ANTICORRUPÇÃO
Anticorrupção - Transparência - Integridade Edição No
7/2018 - Julho - Distribuição Gratuita
Centro de Integridade Pública
MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO
LEI ANTI-CORRUPÇÃO
LEI DE PROBIDADE PÚBLICA
CÓDIGO PENAL
Há duas décadas que a heroína tem vindo a ser uma das maiores exportações de Moçambique e o
negócio continua a crescer. Produzida no Afeganistão, passa pelo Paquistão a caminho do porto que
a traz por mar até à África Oriental e particularmente ao Norte de Moçambique. 1
A partir daqui vai por estrada até Joanesburgo, para ser enviada para a Europa. Esta rota tem se mantido
invariável há 25 anos. Estima-se que todos os anos se movimentam entre 10 e 40 toneladas de heroina,
ou mesmo muito mais, através de Moçambique. Com um valor de exportação de 20 milhões de US
$ por tonelada 2
, a heroina é provavelmente o maior, ou o segundo maior, produto exportado, logo a
seguir ao carvão.3
Estima-se que pelo menos 2 milhões de US $ por tonelada ficam em Moçambique,
na forma de lucros, subornos e pagamentos a figuras seniores Moçambicanas.
1 UNODC, “Market analysis of plant-based drugs”, World Drugs Report 2017 Booklet 3, p 18; Centro Europeu de Monitoria de Drogas e Dependência
de Drogas, “EU Drugs Market Report 2016”, Lisboa: 2016, pp 86-7; Departamento do Estado dos Estados Unidos, “2017 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report Volume I”, Washington, 2017, p 252; “The Smack Track”, The Economist, 15 Jan 2015.
2 Muito variável. O preço ao consumidor na Europa também varia entre 30 US$ a 300 US$ por grama, isto é 30 a 300 milhões de US$ por tonelada.
3 Oficialmente, as cinco maiores exportações de Moçambique em 2016 foram: 687 milhões de US$ de carvão, 378 milhões de US$ de electricidade, 378
milhões de US$ de alumínio, 370 milhões de US$ de gás e petróleo e 208 milhões de US$ de tabaco.
Heroína continua sendo
uma das maiores
exportações
Por: Joseph Hanlon
Traduzido por: Maria de Lourdes Torcato
Até há pouco tempo o negócio era levado a cabo por famílias de origem sul-asiática baseadas no
Norte de Moçambique e estritamente controlado pelas individualidades mais senhores do Partido
Frelimo. O negócio é bem conhecido desde 2001 quando foi publicado um artigo sobre tráfico de
drogas no Metical.4
Não se tem conhecimento de guerras pela droga entre famílias detentoras dos
negócios da droga e pouca heroina fica em Moçambique.5
Em resultado disto, e com uma única
excepção (os EUA em 2008-2010), a comunidade internacional tem optado por ignorar o negócio
regulado da heroina. Outros assuntos, desde o gás à corrupção, são vistos como mais importantes.
Alterações a nivel nacional e internacional estão a mudar o quadro e o tráfico começa a ter uma
importância cada vez maior. No Afeganistão está a aumentar a produção de heroina. Mas o controlo
mais apertado no trânsito pela Europa de Leste está a transferir as rotas para sul ao mesmo tempo que
um maior controlo da importação pelo Quénia e pela Tanzânia resulta em cada vez mais desembarques
no norte de Moçambique. Esta mudança conduziu a uma investigação da Iniciativa Global Contra o
Crime Organizado Transnacional6
baseada em Genebra que acaba de de ser publicada: “The Heroin
Coast: The political economy of heroin trafcking along the eastern African seaboard”, por Simone
Haysom, Peter Gastrow e Mark Shaw.7
O relatório argumenta que o tráfico de heroina tem “protecção
política” e que “em Moçambique, encontramos uma notória integração entre figuras do partido no
governo e traficantes.” O relatório prossegue: “indivíduos na Frelimo passaram a estar implicados em
actividades criminosas e…o próprio sistema partidário para gerar fundos assenta na ausência de um
Estado de Direito.”
O relatório presente baseia-se no artigo de fundo sobre Moçambique escrito para a Iniciativa Global por
Joseph Hanlon.8
Estudos recentes mostram que houve nos últimos tempos mudanças significativas
no modo como o comércio da heroina é controlado. Apesar deste negócio ser bem conhecido das
embaixadas, só em 1 de Junho de 2010 o Presidente Barack Obama dos EUA designou Mohamed Bachir
Suleman (MBS) como um “barão da droga”, declarando ser ilegal para cidadãos e companhias dos EUA,
ou quaisquer companhias operando nos EUA, fazerem transacções comerciais ou financeiras, com
MBS ou três das suas empresas. Acredita-se que MBS ainda controla uma grande parte do negócio
da heroina que passa por Moçambique, mas a importância da sua posição e das famílias a ele ligadas
parece ter diminuido.
Por outro lado ocorre na África Oriental uma tendência que reflecte a tendência global adoptada
pela Uber e Airbnb, que consiste em abandonar o modelo rígido de redes de negócios e armazéns
substituindo-os por sistemas informais de trabalhadores por conta própria, supervisionados através
do WhatsApp e BlackBerry. Entretanto, a pequena corrupção tornou-se de tal modo endémica dentro
de Moçambique que os negócios fazem-se com subornos e já não são precisos “padrinhos” políticos.
4 Joseph Hanlon, “O grande negocio da droga”, Metical 1017, 28 Junho 2001. Metical foi o jornal por fax com maior número de leitores, fundado por
Carlos Cardoso, que viria a ser assassinado em 2000. Em Português e Inglês. “Drugs now biggest business” em https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/
mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d135483.pdf
5 Em termos de tráfico, a heroina é a única droga importante. A cannabis herbácea produzida em Moçambique é exportada para a África do Sul; há
comércio de haxixe, ligado ao negócio da heroina; e o mandrax (Methaqualone) é manufacturado para a África do Sul em fábricas situadas em Maputo
e onde são regularmente feitas rusgas, como está publicado no Noticias de 7 de Abril 2017. Estas três substâncias não são tratadas como importantes
pelas autoridades de controlo. Dentro de Moçambique, o álcool e a soruma (cannabis) são as drogas principais e não há um grande mercado para
drogas pesadas; heroina e cocaina são consumidas localmente (o crack em Maputo vende-se na rua) mas não em grandes quantidades. A heroina
aparentemente é sobretudo fumada e não injectada.
