank 2 and sold to investors worldwide, including in the United States, Over the course of the transactions, the co-conspirators, among other things, conspired to defraud investors and potential investors in the Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM financings through numerous material misrepresentations and omissions relating to, among other things: (i) the use of loan proceeds, (ii) bribe and kickback payments to Mozambican government officials and bankers, (iii) the amount and maturity dates of debt owed by Mozambique, and (iv) Mozambique’s ability and intention to pay back the investors.
25. Each of the companies entered into contracts with Privinvest to provide equipment and services to complete the maritime projects. The loan proceeds were supposed to be used exclusively for the maritime projects, and nearly all of the borrowed money was paid directly to Privinvest, the sole contractor for the projects, to benefit Mozambique and its people. In reality, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI,m|
MANUEL CHANG,
ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, created the maritime projects as fronts to raise money to enrich themselves and intentionally diverted portions of the loan proceeds to pay at least $200 million in bribes and kickbacks to themselves, Mozambican government officials and others.
6
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26. The co-conspirators applied only a portion of the loan proceeds towards the maritime projects, In furtherance of the scheme, Privinvest charged inflated prices for the equipment and services it provided, which were then used, at least in part, to pay bribes and kickbacks, After conducting little or no business activity, Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM each defaulted on their loans.
B. Relevant Internal Accounting Controls of Investment Bank 1 27. The FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(4), 78(b)(5) and 78ff(a) required issuers to maintain a system of sufficient internal accounting controls and made it illegal to nowingly and willfully circumvent such controls.
28. Investment Bank 1 had internal accounting controls (“internal controls”) that addressed, among other things, the prevention of bribery of and by Investment Bank 1 employees; the prevention of money laundering and other financial crimes; conflicts of interests; outside employment; and the use of intermediaries in financial transactions, Investment Bank 1 ’s compliance department exercised primary responsibility for overseeing and enforcing Investment Bank 1 ’s internal controls.
29. Wi thin Investment Bank 1, the group of investment bankers assigned to a specific transaction was called the “deal team.” The defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA were part of the deal team on the Proindicus proj ect and SINGH was a member of the deal team on the EMATUM proj ect. They received regular training on Investment Bank 1 5 s internal controls and were also aware of those internal controls through their involvement in numerous transactions.
7
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C. The Proindicus Project
30. On or about January 18, 2013, Privinvest entered into a $366 million contract with Proindicus to supply materials and training to protect Mozambique’s territorial waters. On or about February 28, 2013, pursuant to a written loan agreement, Investment Bank 1 agreed to arrange a $372 million syndicated loan to Proindicus, guaranteed by the Republic of Mozambique (the “Proindicus Loan”). The defendant SURJAN SINGH signed
the loan agreement on behalf of Investment Bank 1,
^^^^SBco-sigired on behalf of Proindicus and the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee for the loan on behalf of Mozambique, Between approximately June and August 2013, Investment Bank 1 increased the Proindicus Loan by approximately $132 million. On or about November 15, 2013, Investment Bank 2 further increased the Proindicus Loan by $118 million, bringing the total loaned amount to $622 million.
Proindicus never conducted significant operations or generated significant revenue and defaulted on its loan payment due on or about March 21, 2017.
(1) Brib ery of Mozambican Government Offi cials to Gain Approval for the
Proindicus Project
31. Beginning in or about 2011, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, through withHHHH^^^^IHHBI arr ang & d b Y Privinvest Co- Conspirator 1, attempted to persuade Mozambican government officials to establish a coastal monitoring system through a contract with Privinvest, Almost immediately, BOUSTANI and^^^^Jj^^regotiated the first round of bribe and kickback payments that Privinvest would have to make for the benefit of Mozambican government officials for the
8

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project to be approved. For example, in furtherance of the scheme, BOUSTANI, and other co-conspirators had the following discussions:
(a) On or about November 11,2011, wrote to BOUSTANI by email, stating: “To secure that the project is granted a go-ahead by the HoS [Head of State], a payment has to be agreed before we get there, so that we know and agree, well in advance, what ought to be paid and when, Whatever advance payments to be paid before the project, they can be built in the project, and recovered.”
(b) Later on or about the same day, November 11, 2011,
>y email, stating: “A very important issue which BOUSTANI wrote to needs to be clear: we had various negative experiences in Africa. Especially related to the ‘success fees’ payments. Therefore, we have a strict policy in the Group consisting of not disbursing any ‘success fee’ before the signature of the Project Contract.” responded (c) On or about November 14, 2011 by email to BOUSTANI, stating: “Fabulous, I agree with you in principle. Let us agree and look at project in two distinct moments, One moment is to massage the system and get the political will to go ahead with the project. The second moment is the project implementation/execution. I agree with you that any monies can only be paid after the project signing. This has to be treated separately from the project implementation . .. Because for the project implementation there will be other players whose interest will have to be looked after e.g. ministry of defense, ministry of interior, air force, etc.... in democratic governments like ours people come and go, and everyone involved will want to have his/her share of the deal while in office, because once out of the office it will be difficult, So, it is
9
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important that the contract signing success fee be agreed and paid in once-off, upon the signing of the contract.”
32. Soon thereafter, during an email exchange on or about December 28, 2011, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI to $50 million in bribe and kickback payments to Mozambican government officials and $12 million in kickbacks for Privinvest co-conspirators. For example;
(a) On or about December 28, 2011, in response to an email from BOUSTANI requesting a bribe and kickback figure,wrote; “Fine brother. I have consulted and please put 50 million chickens. Whatever numbers you have on your poultry I will add 50 million of my breed,”
(b) On or about the same day, BOUSTANI forwarded this email to Privinvest personnel, stating, “50M for them and 12M for [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1] (5%) —> total of 62M on top,” 33. After more than a year of negotiations, on or about January 18,2013, Privinvest and Proindicus signed a $366 million contract for Privinvest to provide a coastal monitoring system to Mozambique. Five days later, on or about January 23,2013, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI instructed a bank in the UAE to make payments to and Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1. The instructions ordered the bank, in relevant part: “Upon receipt by Privinvest Shipbuilding of a minimum amount of US$ 317,000,000 ... to pay immediately; a. jm||m||the sum of US$ 5,100,000 ... and b. [Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1] the sum of US$ 5,100,000.” The instructions also ordered the bank to pay ^^^^^^^^Hand Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1 an additional approximately $3.4 million each at later dates.
10
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(2) Bribery to Gain Mozambique’s Government Guarantee for the Proindicus Financing
34. At the same time as the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and r ere negotiating bribe payments to cause Mozambican government officials to approve the Proindicus project, BOUSTANI recruited Investment Bank 1 to arrange financing for the project. During negotiations, bankers at Investment Bank 1 made clear that Investment Bank 1 would only arrange a loan that was at or near market interest rates, with debt that was either directly issued by the Government of Mozambique or guaranteed by the government.
35. To further negotiations on the Proindicus project, on or about September 13, 2012, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE traveled to the UAE to meet with the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and ^j|^^^mm||and a close relative of a senior Mozambican government official, among others.
36. To help obtain Mozambique ’ s agreement to Investment B anlc 1 ’ s terms, including that any loan be at or near market rates and guaranteed by the Mozambican government, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and|^^H^H^^^m||^m||||enlisted the defendant MANUEL CHANG, Mozambique’s Minister of Finance. On or about December 22, 2012, CHANG wrote a letter to Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, which was forwarded to an employee of Investment Bank 1 (“Investment Bank 1 Employee 1”), an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, explaining that “the financing of this project is still constrained by the IMF imposed limitation on the Government for Mozambique to accept commercial credit for commercial projects. Therefore, we have devised an alternative solution whereby an SPY [Special Purpose Vehicle]... will be formed.”