6 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime; globalinitiative.net/ https://enactafrica.org
7 Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow e Mark Shaw “The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafcking along the eastern African seaboard”,
Genebra: Iniciativa Global Contra o Crime Organizado Transnacional, http://globalinitiative.net/ A seguir: Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
8 Obrigado também a dois jornalistas moçambicanos
3
Uma da minhas fontes9
chama a isto “crime desorganizado “, que aparentemente é o responsável pelo
novo crescimento do negócio da heroina.
O secretismo do negócio da heroina faz com que mesmo fontes bem informadas não estejam de acordo
em duas áreas, nomeadamente: (i) a partilha do negócio no antigo sistema de crime organizado e a
rede de famílias e de partilha no novo sistema de crime desorganizado, e (ii) em relação à importância
de diferentes rotas do tráfico da heroina da África do Sul para a Europa.
Há alguns anos atrás houve uma vaga de heroina adulterada e agora os compradores exigem a marca
de um fornecedor conhecido do Afeganistão. Cada vez mais a heroina aparece em pacotes de 1 kg
marcados com logótipos, por exemplo um aperto de mãos, Tokapi, Africa Demand, e 555. Também e
cada vez mais, como parte do negócio descentralizado, os compradores europeus podem contactar
directamente um negociante do Dubai e pedir uma marca, mas a carga pode conter encomendas
misturadas que são depois separadas em Joanesburgo ou no armazém em Maputo, de acordo com
instruções enviadas por WhatsApp ou BlackBerry.
Pacotes de 1 kg de marcados com 555 e um logo. Foto de drogas apreendidas depois de
atravessarem de Moçambique para a África do Sul, cedidas por The Hawks (falcões), Direcção
Sul-africana para Investigação do Crime Prioritário.
Este artigo divide-se em quatro secções. A primeira descreve aquilo que é conhecido sobre o negócio
da heroina em concreto e os movimentos dentro de Moçambique. A segunda secção fala de MBS, o
maior negociante de heroina. A terceira é sobre a política nacional e internacional do negócio regulado
da heroina em Moçambique. A secção final trata do crescimento recente do negócio paralelo não
regulado.
9 O relatório da Iniciativa Global nota que “para encorajar a sinceridade e proteger as nossas fontes” não cita nomes e em certos casos nós não damos
nomes aqui.
4
As rotas do tráfco da heroina
Moçambique é essencialmente um centro de trânsito para heroina. Como qualquer outra mercadoria,
existe uma cadeia de fornecimento e os pontos entre o produtor e o comprador final onde ela tem
de ser armazenada enquanto espera uma encomenda ou é pelo menos réempacotada para satisfazer
uma encomenda, e este é o papel de Moçambique. No nosso caso, a cadeia começa no Afeganistão
com a produção do cloridrato de heroina – um pó branco ou blocos de cristais cinzentos - passa
através do Paquistão (e Irão) e é depois transportada até ao norte de Moçambique. Aqui entra no
armazém, é réempacotada e segue por terra até Joanesburgo. Daqui é levada para a Europa.
Moçambique tem 2300 km de comprimento mas existe apenas uma estrada norte-sul, a N1, estrada
essencial para o trânsito da heroina. A guerra de 1982-92 cortou esta estrada e devastou a economia
do país. A guerra terminou em 1992 e a estrada foi reaberta por volta de 1995, o que revitalizou
substancialmente o comércio e não tardou a incluir o trânsito da heroina.10
Esta secção trata das três vias para Moçambique (mar, contentor, estrada), a passagem através de
Moçambique, e o envio via África do Sul.
Chegada: por mar
Durante séculos, negociantes navegando nos seus barcos tradicionais, os dhows, usaram os ventos
para seguir as rotas do Paquistão até à África Oriental. Nos nossos dias, os dhows de madeira equipados
com motor, cruzam o Mar Arábico directamente, embora ainda evitem o período de ventos fortes e
tempesteadas das grandes monções, de Junho a Agosto.11 A heroina é embarcada na costa de Makran
no Irão e Paquistão, e transportada para os destinos habituais nas praias do Quénia, Tanzania e Norte
de Moçambique. Habitualmente os dhows são do tipo Jelbot em madeira, com motor, construidos
nos Emiratos Árabes Unidos e concebidos para a pesca no mar. O seu comprimento mais comum
é de 15 a 23 metros, o que lhes permite navegar no mar alto mas sendo suficientemente pequenos
para não serem detectados nas fotografias de satélite ou pelos barcos de patrulha. São providos de
compartimentos escondidos que podem carregar 100 a 1000 Kgs de heroina. Se são mandados parar,
passam facilmente por barcos de pesca. Forças Combinadas da Marinha que patrulham o Oceano
Indico Ocidental apreenderam assim mais de 9.3 toneladas de heroina em três anos, 2013-6.12 Foime
dito que só na primeira metade de 2017 foram apreendidas 3 toneladas de heroina em barcos no
Oceano Índico.