11
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37. On or about December 26, 2012, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI sent an email P re P ara ^ on a meeting Mozambique between employees of Investment Bank 1, Privinvest and Proindicus to negotiate the terms of the transaction. In the email, BOUSTANI emphasized: “But the only imperative matter for [Investment Bank 1] bro is [the defendant MANUEL CHANG's] signature of the guarantee for the loan.”
38. On or about February 28, 2013, the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the guarantee for the Proindicus Loan. In or about and between October 2013 and December 2013, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI andalong with others, paid at least $5 million in bribe and kickback payments for the benefit of CHANG from a bank account in the UAE, through the United States, to a bank account in Spain.
(3) Conspiracy to Circumvent Investment Bank 1 ’s Internal Controls and Win Business for Investment Bank 1 in Connection with the Proindicus Project. Including Paving Bribes to Mozambican Government Officials
39. While negotiations over the Proindicus financings proceeded in 2012 and early 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, conspired to circumvent Investment Bank l’s internal controls to enrich themselves and win the Proindicus business for Investment Bank 1, including through the payment of bribes to Mozambican government officials. At the time, PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA were agents acting within the scope of their employment on behalf of Investment Bank 1, with the intent, at least in part, to benefit Investment Bank 1.
40. Investment Bank 1 ’s internal controls required employees, including the compliance department and the deal team, to evaluate the potential for corruption related to the Proindicus project and the Mozambican government officials who would be involved
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in running it, Investment Bank 1’s review process identified certain red flags concerning the proposed Proindicus transaction at an early stage, On or about March 9,2012, in response to a question from Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 as to whether there was a competitive bidding process that resulted in Privinvest being selected, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI replied by email, copying the defendant SURJAN SINGH, that the selection of Privinvest had not resulted from a competitive bid and that the deal had come about due to “high level connections” between Privinvest and the Mozambican government,
41, In or about March 2012, in anticipation of arranging financing for the Proindicus project, Investment Bank 1 employees began conducting due diligence, or research, on the parties involved in the project. Accordingly, as early as approximately March 12, 2012, Investment Bank 1 employees identified allegations of corruption associated with Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2. On that day, Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 reported to his superior and the defendant SURJAN SINGH that Investment Bank 1 had previously designated Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2 as “an undesirable client, Furthermore, on or about March 13, 2012, Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 began collecting approximately 10 news articles containing potentially derogatory information regarding Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2, and exchanged emails with SINGH regarding the information and articles.
42. Notwithstanding the existence of such red flags, while conducting due diligence on the Proindicus transaction as required by Investment Bank l’s internal controls, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA withheld information about the likelihood of corruption connected to the Proindicus transaction from Investment Bank 1 ’s compliance department. For instance, in or about November 2012, at the direction of the head of Investment Bank l’s compliance department, members of the
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Proindicus deal team consulted with a senior executive for Investment Bank 1 *s Europe, Middle East and Africa (“EMEA”) region (the “EMEA Executive”), an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, regarding any legal or reputational concerns that the Proindicus transaction might raise for the hank. On or about November 19,2012, PEARSE summarized those discussions in an email he sent to Investment Bank 1 Employee 1, writing that the EMEA Executive “said no to the combination of Mozambique] and your friend [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2], so we need to structure him out of the picture.” Similarly, Investment Bank 1 maintained a report in its due diligence files describing Privinvest Co- Conspirator 2 as a “master of kickbacks,” Despite such information, PEARSE, SINGH and Investment Bank 1 Employee 1 all failed to relay the EMEA Executive’s concerns to Investment Bank l’s compliance department, and the compliance department failed to pursue its inquiiy further.
43. Furthermore, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA conspired to withhold from Investment Bank 1 ’s compliance department that Privinvest and Proindicus sought to appoint an individual in Mozambique who had previously been involved in fraudulent conduct to Proindicus’s Board of Directors. Specifically, even though Investment Bank 1 compliance personnel were responsible for choosing an external firm to perform due diligence on Proindicus’s officers and directors, in or about February 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, DETELINA SUBEVA and SURJAN SINGH secretly selected a due diligence firm (“Due Diligence Firm 1”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury, to research the transaction and pre-screen the individuals identified as directors of Proindicus to secure approval by Investment Bank 1 compliance personnel.
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44. In or around February 2013, Due Diligence Firm 1 reported to the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA that one of the proposed directors of Proindicus had previously been involved in fraudulent conduct while he was an officer of a Mozambican state-owned company. PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA did not share this information with Investment Bank l’s compliance department. Instead, PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA obtained a replacement group of directors, which included from ^ v * nvest Proindicus Due Diligence Firm 1 for a background investigation on them. Due Diligence Firm 1 reported fewer red flags related to the second group of directors.
45. On or about February 26,2013, having pre-cleared the second group of Proindicus directors and without revealing that two separate groups of directors had been researched, the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA forwarded the names of the second group of proposed directors to Investment Bank l’s compliance department for due diligence by the firm that the compliance department had selected (“Due Diligence Firm 2”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury. After reviewing a report from Due Diligence Firm 2, the compliance department approved the new group of directors.
(4) Conspiracy to Remove or Modify Conditions on the Proindicus Loan that Had Been Consistent with Investment Bank 1 *s Internal Controls
46. As part of its system of internal controls, Investment Bank 1 imposed conditions that Mozambique would have to meet to receive a loan. Some of those conditions, however, earned a risk of exposing the existence of the Proindicus project to the Mozambican public and members of Mozambique’s government beyond the circle of government officials who were part of the fraudulent scheme. To conceal the fraudulent
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scheme, avoid scrutiny and help win business for Investment Bank 1, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, removed some of Investment Bank 1 ’s conditions for the Proindicus Loan.
47, For example, Investment Bank 1 originally had required Proindicus to provide an opinion from the Attorney General of Mozambique concerning the validity of the government guarantee. On or about February 18, 2013, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, on behalf of both Privinvest and Mozambique, strenuously objected, explaining to the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA in an email: “[T]he attorney general opinion is not mandatory , , . I believe that this will not be accepted by Proindicus since its owner wanted to bypass public tender and normal bureaucratic procedures from day 1 by creating a private entity!! So they will never accept to inform the attorney general!! The [Minister of Finance] guarantee is legally covered by a presidential decree,” On or before February 28, 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and SUBEVA, together with others, ultimately removed the requirement from the conditions Investment Bank 1 had imposed.
48. S imilar ly, on or about February 25, 2013, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURTAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, removed Investment Bank 1 ’s condition that Mozambique inform the IMF of the loan. PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA replaced that condition with the less stringent requirement that Mozambique represent to investors “that they [were] in compliance with their IMF and World Bank obligations.” In fact, the IMF was not informed of the Proindicus Loan at the time of the transaction. Indeed, the IMF learned of the transaction only in or about 2016,

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when its exposure contributed to the IMF’s decision to cease providing aid and financing to Mozambique and caused a severe financial crisis in Mozambique.
(5) The Froindicus Loan and Recruiting of Investors in the United States
49. After Investment Bank 1 ’s compliance department approved the transaction on or about March 20,2013, Investment Bank 1 agreed to arrange a $372 million syndicated loan to Proindicus, guaranteed by the Republic of Mozambique, pursuant to a written loan agreement. The defendant SURJAN SINGH signed the loan agreement on Bank l,H^^^^^^UH^H^^H||^o-signed of Proindicus and the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee on behalf of Mozambique.
50. The Proindicus loan agreement provided that all payments by the borrower or the lenders would be paid to Investment Bank 1 ’s bank account at a New York City-based financial institution (“New York City Bank 1”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury. The loan agreement also required Proindicus to “apply all amounts borrowed by it under the Facility towards the financing of the Project.” Furthermore, the loan agreement prohibited improper payments in connection with the Proindicus project, including payments that would violate the FCPA, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act (“UK Bribery Act”) and the Mozambican Anti-Corruption Law.
51. On or about March 21, 2013, Investment Bank 1 transferred the entire proceeds of the loan, less fees totaling approximately $44 million, through a bank account at New York City Bank 1, directly to a bank account held by Privinvest at a bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE (“UAE Bank 1”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury. Investment Bank 1 immediately solicited United States-based investors to participate in the loan, in part by
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sending them electronically, among other things, the Proindicns loan agreement and a confidential information memorandum that summarized its terms.
(6) Proindicus Loan Increase and Bribe and Kickback Payments to PEARSE and SUBEVA
52. On or about March 28, 2013, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE notified the defendants SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA and others at Investment Bank 1 that Proindicus sought to borrow an additional $250 million from Investment Bank 1.
53. On or about June 13, 2013, the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed, on behalf of Mozambique, a government guarantee for an additional $250 million in borrowing by Proindicus. One day later, on or about June 14, 2013, Investment Bank 1 and Proindicus amended their loan agreement to permit Proindicus to borrow up to an additional $250 million from Investment Bank 1.
54. Even though Proindicus had conducted no operations, on or about June 23,2013, Investment Bank l’s Credit Risk Management team agreed to loan an additional $100 million to Proindicus based on a memorandum written by the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, representing that Privinvest required additional equipment.
55. On or about June 25, 2013, Investment Bank 1 wired approximately $100 milli on less its fees through New York City Bank 1 to a Privinvest account at UAE Bank 1. Investment Bank 1 marketed and sold portions of the debt to investors, including to an investor in the United States.
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56. Throughout 2013 and 2014, using loan proceeds, Privinvest made numerous kickback payments to the defendant ANDREW PEARSE. On or about April 15, 2013, PEARSE opened a bank account at a bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE (“UAE Bank 2”), the identity of which is known to the Grand Jury. After PEARSE opened the account, Privinvest wired bribe and kickback payments of more than $45 million from UAE Bank 1 accounts to PEARSE’s UAE Bank 2 account. Each payment was denominated in United States dollars and each was routed and completed through the UAE banks’ correspondent bank accounts in New York City and passed through the Eastern District of New York, as follows:

Date
Amount
Wire Instruction
April 23, 2013 $2,500,000 “partial pymt on consultancy agreement” May 26, 2013
$1,000,000 “partial pymt on consultancy agreement”
June 26, 2013 $1,000,000 “partial pymt on consultancy agreement”
July 25, 2013
$1,000,000
“partial pymt on consultancy agreement”
September 1, 2013
$1,000,000
“partial pymt on consultancy agreement”
September 25, 2013
$15,600,000
“dividends payment”
September 30, 2013
$1,000,000
“partial payment on consultancy
agreement”
October 23, 2013
$7,800,000
“divident pym”
October 31, 2013
$1,000,000
“partial pmt on consultancy agreement”
December 3,2013
$1,000,000
“partial pmt on consultancy agreement”
December 23,2013
$1,000,000
“partial pyt on consultancy agreement”
1 January 27, 2014
$1,000,000
“partial pyt on consultancy agreement”

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February 27, 2014
$250,000
“partial pyt on consultancy agreement”
June 3, 2014
$10,050,000
“dividends payment”

57. The defendant ANDREW PEARSE shared some of the bribes and kickbacks that he received from the fraudulent loan proceeds with the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA. On or about and between June 12, 2013 and October 27, 2013, PEARSE transferred a total of approximately $2.2 million from bank accounts he held at UAE Bank 2 to a bank account SUBEVA held at UAE Bank 2.