Moçambique não tem guarda naval ou costeira operacional pelo que carece de controlos ao
10 Carina Bruwer da University of Cape Town escreveu sobre isto dois artigos: “Heroin trafcking through South Africa: why here and why now?”,
The Conversation, 15 de Agosto 2017, https://theconversation.com/heroin-trafcking-through-south-africa-why-here-and-why-now-81627 e “From
Afghanistan to Africa: Heroin trafcking in East Africa and the Indian Ocean”, Daily Maverick 21 de Junho 2016, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/
article/2016-06-21-from-afghanistan-to-africa-heroin-trafcking-in-east-africa-and-the-indian-ocean/#
11 Julian Whitewright, “The maritime rhythms of the Indian Ocean monsoon”, University of Southampton mooc, http://moocs.southampton.ac.uk/
shipwrecks/2014/10/02/maritime-rhythms-indian-ocean-monsoon/
12 Agência da ONU sobre Drogas e Crime (UNODC), informação distribuida em 4 de Novembro 2016, “Indian Ocean: ‘Colombo Declaration adopted
to coordinate anti-drugs eforts”. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/November/indian-ocean_-colombo-declaration-adopted-tocoordinate-anti-drugs-eforts.html
5
contrabando ou pesca ilegal.13 Calcula-se que os dhows chegam pelo menos uma vez por semana
excepto nos 3 meses da monção, o que indica desembarques de 10 a 40 toneladas de heroina por
ano. Os dhows ficam ancorados no mar, a 20-100 kms da praia. Uma flotilha de barcos pequenos vai
ao seu encontro e volta com carga que distribui por vários pontos ao longo da costa. A costa de Cabo
Delgado é privilegiada porque é a mais longínqua a norte do país. O transbordo é feito mais facilmente
na zona a norte de Pemba com as ilhas Quirimbas ao longo da costa. Estas são zonas de mar calmo
com um tráfego significativo de barcos pequenos normalmente desembarcando na praia.
Quisanga a norte de Pemba, é uma pequena praia que se transformou num porto onde se movimentam
pequenos barcos que navegam entre as ilhas do Ibo e Quirimba para pescar, e passou a ser um
importante ponto de desembarque para a heroina. Talvez se tenha tornado demasiado conhecido
obrigando a uma mudança de destino para a costa a sul de Pemba onde há boas praias com dunas de
areia que facilitam esconderijos para proceder ao desembarque. Há relativamente poucas apreensões
de droga em Moçambique, mas as maiores e mais publicitadas apreensões de haxixe indicam rotas de
droga. Em Agosto de 1997 foram apreendidas em Quisanga 12 toneladas de haxixe.
Os dhows chegam a descer mais para sul até ao porto de Angoche, antigo porto de tráfico de escravos
na província de Nampula e onde também há ilhas.14 Em 2012 a polícia apanhou 187 Kgs de haxixe
enterrado no quintal de uma casa em Angoche. O porta-voz do Comando da Policia na Província de
Nampula, Inácio Dina, disse: “O que sabemos é que estas drogas vieram num barco que ancorou a
algumas milhas ao largo da costa de Angoche. As drogas foram depois trazidas em pequenos barcos
alugados.“ A Iniciativa Global argumenta que o Governo de Moçambique tem vindo a escamotear
provas do tráfico de heroina e algumas apreensões de haxixe podem na realidade terem sido de
heroina.
Chegadas: em contentores
Famílias de comerciantes asiáticos15 trazendo contentores de mercadoria sempre providenciaram
o expediente para importar heroina, porque não há muita inspecção à carga que chega; algumas
companhias não são inspeccionadas e o suborno resolve qualquer problema. O Paquistão é um
grande exportador de arroz, e Moçambique compra significativas quantidades de arroz paquistanês.
A heroina pode ser incluida em contentores de arroz e enviada para Nacala e Pemba.
Pemba é um porto relativamente pequeno, manuseando menos de 15 000 contentores por ano,
embora isto esteja em vias de mudar por causa do desenvolvimento do gás. Pemba não é normalmente
13 Em 2013-14 Moçambique fez uma dívida secreta de 2 biliões de US$ ostensivamente para criar um sistema de protecção da costa. O Canal de
Moçambique entre Moçambique e Madagascar não tem patrulhas militares regulares e está assim aberta ao contrabando, pirataria (só uma vez) e talvez
sobretudo, à pesca ilegal. O esquema envolveu empréstimos de 2 biliões de US$ organizados em segredo com o Crédit Suisse e o banco russo VTB. Uma
subsequente auditoria pela Kroll diz o uso mais de metade desse dinheiro não pode ser explicado.
14 Houve vários relatos de drogas desembarcadas mais a sul perto do Bazaruto e outras ilhas ao largo da costa em Vilanculos, Inhambane, mas não
parece ser muito comum. Relatos incluem cocaina e heroina que deu à costa, possivelmente resultado de um transbordo que correu mal, e de um barco
carregado de haxixe que ficou encalhado nas rochas em Junho de 2000 com 16 toneladas de haxixe embalado em latas que depois vieram dar à costa.
Os nove paquistaneses que escaparam do naufrágio foram condenados a longas penas de prisão.
15 Na era colonial o comércio urbano estava essencialmente nas mãos de portugueses brancos enquanto o comércio rural era feito através de
comerciantes de origem asiática. Na independência a maioria os portugueses foram embora e mudaram os rosto do comércio, com os asiáticos a
mudarem-se para as vilas e cidades. Esta divisão racial do comércio, com raizes na história colonial, ainda hoje caracteriza o comércio, tanto o legal
como o ilegal. Na independência, muitas famílias de origem asiática não estavam seguros do que iria acontecer em Moçambique e à cautela dividiram
as famílias com algumas permanecendo em Moçambique e construindo ligações à Frelimo, enquanto outros membros foram para África do Sul, Malawi,
Portugal, Dubai, Índia e Paquistão. Os laços foram mantidos e têm sido fundamentais para a lavagem de dinheiro e para os tráficos de heroina, haxixe e
mandrax.
6
um porto de cereais por isso contentores de arroz eram vistos como fora do comum e chamavam
a atenção. O pequeno porto de águas profundas há muito tempo que era o foco de tráfico ilegal,
para exportar contentores de madeiras preciosas, fauna bravia e produtos marinhos, e importação de
heroina e haxixe. A gestão dos portos foi privatizada a partir de 2000 mas Pemba foi o único porto
mantido debaixo de controlo estatal através da empresa estatal CFM, Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de
Moçambique, e era evidente que os altos funcionários não queriam forasteiros no porto.