D. EMATUM
58. On or about August 2,2013, EMATUM entered into an approximately $785 mil lion contract with Privinvest to purchase vessels, equipment and training to create a state-owned tuna fishing company. On or about August 30,2013, Investment Bank 1 agreed to make up to $850 million in loans guaranteed by Mozambique to EMATUM (the “EMATUM Loan”). The EMATUM loan agreement was signed by, among other people, the defendant SURJAN SINGH on behalf of Investment Bank 1 and| behalf of EMATUM. The defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee on behalf of Mozambique. On or about September 11, 2013, Investment Bank 1 loaned approximately $500 million to EMATUM to finance the EMATUM project and, because Investment Bank 1 refused to loan additional funds, on or about October 11, 2013, Investment Bank 2 loaned an additional approximately $350 million to EMATUM.

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(1) The Fabricated Rationale for the EMATUM Loan 59. In or about May 2013, while Investment Bank 1 was increasing the Proindicus Loan by approximately $100 million, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE,

I together with
DETELINA SUBEVA, JEAN BOUSTANI others, agreed to a scheme for Mozambique to borrow another $850 million. A significant portion of the additional funds would be funneled to Privinvest and then misappropriated, at least in part, to make additional bribe and kickback payments, pay inflated profits and make loan payments on the Proindicus Loan to prevent discovery of the co-conspirators fraudulent scheme.
60. In approximately July 2013, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE announced to others at Investment Bank 1 that he intended to leave the bank, but he remained a bank employee on leave until on or about September 13,2013. Investment Bank 1 also placed the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA on leave on or about July 22, 2013 and terminated her on or about August 21, 2013.
61. During the summer of 2013, contrary to Investment Bank 1 policies and procedures, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA used their personal email accounts to conspire with Mozambican government officials and Privinvest employees to effectuate a large loan through Investment Bank 1 for the EMATUM project. For example, on or about July 4, 2013, PEARSE used his personal email account to email SUBEVA and the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI certain questions about a proposal PEARSE had drawn up to create a tuna fishing fleet. In response, on or about July 4, 2013, BOUSTANI replied that||||^^^^|^||m|||^m|||^|^ vo uld “go ahead suggestions needed in order to maximize funding size.”
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62. By the end of July 2013, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI,

ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA

SUBEVA, together with others, had established the details of the EMATUM project as a pretext to justify the maximum possible loan amount, rather than to meet legitimate fishing needs of the EMATUM project, For example, on or about July 21, 2013, BOUSTANI emailedcopying PEARSE and SUBEVA at their personal email accounts: “[W]e need your Marshall skills to finish by August 19 .. . we will go for 800 millionS so we keep a cushion for Proindicus interest payment next year.” Later in the email conversation, BOUSTANI added: “We can decrease the trawlers to 25 and add two 45 meters OPVs [military-style trimaran boats] with special systems to ‘protect’ the trawlers. Is that better Andrew?” PEARSE responded on or about July 21,2013, to BOUSTANI and SUBEVA, writing, in part: “2 big fisheries makes a lot of sense and ties into Fisheries Master Plan!”
63. Moreover, to avoid detection of the ongoing fraudulent scheme, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA also planned to use some of the EMATUM Loan to pay the debt of the earlier Proindicus project, On or about July 21,2013, SUBEVA wrote an email to BOUSTANI, PEARSE andstating: “[W]e should also keep a cushion for Proindicus of $17mn so that we don’t need to go back to MoF [Ministry of Finance] and they are on our side.”
(2) Conspiracy to Circumvent Investment Bank 1 ’s Internal Controls and Win Business for Investment Bank 1 in Connection with the EMATUM Project. Including Paving Bribes to Mozambican Government Officials
64. The defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and
DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, conspired to circumvent Investment Bank 1 ’s
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internal controls to enrich themselves and win business for Investment Bank 1 in connection with the EMATUM project. Thus, even though still employed by Investment Bank 1, PEARSE and SUBEVA sought to conceal their involvement in setting up the EMATUM project by using personal email accounts and removing all references to themselves from documents they had prepared. For example:
(a) On or about July 27, 2013, in response to a request from the defendant SURJAN SINGH for information on the tuna fishing proposal, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE used his personal email account to send an email to the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, copying the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA on her personal email account, stating: “We are going to send both shortly. Pise bro don’t just forward but rather create new email and attach the docs, [Investment Bank 1] is very sensitive to seeing our names involved,”
(b) On or about July 27,2013, the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA, using her personal email account, sent an email concerning the tuna fishing proposal to the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI and ANDREW PEARSE, addressing the email to PEARSE’s personal email account, stating: “Hi Jean - sending you a fall info package to please send to Surjan [SINGH] in a clean email (without my email details).” Minutes later, SUBEVA sent documents she titled “feasibility materials” and “financial model” to BOUSTANI and PEARSE.
(c) In response, on or about July 27, 2013, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE used his personal email account to instruct the defendant DETELINA SUBEVA on her personal email account: “[I]f you go into the properties of each doc, it shows you as the author. You may want to delete [the metadata] and resend” the documents, Later the same
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day, using the same personal email accounts, SUBEVA sent an email to PEARSE stating: “I’m sure Surj [SINGH] can sanitize worst comes to worst and delete the author.”
65. In addition, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA created fake competing bids from contractors for the EMATUM project in anticipation of an inquiiy from Investment Bank 1 as to why Privinvest would be awarded the project. For example, on or about July 31, 2013, PEARSE sent an email to the BOUSTANI and SUBEVA stating: “Guys, below is the argument that I think we (or rather the Borrower) should present to [Investment Bank 1] next week when in Maputo .... The sponsors of the Borrower (ie the various Ministries, but principally SISE) at the behest of the President went out to 4 shipyards [we need to have names] asking for proposals to build a fleet.... There was no need legally to have a public tender as procurement rules don’t apply to private companies, but nonetheless they sought a number of bids, [ ]ONLY ADM [a Privinvest entity] responded with the full package and offered an integrated solution with fishing surveillance, command center and boats.” BOUSTANI replied: “Let’s say they contacted South African yards and Spanish + Portuguese. Without naming.”
66. In an effort to ensure that Investment Bank 1 would arrange the EMATUM Loan, the defendant SURJAN SINGH included fake bid information in a memorandum he wrote and submitted to Investment Bank 1 in or about August 2013 to gain approval for the EMATUM Loan, falsely asserting that the Privinvest proposal was deemed the most competitive one in comparison to bids from three other international companies.
67. Moreover, in or about early August 2013, the defendant SURJAN SINGH travelled to Mozambique to lead Investment Bank 1 ’s due diligence for the
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EMATUM transaction. In furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, SINGH and the defendants ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA provided talking points and suggested answers to Mozambican government officials for due diligence meetings with Investment Bank 1 in an effort to ensure that Investment Bank 1 would arrange the loan.
68. The defendants ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA, with the knowledge of the defendant SURJAN SINGH, also continued to hide their own involvement in the due diligence process, On or about August 4,2013, SUBEVA sent an email to the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI, copying PEARSE, stating: “Pise remind not to mention Andrew [PEARSE] and myself to the [Investment Bank 1] team! They cannot know we are involved in this project!!!! If there is a slip up, say he knows us from the previous deal.”
(3) The EMATUM Lo an Agreement and S olicitation of United States Investors
69. On or about August 30,2013, Investment Bank 1 entered into the
$850 million loan agreement with EMATUM. The EMATUM loan agreement was signed by, among others, the defendant SURJAN SINGH on behalf of Investment Bank 1 andHjj on behalf of EMATUM. The defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee on behalf of Mozambique.
70. The EMATUM loan agreement provided that all payments by the borrower or the lenders would be paid to Investment Bank 1 ’s bank account at New York City Bank 1. The agreement also required EMATUM to “apply all amounts borrowed by it under the [EMATUM loan agreement] towards ... the purchase of fishing infrastructure, comprising of 27 vessels, an operations centre, and related training.” The loan agreement
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also prohibited improper payments in connection with the project, including payments that would violate the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act and the Mozambican Anti-Corruption Law.
71. On or about September 11,2013, Investment Bank 1 sent $500 million in loan proceeds, less its fees, to Privinvest. Investment Bank 1 funded the EMATUM Loan by selling loan participation notes to investors in the United States and elsewhere, By email and other electronic means, Investment Bank 1 sent potential investors, including United States investors, materials that included the EMATUM loan agreement and an offering circular. Like the loan agreement, the offering circular stated: “The proceeds from the Loan will be used by the Borrower towards the financing of the purchase of fishing infrastructure, comprising of 27 vessels, an operations centre and related training and for the general corporate purposes of the Borrower,”
72. In reliance on the representations in the loan agreement and offering circular, investors, including investors in the United States, purchased EMATUM loan participation notes.
73. Despite proj ections that EMATUM would generate annual fishing revenues of approximately $224 million by December 2016, it generated virtually no revenues and, as of approximately late 2017, conducted no fishing operations. EMATUM defaulted on its financing payment due on or about January 18, 2017.
(4) Bribes and Kickbacks to the Defendant SURJAN SINGH and Mozambican Government Officials
74. The defendant SURJAN SINGH also received bribe and kickback payments directly from Privinvest for his role in the fraudulent scheme. Specifically, on or about October 20, 2013, the defendant ANDREW PEARSE sent an email to the defendant
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JEAN BOUSTANI with SINGH’s bank account information at UAE Bank 2, referring to SINGH as “Uncle,” and adding, “[i]f we can do something this week he would appreciate it,” That same day, on or about October 20, 2013, BOUSTANI forwarded the request to||H writing, “Uncle , , , Surjan. Total of 4,”
75. On or about and between October 23, 2013 and February 27, 2014, Privinvest wired approximately six payments totaling approximately $4.49 million from its bank account at UAE Bank 1 to the defendant SURJAN SINGH’s UAE Bank 2 account, Each payment was routed through the UAE banks’ correspondent bank accounts in New York City, Privinvest made the following bribe and kickback payments to SINGH;