Nacala é considerado o porto mais profundo da costa oriental e é um importante porto de contentores
ligado por uma via férrea ao Norte de Moçambique, ao Malawi e à Zâmbia, e actualmente às minas
de carvão de Tete. A gestão do porto é feita por uma “joint venture” na qual os CFM desempenham
um grande papel, mas tratando-se de um porto de contentores de grande dimensão não pode ser
fechado da mesma maneira que foi o porto de Pemba. Em vez disso, existe um número de armazéns
controlados por famílias de comerciantes de origem asiática e com uma segurança privada apertada
e menos ligada ao porto. Estes armazéns são usados para mercadoria branca importada, como
frigoríficos, bem como motocicletas e outros bens, abertamente subfacturadas para reduzir taxas
de importação. Acredita-se que estes também são usados para importar heroína, por exemplo em
tanques de combustível de motocicletas, e os armazéns também são usados para armazenar heroína
aguardando pedidos da África do Sul e da Europa. As famílias citadas como estando envolvidas no
tráfico de heroina estão baseadas em Nampula e Nacala que distam 160 Kms uma da outra.
Ambos os portos, Nacala e Beira, são profundamente corruptos e qualquer problema com tráfico
ilegal é resolvido com subornos. Contentores para o Malawi passam por eles e à chegada ao Malawi
alguns ostentam evidência óbvia de terem sido abertos e fechados de novo no porto com algumas
mercadorias de contrabando retiradas. Diz-se que alguns contentores são usados para um certo
número de bens contrabandeados: carros roubados da Europa para a África do Sul, explosivos para a
mineração ilegal, álcool e tabaco, e portanto, provavelmente também heroina ou armas para a caça
furtiva a espécies bravias. A Iniciativa Global entrevistou funcionários da empresa de “scan” em Maputo
e Nacala que dizem terem sido proibidos de usar o “scan” em contentores importados por certos
comerciantes protegidos.16
Não há estimativas sobre quantidades de heroina importada por esta via. Todavia, os portos de Karachi
e Dubai, abertos há 15 anos, foram agora obrigados a instalar equipamento de “scan” que pode reduzir
a entrada de heroina. Apesar disso, o tráfico de heroina em contentores é provavelmente significativo.
Chegadas: por terra
Alguma heroina vem por terra, pela estrada da Tanzânia. Em Março de 2013 a polícia moçambicana
apreendeu 600 Kgs de heroina em sacos de 5 Kgs no posto fronteiriço de Namoto, perto da costa
e na Estrada entre Mtwara na Tanzânia e Palma, em Cabo Delgado, Moçambique. A apreensão foi
orgulhosamente reportada pela polícia e publicada na imprensa moçambicana, mas nunca apareceu
nas estatísticas do Governo. Malva Brito, porta-voz da polícia de Cabo Delgado, disse que o destino da
droga era a Africa do Sul e era transportada numa carrinha Toyota Hiace com matrícula da República
16 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
7
Democrática do Congo 17 que aparentava não ter carga mas tinha um compartimento secreto debaixo
da carroçaria. Brito explicou que a altura da porta de trás e um aroma esquisito, chamaram a atenção
da polícia que inspeccionou o veículo. Foi a única apreensão reportada nesta rota.
O relatório da Iniciativa Global diz que uma fonte confiável tinha visto os resultados do teste do
Departamento de Alfândegas que confirmava que era heroina embora a droga estivesse registada
como N-Acetylanthranilic Acid pelas autoridades provinciais” e uma apreensão de 604 Kgs de
N-Acetylanthranilic Acid aparece nos registos provinciais de 2013.18 N-Acetylanthranilic Acid é usada
na síntese da methaqualone (mandrax), que é tratado como uma droga menos importante que a
heroina mas é reportada, daí a prova de que houve tentativa de escamotear o tráfico de heroina.
O tráfico por esta rota é provavelmente pequeno. As estradas são más e outro tráfego é limitado,
tornando os contrabandistas da heroina mais visíveis. Mas foi chamada a atenção para o facto de os
traficantes globais não estarem a abastecer o pequeno mercado moçambicano e sugere-se que este
é fornecido pelos pequenos traficantes da Tanzânia.
Por Estrada para a África do Sul
As drogas são enviadas por estrada para o sul de Moçambique e depois para a África do Sul, pela
N1, a única estrada que une o norte ao sul do país. Maputo fica a 2200 Kms a partir de Nacala e até
Joanesburgo, são mais 500 ou 600 Kms conforme o itinerário. Do norte de Moçambique até Nacala
são mais 650 km. A droga pode assim viajar 3300 Kms para chegar a Joanesburgo.
Os importadores usam diferentes padrões. As redes organizadas MBS movimentam as drogas para
armazéns no porto de Nacala ou para outros armazéns de famílias de traficantes, como o complexo
industrial SeS em Nacala, ou armazéns em Nampula, a 160 kms de Nacala, que têm uma apertada
segurança. Diz-se que as redes mais recentes de “crime desorganizado” preferem locais no interior e
seguem os modelos latino-americanos que se estabelecem em locais de pouco tráfego e cujo acesso
pode ser guardado, por exemplo a partir das colinas que os rodeiam.
Há muitos postos de controlo da polícia nas estradas e as exigências de subornos são vulgares. Diz-se
que no início, o transporte de carregamentos de heroina na N1 era acompanhado pela polícia com
o objectivo de ignorar os postos de controlo. À medida que melhorou a rede de telefonia móvel ao
longo das estradas principais, os condutores dos veículos recebiam um número de telefone de um
oficial da Polícia ou de uma individualidade da Frelimo, que usavam no caso de serem interceptados.