Date
Amount
Wire Instruction
October 23,2013 $800,000 “pymt on consultancy agreement”
—f-
November 27,2013 $800,000 “pmt'on consultancy agreement”
December 23, 2013 $800,000 “pyt on consultancy agreement”
January 27,2014 $800,000 “pyt on consultancy agreement”
January 28,2014 $799,960 “pyt on consultancy agreement”
February 27, 2014 $500,000 “pyt on consultancy agreement,”
76. The defendants JEAN BOUSTANI nd^^^^^J^continued to coordinate the payment of bribes to Mozambican government officials. On or about April 8, 2014, BOUSTANI sent an email to^J^j| providing an accounting of bribes through the Proindicus and EMATUM projects and stating that Privinvest had paid “125 [million U.S. dollars] for all for everything ...” BOUSTANI summarized the distribution of the bribes, Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1, $15 million to
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$7 milli on to the defendant MANUEL CHANG and $3 million to Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3, among others,
77. In an effort to conceal the unlawful nature of these payments, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, party entities and fabricated invoices to distribute money to the Mozambican government officials. For example, on or about October 17, 2013, BOUSTANI wrote an email to^ stating: “I need asap invoices in the name of: Logistics International Abu Dhabi [a Privinvest-related company]. Invoices for everything my brother. Each one mentioning the subject (real estate purchase., .etc....). Even for Pantero [the defendant MANUEL CHANG], a small paper say ‘consultancy fees.”’
78. Accordingly, on or about and between October 20, 2013 and December 4, 2013, the defendant JEAN BOUSTANI caused Privinvest to make bribe payments of approximately $5 million, from Privinvest’s UAE-based bank account, through the Eastern District of New York, to a bank account in the name of a company controlled by the defendant MANUEL CHANG.
E. MAM
(1) MAM Loan Agreement
79. On or about May 1,2014, MAM and Privinvest executed an approximately $500 million contract for Privinvest to, among other things, build a shipyard, provide additional naval vessels and upgrade two existing facilities to service Proindicus and EMATUM vessels.
80. On or about May 20, 2014, Investment Bank 2 and the Privinvest entity Palomar, acting through the defendants ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA,
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together with others, arranged a syndicated loan of up to $540 million to MAM, guaranteed by the Republic of Mozambique (the “MAM Loan”). Investment Bank 2 solicited investors, using, among other things, the MAM loan agreement and a confidential information memorandum that summarized its terms. As with the Proindicus and the EMATIIM loans, the loan agreement required that the MAM loan proceeds be used for project purposes and payments.
l
the loan agreement on behalf of MAM, and the defendant MANUEL CHANG signed the government guarantee on behalf of Mozambique, 81. The MAM loan agreement also provided that all payments required under the agreement were to be made through a bank account in New York City at a New York City-based financial institution (“New York City Bank 2”), the identity of which is kn own to the Grand Jury.
82. On or about and between approximately May 23,2014 and June 11, 2014, MAM borrowed approximately $535 million from Investment Bank 2, guaranteed by the Republic of Mozambique, which Investment Bank 2 sent directly to Privinvest through correspondent bank accounts at New York City Bank 2. (2) MAM Bribe and Kickback Payments
83. An accounting spreadsheet maintained by aSpl^Mreflected that Privinvest made bribe and kickback payments to obtain the MAM contract. Such payments included approximately $ 13 million to ■■■■■ approximately $5 million to the defendant MANUEL CHANG, approximately $918,000 to Mozambican Co-Conspirator 2 and approximately $1.8 million to Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3.
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84. Despite projecting approximately $63 million in operating revenues by the end of its first year of operations, MAM generated virtually no revenues and defaulted on its loan payment due on or about May 23, 2016, F. EMATUM Exchange 85. In or about 2015, Proindicus, EMATUM, MAM and Mozambique encountered problems servicing the approximately $2 billion in debt they had amassed in 2013 and 2014, including as a result of the Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM Loans, Furthermore, at around the same time, Mozambican government officials, including received inquiries from the IMF concerning the use of some of the loan proceeds,
86. To hide from the public and the IMF the near bankruptcy of the project companies resulting from loan proceeds being diverted as part of the fraudulent scheme, avoid inquiry from the IMF and conceal discovery of the scheme, several of the co¬conspirators, including the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA, proposed to exchange the EMATUM loan participation notes for Eurobonds issued directly by the Mozambican government,
87. In furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, in or about and between March 2015 and May 2015, Investment Bank 1 employees, together with the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA, organized meetings with Mozambican government officials to convince them to restructure the existing loans by converting them into Eurobonds. The Mozambican government accepted the co-conspirators’ recommendation and hired Investment Bank 1 and Divestment Bank 2 to
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conduct the exchange and Palomar, which employed PEARSE and SUBEVA, as an adviser for the exchange.
88. On or about March 9,2016, Investment Bank 1 and Investment Bank 2 announced the exchange. To convince investors to exchange their loan participation notes for Eurobonds, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with bankers at Investment Bank 1 and Investment Bank 2, prepared documents that were sent to investors, including in the United States, The exchange documents failed to adequately disclose the existence of the Proindicus and MAM Loans or the maturity dates of those loans, The documents therefore contained false and misleading information about the Eurobonds and Mozambique’s creditworthiness.
89. By on or about April 6, 2016, based upon the co-conspirators’ false and misleading information, the EMATUM investors consented to the exchange, resulting in the exchange of the EMATUM LPNs for Eurobonds on that same day.
G. Proindicus. EMATUM and MAM Loan Defaults
90. Following the 2016 EMATUM exchange, in or about and between May 2016 and March 2017, Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM each defaulted on then loans, and Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM proceeded to miss more than $700 million in loan payments.
H. Summary of Bribe and Kickback Payments 91. In furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, numerous Mozambican government officials received bribe and kickback payments from Privinvest in connection with the Mozambican projects. Specifically:
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(a) The defendant MANUEL CHANG received at least $5 million in bribe and kickback payments from Privinvest.
(d) Mozambican Co-Conspirator 1 received at least $8.5 million in bribe and kickback payments from Privinvest.
(e) Mozambican Co-Conspirator 2 received at least $9.7 million in bribe and kickback payments from Privinvest,
(f) Mozambican Co-Conspirator 3 received at least $2 million in bribe and kickback payments from Privinvest,
92. The defendant JEAN BOUSTANI received approximately $15 million .from the proceeds of Privinvest’s fraudulent scheme. In or about and between May 2013 and July 2014, Privinvest paid BOUSTANI these funds in a series of wire transfers, many of which were paid through a correspondent bank account in New York City and passed through the Eastern District of New York.
93. Also in furtherance of the scheme, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUB EVA received bribe and kickback payments in connection with the Mozambican projects. Specifically:
(a) The defendant ANDREW PEARSE received over $45 million in bribe and kickback payments from Privinvest in connection with the Mozambican maritime proj ects, Many of these bribe and kickback payments were paid through a
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correspondent bank account in New York City and passed through, the Eastern District of New York.
(b) The defendant SURJAN SINGH received bribe and ldckbaclc payments totaling approximately $4.5 million from Privinvest. At least one bribe and kickback payment from Privinvest was paid through a correspondent account in New York City and passed through the Eastern District of New York.
(c) The defendant DETELINA SUBEVA received bribe and ldckbaclc payments of at least $2.2 million from the defendant ANDREW PEARSE, COUNT ONE (Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud)
94. The allegations contained in paragraphs one through 93 are realleged and incorporated as if fully set forth in this paragraph.
95. In or about and between 2011 and the date of the filing of this Indictment, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, MANUEL CHANG, ^^HH^^^HHHBI^^^^^^^NDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud one or more investors and potential investors in Proindicus, EMATUM and MAM, and to obtain money and property from them by means of one or more materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, and for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, to transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate and foreign commerce

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writings, signs, signals, pictures and sounds, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1349 and 3551 et seq.) COUNT TWO (Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud) 96, The allegations contained in paragraphs one through 93 are realleged and incorporated as if fully set forth in this paragraph.
97. In or about and between 2013 and the date of the filing of this Indictment, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI,^^mjjj|U MANUEL CHANG, ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, did knowingly and willfully conspire to use and employ one or more manipulative and deceptive devices and contrivances, contrary to Rule 10b-5 of the Rules and Regulations of the United States Securities and Exchange ommission, Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 240,1 Ob-5, by: (i) employing one or more devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (ii) making one or more untrue statements of material fact and omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and (iii) engaging in one or more acts, practices and courses of business which would and did operate as a fraud and deceit upon investors and potential investors in EMATUM, in connection with the purchase and sale of divestments in EMATUM, directly and indirectly, by use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the mails, contrary to Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78j(b) and 78ff.
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98. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect its objects, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, ■Hi MANUEL CHANG,ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, did commit and cause to be committed, among others, the following;
OVERTACTS
(a) On or about June 26, 2013, Privinvest sent approximately $1 milli on from the Proindicus loan proceeds to a bank account that PEARSE held at UAE Bank 2, which payment passed through a correspondent bank account in the United States and the Eastern District of New York.
(b) On or about July 21,2013, SUBEVA wrote an email to BOUSTANI, PEARSE stating: “[W]e should also keep a cushion for Proindicus of $17mn so that we don’t need to go back to MoF and they are on our side.”
(c) On or about July 25,2013, Privinvest sent approximately $1 million from the Proindicus loan proceeds to a bank account that PEARSE held at UAE Bank 2, which payment passed through a correspondent bank account in the United States and the Eastern District of New York.
(d) On or about September 1, 2013, Privinvest sent approximately $1 mil lion from the Proindicus loan proceeds to a bank account that PEARSE held at UAE Bank 2, which payment passed through a correspondent bank account in the United States and the Eastern District of New York.
(e) On or about October 11,2013, Investment Bank 2 sent $350 million in EMATUM loan proceeds, less its fees of more than $37 million, to
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Investment Bank 1 ’s bank account at New York City Bank 1, which payment passed through the Eastern District of New York.
(f) On or about October 11, 2013, Investment Bank 1 sent approximately $312 million inEMATUM loan proceeds from New York City Bank 1 to Privinvest, which payment passed through the Eastern District of New York.
(g) On or about October 23, 2013, a Privinvest entity with a bank account in the UAE sent approximately $800,000 to SINGH’s bank account at UAE Bank 2, which passed through a correspondent bank account in the United States and through the Eastern District of New York.
(h) On or about November 24, 2013.^^^^^^^|^ent BOUSTANI an invoice for $400,000 for a “Real Estate Project Purchase in Mozambique Project,” to be paid to the UAE-based bank account of a third party.
(i) On or about November 26, 2013, Privinvest wired $400,000 from its UAE-based bank through a bank in New York City to the UAE-based bank account specified in the invoice referenced in subparagraph (h) above, which payment passed through the Eastern District of New York.
(j) On or about March 31, 2014 Jj^jH^^^^^sent BOUSTANI an invoice for $1 million from a UAE-based third-party entity for “CONSTRUCTION
WORK IN THE MOZAMBICAN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (BEZ) ” (lc) On or about April 2,2014, Privinvest wired $ 1 million from its UAE-based bank through a bank in New York City and through the Eastern District of New York to the UAE-based bank account specified in the invoice referenced in subparagraph (j) above.
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(l) On or about April 8,2014, BOUSTANI an invoice for $1.75 million for a “Real Estate Project Purchase in Mozambique.” (m) On or about April 9, 2014, Privinvest wired $1 million from its UAE-based bank through a bank in New York City and through the Eastern District of New York to the UAE-based bank account specified in the invoice referenced in subparagraph (1) above,
(n) On or about May 28,2014, Privinvest wired $976,000 from its UAE-based bank account through a bank in New York City and through the Eastern District of New York to the UAE-based bank account specified in the invoice referenced in subparagraph (1) above.
(o) On or about April 8,2014, BOUSTANI sent an email to g jjgj SB detailing bribes and kickbacks Privinvest paid or intended to be paid in connection with the Proindicus and EMATUM projects.
(p) On or about March 14, 2016, mm||and other co¬conspirators flew from London, England to John F, Kennedy International Airport, in Queens, New York, to attend meetings with investors regarding the exchange of the EMATUM loan participation notes for Eurobonds,
(q) On or about March 15,2016, during a meeting in New Yorlc together with others, provided false and misleading information to investors regarding Mozambique’s economic prospects, debt level and its ability and intention to meet its EMATUM debt obligations to induce them to exchange EMATUM loan participation notes for Eurobonds, (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 3551 et seq.)
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COUNT THREE (Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA Anti-Bribery and Internal Controls Provisions)
99. The allegations contained in paragraphs one through 93 are realleged and incorporated as if folly set forth in this paragraph.
100. In or about and between January 2012 and February 2017, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, did knowingly and willfully conspire to commit offenses against the United States, namely:
(a) Being an employee and agent of an issuer, to corruptly make use of the mails and means of instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of the giving of anything of value, to one or more foreign officials, and to one or more persons, while knowing that all or a portion of such money and thing of value would be and had been offered, given, and promised to one or more foreign officials, for purposes of: (i) influencing acts and decisions of such foreign official in his or her official capacity; (ii) inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do acts in violation of the lawful duty of such official; (iii) securing any improper advantage; and (iv) inducing such foreign official to use his or her influence with a foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such government and agencies and instrumentalities, in order to assist Investment Bank 1 and others in obtaining and retaining business, for and with, and directing business to, Privinvest, Investment Bank
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1, PEARSE, SINGH, SUBEVA, and others, contrary to the FCPA, Title 15, United States
Code, Sections 78dd~l and 78ff; and
(b) To circumvent and cause to be circumvented a system of internal controls at Investment Bank 1, contrary to Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(4), 78m(b)(5) and78ff(a).
101. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect its obj ects, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants ANDREW PEARSE, SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, did commit and cause to be committed, among others, the following:
OVERT ACTS
(a) On or about November 19,2012, PEARSE sent an email to Investment Bank 1 Employee 1, stating that the EMEA Executive “said no to the combination of Mozambique] and your friend [Privinvest Co-Conspirator 2], so we need to structure him out of the picture.”
(b) In or about February 2013, PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA commissioned Due Diligence Firm 1 to advise on potential corruption and bribery risks involving members of the Mozambican government in the contemplated Privinvest transaction, which diligence PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA then purposefully concealed from Investment Bank l’s compliance department.
(c) On or about February 15,2013, SINGH and SUBEVA provided a list of Proindicus’s intended directors to Due Diligence Firm 1 to pre-screen the potential directors,
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(d) On or about June 21, 2013, PEARSE, SINGH and SUBEVA submitted a memorandum to Investment Bank 1 ’s Credit Risk Management team that falsely described why the Proindicus Loan was being increased and failed to inform Investment Bank 1 that the proposed loan increase was being used to make bribe and kickback payments to the co-conspirators, including Mozambican government officials.
(e) On or about July 8,2013, Privinvest made a payment of $1 million from its bank account in the UAE to a bank account in Portugal for the benefit ofUJI which passed through a correspondent bank account at New York City Bank 1 and the Eastern District of New York, (f) On or about July 27, 2013, PEARSE sent an email from his personal email account to SUBEVA at her personal email account, stating: a [I]f you go into the properties of each doc, it shows you as the author. You may want to delete and resend” the documents.