Pode ser que isto ainda seja usado nas cargas ligadas ao MBS. Mas em Moçambique a corrupção está
tão generalizada que os condutores por conta própria que trabalham para as novas redes, recebem
simplesmente dinheiro para subornar e o seu pagamento acaba sendo o que conseguirem poupar
depois de pagar os subornos. Ao contrário de outros países, transportadores não são pagos em produto
e pouca heroina fica em Moçambique.
Normalmente o transporte é um veículo preparado para o efeito. Carrinhas 4x4 e carros Toyota Hilux
podem levar entre 20 a 100 Kgs, e camiões maiores especialmente adaptados podem levar entre 100
17 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
18 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
8
a 200 Kgs. As apreensões feitas dão-nos um melhor percepção disto. Em Maio e Junho de 2017, as
autoridades da África do Sul reportaram ter mandado parar dois camiões em estradas rurais do sul
de Moçambique que atravessam a fronteira para a África do Sul.19 Uma carrinha foi apanhada com
145 Kgs de heroina em sacos de 1 kg, no posto de fronteira de Golela, Suazilândia a 4 de Maio de
2017 e uma quantidade semelhante foi encontrada num camião no posto fronteiriço de Kosi Bay a
12 de Junho de 2017. Aparentemente não foi reportada a apreensão em 2017 de 100 Kgs de heroina
escondida debaixo do pavimento da caixa de um camião mandado parar na N4 na direcção MaputoJoanesburgo.
Na primeira metade de 2016 a polícia reportou ter apanhado um carro Nissan NP 200
contendo 20 000 US$ e 93 sacos de heroina pesando 1 Kg cada um, escondida atrás dos painéis das
portas; um Toyota Prado com 50 Kgs de heroina escondida no depósito de combustível; e ainda, 58
Kgs escondidos numa carrinha Opel Corsa, e 38 Kgs escondidos num Toyota Hilux.20
Igualmente muitos camiões trazem carga da Africa do Sul para Moçambique e regressam vazios, e
alguns levam carga ilegal incluindo heroina.21
Não há apreensões no lado moçambicano da fronteira, em parte devido à corrupção. No ultimo mês
de Julho de 2017 foi suspensa toda a força policial da Ponta do Ouro, o lado moçambicano do posto
de Kosi Bay, alegadamente por corrupção, incluindo turistas e negociantes locais importunados com
pedidos de dinheiro 22. Mas a Presidente da Autoridade Tributária de Moçambique, Amelia Nankhare,
disse a uma equipa do Grupo da África África Oriental e Austral Contra a Lavagem de Dinheiro, em
Julho de 2017, que por falta de fundos não tinha “scanners” para levar a cabo controlos eficazes de
fronteira e por isso muita mercadoria ilegal só era apanhada no lado sul-africano. 23
Para além de Joanesburgo
A maior parte da heroina que chega à Africa do Sul está em trânsito, mas cada vez maiores quantidades
permanecem neste país, o que está a aumentar a vigilância nas fronteiras. O consumo de heroina
existe mas não está muito difundido na Africa do Sul, embora possa estar a aumentar e pode mesmo
ser responsável pelo agravamento das guerras de gangs na Cidade do Cabo. A maior preocupação
é o uso crescente de nyaope (também chamado unga e whoonga) que consiste numa mistura de
heroina e canabis, e por vezes outras drogas. É fumada e nos passados cinco anos o consumo tem
crescido substancialmente. Faz efeito durante pouco tempo mas é muito barata, menos de um dólar
por dose.
Nos primeiros tempos do tráfico a heroina era enviada directamente para os portos, nomeadamente
Durban e, em menor dimensão, para Maputo, onde era adicionada em contentores. Isto deixou
19 Na fronteira de Golela, Suazilândia, foi mandado parar um camião com 145 Kgs de heroina em sacos de 1 Kg a 4 de Maio 2017, http://www.news24.
com/SouthAfrica/News/police-seize-more-than-r100m-worth-of-drugs-at-swazi-sa-border-20170505, e quantidade semelhante foi encontrada num
camião no posto de fronteira de Kosi Bay em 12 de Junho de 2017, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/three-arrested-r100m-worthheroin-seized-in-drug-bust-9784596.
Os dois postos de fronteira estão em estradas rurais do sul atravessando de Moçambique para a Africa do Sul.
20 Jana Boshof, “Middelburg situated on popular drug route”, Middleburg Observer, 25 July 2017, https://mobserver.co.za/69733/middelburg-situatedpopular-drug-route/
e https://www.facebook.com/policepicsandclips/photos/a.467274603397847.1073741829.440736009385040/535476389911001/?type
=3&theater
21 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
22 MediaFax 2 de Agosto 2017
23 Proposta de Relatório da missão de alto nível à República de Moçambique, 26-28 de Julho 2017, Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering
Group.
9
de ser assim e Joanesburgo passou a ser o ponto de armazenagem e embarque. O Terminal de
Contentores de City Deep é o maior porto seco interior de África, com uma capacidade de manusear
400 000 TEUs (unidades equivalentes a vinte-pés) por ano. Os contentores são levados por caminho
de ferro até os portos de mar e embarcam sem mais inspecções aduaneiras, porque City Deep é
considerado um porto. Todavia sabe-se que é muito corrupto e os contentores de heroina passam
sem ser interceptados. E mesmo a polícia admite a extensa corrupção no Aeroporto internacional O
R Tambo.24 Por isso a maneira mais fácil é passar por City Deep ou o Aeroporto
Por causa do secretismo do tráfico de heroina, fontes aparentemente bem informadas discordam
no que se refere à maior parte da heroina ter sido exportada para a Europa por mar em contentores
ou por ar. A África do Sul está interessada sobretudo em impedir a heroina de entrar no país, para
reduzir o consumo local, e há poucas inspecções às exportações. Apenas foram reportadas duas
apreensões de exportação, uma em cada via. Em 2009, 150 Kgs de heroina foram interceptados num
carregamento de “souvenirs” turísticos no aeroporto de Heathrow, Londres, num voo vindo da África
do Sul; o rasto conduziu até Durban e depois Moçambique, onde a unidade sul-africana de crime
organizado, os Hawks, disseram que a heroina tinha sido empacotada com os artefactos”. 25 E em
Junho de 2017 em Overberg, a 250 Kms da Cidade do Cabo, a polícia apreendeu 963 Kgs de heroina,
uma das maiores apreensões de sempre. Estava acondicionada em 253 maços de heroina em paletes
de caixas de vinho destinados a exportação. Parece ter sido uma apreensão inteiramente por acaso. As
mercadorias estavam a ser transportadas e a carga mudou. Os trabalhadores da vinha começaram a
reacondicionar o contentor quando verificaram que algumas caixas de vinho tinham sido substituidas
por heroina. A apreensão foi feita na propriedade vinícola de Eerste Hoop, de proprietários belgas, e a
carga ia para Antuérpia, na Bélgica.26
A heroina é transportada em contentores de bens não perecíveis como vinho, pedra, materiais
cerâmicos, etc., que escapam mais facilmente nos “scans” e podem ficar muito tempo num porto
europeu. Note-se que a apreensão de Overberg estava num contentor destinado directamente a
um porto e não via City Deep, sugerindo que algum empacotamento é feito pelos transportadores e
noutros casos a heroina é acrescentada à carga sem o conhecimento destes.
24 Thando Kubheka, “Mbalula committed to fighting corruption at OR Tambo airport”, Eyewitness News, 22 de Julho 2017, http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/22/
mbalula-committed-to-fighting-corruption-at-or-tambo-airport
25 “South African Hawks in drugs bust,” BBC News, 16 de Setº 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8259456.stm; “SA centre of £75 million drugs haul”,
New Zimbabwe, 18 de Setº 2009, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-999-SA+centre+of+%C2%A375+million+drug+haul/news.aspx
26 Inicialmente a carga foi identificada incorrectamente nos media como cocaina. Aron Hyman, “Heroin-smuggling plot ‘foiled by sharp-eyed workers
on Cape wine farm’,” Sunday Times Live, 23 June 2017; Caryn Dolley, “Police make massive R500m cocaine bust in Overberg town” e “Inside SA’s ‘biggest’
drug bust – 5 things that have emerged so far”, News24, 22 de Junho 2017. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2017-06-23-heroina-smuggling-plot-foiledby-sharp-eyed-workers-on-cape-wine-farm/;
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/inside-sas-biggest-drug-bust-5-things-that-have-emergedso-far-20170626
10
Moçambique e o seu “barão da droga”
O Presidente Joaquim Chissano foi o convidado de honra no casamento do segundo filho de Mohamed
Bachir Suleman (MBS) a 19 de Abril de 2001. Num artigo aparecido no maior semanário de Maputo,
Savana (27 de Abril de 2001), as bodas foram descritas como “sumptuosas” e havia 10 mil convidados
de todo o mundo.
Para um país saido duma guerra há menos de uma década, era uma despesa de ostentação massiva.
MBS era também conhecido como o maior contribuinte para a Frelimo. É um dos homens de negócio
mais ricos e proeminentes e a sua riqueza não provem só da venda de electro-domésticos no seu
Kayum Centre. Ainda em 2001, fui informado por um funcionário internacional do controlo de drogas
que a sua empresa, MBS, era o maior centro de negócio da heroina em Moçambique.
As ligações ao MBS passaram para Armando Guebuza quando foi eleito Presidente em 2004. Este
visitou publicamente por duas vezes o Maputo Shopping de MBS – a 22 de Junho de 2006 e depois
na abertura oficial em 8 de Maio de 2007. Este complexo de 32 milhões de US$ era na altura o maior
de Moçambique e Guebuza elogiou-o como um modelo de investimento privado.27 Foi publicado
que MBS fez uma contribuição de 1 milhão de US$ para a campanha eleitoral de 2009 do Presidente
Armando Guebuza.28 Mas as ligações podem ter sido feitas por intermédio dos filhos de Guebuza.
Em telexes de 16 de Novº de 2009 e 25 de Janº de 2010, Todd Chapman, Encarregado de Negócios na
Embaixada dos EUA em Maputo, alegava que MBS tinha ligações directas com o Presidente Guebuza
e antigo Presidente Chissano e que MBS é o coordenador da heroina que passa por Moçambique e
talvez pelo sul da Tanzânia.
Em seguida, a 1 de Junho de 2010, o Presidente dos EUA Barack Obama designava MBS como um
“barão da droga” e declarava ilegal para cidadãos dos EUA, empresas dos EUA ou que operassem
nos EUA, fazerem transacções comerciais ou financeiras com ele ou com três das suas empresas,
nomeadamente o Grupo MBS, o Kayum Centro e o Maputo Shopping. O Departamento norteAmericano
do Tesouro declarava que “Mohamed Bachir Suleman é um narco-traficante de grande
escala em Moçambique, e a sua rede contribui para a crescente tendência do tráfico de narcóticos e
lavagem de dinheiro relacionada com ele, por toda a África Austral.. … Suleman dirige em Moçambique
um rede de tráfico de drogas e lavagem de dinheiro bem financiado.” 29 Na secção a seguir chamamos
a atenção para o facto desta ter sido a única intervenção no assunto, apesar de o negócio da heroina
ser conhecido de toda a comunidade internacional.
Diz-se que a estreita ligação entre MBS e Chissano reflecte uma relação complexa. O negócio da
heroina era regulado ao nível mais alto. Diz-se que Chissano se encontrava regularmente com MBS e
provavelmente com chefes das outras famílias envolvidas. MBS era publicamente identificado com um
grande benfeitor para a Frelimo. Era em geral assumido que havia um acordo para regular o negócio.