(g) On or about August 4,2013, SUBEVA, using her personal email account, sent an email to PEARSE at his personal email account that stated: “[A]s promised, below is suggested ‘script’ for the DD [due diligence] meeting with the lady from Ministry of Fisheries. These questions have been answered very well before so should ensure a very productive low risk meeting. It overlaps well with the [Investment Bank 1] list.”

(h) On or about August 4, 2013, SUBEVA sent an email to^| providing information for a due diligence meeting with Investment Bank 1 scheduled for the next day.

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(i) On or about August 5,2013, SUBEVA used her personal email account to send PEARSE at his personal email account another due diligence script, which, she explained, “[M]ay be helpful to go to S as it has gone to he should be prepared to handle the DD [due diligence] questions on competition, export plans and why ADM [Abu Dhabi MAR] that are part of the list.”
(j) On or about August 5, 2013, SINGH traveled to Mozambique and led the Investment Bank 1 deal team conducting due diligence for the EMATUM LPN transaction,
(lc) On or about September 11, 2013, Investment Bank 1 sent approximately $500 million in EMATUM loan proceeds, less its fees, to Privinvest, which payment passed through a correspondent bank account at New York City Bank 1 and the Eastern District of New York.
(l) On or about October 23, 2013, Logistics International sent a wire transfer of $1,175 million to a Mozambican bank account for the benefit. °f H i^^^^^jjwhich payment passed through a correspondent bank account at New York City Bank 1 and the Eastern District of New York,
(m) On or about May 15, 2014, after receiving an email from a member of the Investment Bank 1 deal team asking him to provide verification of EMATUM’s bank account details jm|m||forwarded the request to PEARSE, who responded: “I am trying to get hold of uncle [SINGH], Don’t have a call pise until I have spoken with him and conformed wot the [expletive] this is about,”
(n) On or about the same day, May 15, 2014, after speaking with SINGH, PEARSE wrote an email to|H^|HHand BOUSTANI, stating: “Uncle is
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sorting it out, There is some stupid UK regulatory requirement.,, , In any event I told him to tell [an Investment Bank 1 employee who made the initial request], that she is fired if she doesn’t behave in the future!” (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371 and 3551 et seep) COUNTFOUR (Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering)
102. The allegations contained in paragraphs one through 93 are realleged and incorporated as if fully set forth in this paragraph.
103. In or about and between 2013 and the date of the filing ofthis Indictment, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants JEAN BOUSTANI, MANUEL
[ANDREW PEARSE,
CHANG,|
SURJAN SINGH and DETELINA SUBEVA, together with others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire to transport, transmit and transfer monetary instruments and funds to one or more places outside the United States Rom one or more places inside the United States, and to one or more places inside the United States from one or more places outside the United States, (a) with the intent to promote the carrying on of one or more specified unlawful activities, to wit; (i) a violation of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-l and 78ff; (ii) offenses against a foreign nation involving the bribery of a public official or misappropriation, theft, and embezzlement of public funds by and for the benefit of a public official, in violation of Mozambican law, as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv); (iii) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343; and (iv) fraud in the sale of securities, in violation of Title 15, United States
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Code, Sections 78j(b) and 78ff (collectively, the “Specified Unlawful Activities”), contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2)(A); and (b) knowing that the monetary instruments and funds involved in the transportation, transmission and transfer represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and knowing that such transportation, transmission and transfer was designed in whole and in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership and control of the proceeds of one or more specified unlawful activities, to wit: the Specified Unlawful Activities, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(h) and 3551 et seq.)
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE ALLEGATION
AS TO COUNT ONE
104. The United States hereby gives notice to the defendants charged in Count One that, upon their conviction of such offense, the government will seek forfeiture in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2), which requires any person convicted of such offense, to forfeit any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offense.
105. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of the defendants:
(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
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(e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b)(1), to seek forfeiture of any ther property of the defendants up to the value of the forfeitable property described in this orfeiture allegation.
(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(a)(2) and 982(b)(1); Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p))
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE ALLEGATION
AS TO COUNTS TWO AND THREE
106. The United States hereby gives notice to the defendants charged in Counts Two and Three that, upon their conviction of any such offenses, the United States will seek forfeiture in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), which require any person convicted of such offenses to forfeit any property, real or personal, constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offenses.
107. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act
or omission of the defendants:
(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or

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(e) has been commingled with other property which camiot be divided without difficulty;
it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of the defendants up to the value of the forfeitable property described in this forfeiture allegation, (Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C); Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p); Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c))
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE ALLEGATION
AS TO COUNT FOUR
108, The United States hereby gives notice to the defendants charged in Count Four that, upon their conviction of such offense, the government will seek forfeiture in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1), which requires any person convicted of such offense to forfeit any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.
109. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act
or omission of the defendants:
(a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be
divided without difficulty;

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it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b)(1), to seek forfeiture of any other property of the defendants up to the value of the forfeitable property described in this forfeiture allegation, (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(a)(1) and 982(b)(1); Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p)) ■
"DEBORAH L, CONNOI
CHIEF, MONEY LAUNDERING AND
ASSET RECOVERY SECTION,
CRIMINAL DIVISION,
U,S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DANIEL S, KAHN
CHIEF, FCPA UNIT,
FRAUD SECTION,
CRIMINAL DIVISION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Matthew S. Amatruda and MarkK Bini, Assistant TJ.S. Attorneys (718) 254-7012, Margaret A. Moeser, Sean O’Donnell, David Fuhr, U.S. Department of Justice Trial Attorneys, (202) 353-2467

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