Nunca houve guerras entre as famílias do negócio da heroina e do haxixe nem houve condenações
27 Noticias 23 de Junho de 2006, AIM English 9 May 2007.
28 Savana on-line, 20 Outº de 2009.
29 Boletim do Departamento do Tesouro dos EUA, “Treasury Sanctions Entities Owned By Drug Kingpin Mohamed Bachir Suleman”, Comunicado de
imprensa TG-729, 1 de Junho 2010.
11
pela justiça – e nas duas últimas décadas não foi detido ninguém entre as figuras seniores do negócio
da heroina e do haxixe, nem houve apreensões de droga passando pelo negócio regulamentado. O
Ministério do Interior, a Polícia e as Alfândegas, recebem as suas comissões e assistem passivamente
ao negócio. A Frelimo recebe uma quantia considerável de dinheiro para custos operativos e despesas
eleitorais, e assume-se que alguns membros da direcção da Frelimo recebam pessoalmente uma parte.
Chissano foi chefe da segurança da Frelimo durante muitos anos e tinha deste modo os contactos
necessários para organizar e regular o negócio.
Não há nenhuma evidência directa da regulação a alto nível e nenhuma testemunha dos encontros
mencionados estaria certamente interessada em denunciá-los. Especula-se que faz parte do acordo
que a heroina se destine a trânsito internacional e que os comerciantes concordam em que muito
pouca fica em Moçambique. No início da década de 2000, o bairro dos militares situado no centro de
Maputo tornou-se conhecido como “Colômbia” porque era fácil adquirir droga nesta zona, e muitos
filhos da elite tornaram-se assim consumidores. Isto começou a aparecer nos media e a ser muito
falado pelo que, subitamente, passou a ser mais difícil. Teria Chissano dito a MBS para parar a venda
localmente? Claramente passou-se alguma coisa, porque hoje cocaina e particularmente crack, ainda
estão disponíveis em Maputo, sugerindo a falta de regulação do comércio da cocaina.
Outros actores
Embora MBS seja um homem importante em Moçambique, ele é apenas parte de uma cadeia
organizada a partir do subcontinente indiano. A Iniciativa Global identifica três famílias ligadas ao
tráfico sob a chefia de MBS, que têm negócios em Nacala e Nampula. Gulam Rassul Moti e a família
Ayoob foram também mencionadas num telex datado de 16 de Novº de 2009, de Todd Chapman,
Encarregado de Negócios da Embaixada dos EUA em Maputo. Embora ele não seja uma fonte segura
em termos de nomes ou detalhes, 30 Chapman enviou relatos para Washington, mais tarde citados a
partir do WikiLeaks, e no que respeita à heroina parecem ser geralmente correctos.31
Gulam Rassul Moti 32 é proprietário da Moti Comercial e da Moti Rent a Car e tem mantido presença
discreta, mas parece ter sido um dos que mais cedo se juntou ao negócio. Em Agosto de 1997, foram
apreendidas 12 toneladas de haxixe em Quisanga, Cabo Delgado, e Gulam Rassul Moti foi preso em
conexão com este caso. Esta foi a segunda detenção em conexão com as drogas – anteriormente
tinha sido chamado em conexão com o contrabando de haxixe para os EUA e Europa a partir do porto
de Nacala, em contentores disfarçados como sendo de chá. Foi absolvido.
Os partidos políticos têm o direito de importar bens para seu uso próprio livres de taxas aduaneiras.
Em 2012 e 2013 a Rassul Trading importou 3000 motocicletas, 7000 frigoríficos e 5000 pneus para a
30 Paul Fauvet, “Renamo brings WikiLeaks back to parliament”, AIM em Inglês de 28 de Abril de 2011. Chapman correctamente apontou para os extensivos
interesses empresariais do Presidente Armando Guebuza mas exagerou muito e errou a respeito de empresas e propriedades quando podia facilmente
ter verificado. Na questão das drogas, num telex de 1 de Julho de 2009 citou um artigo meu (“Long time commentator on Moçambique Joseph Hanlon”)
como sendo de Maio de 2009 quando de facto era um artigo redistribuido e que já tinha sido publicado no Metical de 2001.
31 Do WikiLeaks: 16 Nov 2009 MAPUTO 001291, 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080; https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html Chapman
alegava que “Domingos Tivane, Chefe do Serviço de Afândega, era um importante recipiente de subornos de narcotraficantes e recentemente comprou
propriedade em Maputo avaliada num preço muito acima do que o salário de funcionário lhe podia permitir”. Tivane foi demitido de Chefe das Alfândegas
em 2013.
32 Também conhecido como Gulamo; listado só como Gulam Rassul como dono da Moti.
12
Frelimo. Mas o Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) concluiu que a maior parte foi vendida nas lojas
da Rassul Trading.33 Era o indicativo dos laços estreitos da empresa com a Frelimo. Um incêndio no
armazém da Rassul Trading em Nacala, em Fevereiro de 2014, alegadamente destruiu 50 contentores
com 5000 motocicletas.34 A Iniciativa Global menciona alegações de que havia heroina importada em
tanques de combustível de algumas das motocicletas.35
O segundo grupo é a família Ayoob. Momed Khalid Ayoob era o dono de hoteis, estâncias turísticas e
companhias de automóveis assim como as lojas Modas Niza e Real Câmbios. Em Outubro de 2008 o
semanário Zambeze36 reportou que Khalid Ayoob tinha sido detido em Portugal em 1987 por posse de
heroina, mas conseguiu escapar 2 anos mais tarde e que o seu irmão Macsud foi preso em Portugal
por tráfico de droga em 1990. O Zambeze escreveu também que a família tinha investido dezenas de
milhões de dólares em hotéis em Maputo.
Macsud Ayoob foi detido em 2002 no aeroporto de Maputo, na posse de mais de 1 milhão de US$ em
notas, a caminho do Dubai. O irmão Momed Khalid Ayoob foi preso a 1 de Dezembro de 2010 pela
polícia da Suazilândia na posse de 18 milhões de Mts (2,6 milhões de US$) em notas bancárias. Estava
em vias de levar o dinheiro de Moçambique para o Dubai, violando as leis cambiais moçambicanas
e suázis. Momed foi alvejado e morto em Maputo a 20 de Abril de 2012. A sua viúva Reyma Ayoob
foi raptada em 2014 e libertada 22 dias depois quando a família pagou um resgate. Momed e Macsud
eram donos da Modas Niza que ficou muito conhecida no início de 2010 quando a Autoridade Fiscal
de Moçambique ordenou a venda dos seus bens em hasta pública para pagar uma dívida de 276
milhões de Meticais (8 milhões de US$) à operadora de telefonia móvel M-Cel. A casa Niza tinha sido
um vendedor autorizado de cartões de pré-pago da M-Cel. Venderam os cartões mas os cheques
para pagar à M-Cel não tinham cobertura e a Autoridade Fiscal apreendeu-lhes electro-domésticos
importados que viriam a ser vendidos para reembolsar a dívida à M-Cel.
A terceira família é chefiada por Momad Rassul, também conhecido por Momad Rassul Abdul Rahim e
só é mencionado pela Iniciativa Global que faz notar que não existe nenhuma prova de ligação entre
Rassul e o tráfico de drogas. Foi detido e liberto com uma caução de 130 mil US$ a 7 de Julho de 2017.
As acusações foram de “a prática de crimes de branqueamento de capitais, enriquecimento ilícito e
outros crimes de natureza tributária, como seja fraude fiscal, contrabando e descaminho”. Alugmas
propriedades suas são o Grupo SeS com grandes fábricas de óleo vegetal e outras empresas, o Grupo
ARJ com cimento e o Parque de Contentores de Nacala.37 Dos três é o mais conhecido, com ligações
políticas à Frelimo e diz-se ter tido acesso directo a Armando Guebuza quando ele foi presidente. 38
33 Borges Nhamire e Lázaro Mabunda, “Isenções aduaneiras do Partido Frelimo”, Centro de Integridade Pública, 13 de Maio de 2014, http://www.cip.
org.mz/historico/article.asp?lang=&sub=iafl&docno=303; Borges Nhamire e Lázaro Mabunda, “Importação ilegal de viaturas: a máfia que custa milhões
ao Estado”, Centro de Integridade Pública Moçambique: Boletim CIP de 1 de Março 2014, https://www.cipmoz.org/images/Documentos/PPP/295_CIP_
Newsletter_n01_2014-importacao_ilegal_de_viaturas.pdf, page 5.
34 Arlindo Chissale, “Incendio de altas proporções destrói acima de 50 contentores de motorizadas”, CAIC Diario, 25 Fevereiro 2014, https://www.
caicc.org.mz/diario/?p=3520; “Incêndio destrói cinco mil motas”, Noticias, 27 Fevereiro 2014, http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/11632-
incendio-destroi-cinco-mil-motas.html
35 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
36 Luís Nhachote, “Traficante de droga procurado em Portugal”, Zambeze 1 Outubro 2008. http://manueldearaujo.blogspot.co.uk/2008/10/traficantes-dedroga-tm-estatuto.html
e http://muliquela.blogspot.co.uk/p/mohamad-khalid-ayoob-momad-aiuba-irmao.html
37 O Tiger Centre de venda de artigos electrónicos e electro-domésticos em Maputo é propriedade de quatro irmãos da família: Mohamed Sabir Gulam
Rassul, Abdul Gafur Rassul, Momade Asslam, e Mahebub Gulam Rassul. Os dois últimos foram alvo de tentativas falhadas de rapto em 2012 e 2016 (AIM
em Inglês de 19 Dezº 2016). Mohamed Sabir Gulam Rassul e outros membros da família são donos de vários hotéis.
38 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
13
Momad Rassul faz questão de dizer que é de origem Indiana e não Paquistanesa.
Parece haver uma tentativa de converter dinheiro da droga em bens legais dentro de Moçambique. Na
década passada houve grande construção de hoteis na cidade de Nampula e de prédios residenciais
e de escritórios na cidade de Maputo. Em 2007 Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) abriu o maior centro
comercial de Moçambique, o Maputo Shopping. Há também construção de luxo em Maputo, Nampula
e zonas de praia perto de Nampula como as Chocas Mar, ligada a famílias de comerciantes de origem
asiática. Embora não haja evidência directa sempre se acreditou que em parte isto é financiado pelos
lucros da droga bem como por outras actividades ilegais. O investimento turístico tem sido significativo
e é útil para o branqueamento de dinheiro porque é sempre possível declarar mais clientela do que
aquela que se aloja realmente, por exemplo num hotel, e usar isto para ocultar futuros lucros da droga.
Os hoteis também proporcionam uma base segura para correios da droga. O Zambeze estimava que
em 2008 tinham sido investidos 10 milhões de US$ pela família só em hoteis em Maputo. A Iniciativa
Global chama a atenção para os hoteis vistosos em Nampula e outras localizações, quase sempre às
moscas.39
Outras importantes áreas de investimento são a Bolsa de Valores e os Bilhetes de Tesouro. O comprador
paga em dinheiro e sem ter de responder a muitas perguntas, mas quando as acções ou os títulos
são vendidos o processo é tratado da mesma maneira que o dinheiro legítimo. Até há pouco tempo o
Banco de Moçambique não tinha dificuldade em encontrar investidores domésticos interessados em
comprar títulos do Estado. E a 7 de Junho de 2001 o presidente da Bolsa de Valores de Moçambique,
BVM, Jussub Nurmamade, disse que o rápido crescimento da BVM era “único”. “Nós começámos com
3 milhões de US$ ainda não há dois anos”, disse aos jornalistas, e previu que no final de 2001 teriam
sido investidos 100 milhões de US$ em companhias listadas na Bolsa e títulos do Governo e dos
bancos. Como poderia uma economia tão pequena como a de Moçambique encontrar 100 milhões
de US$ em tão pouco tempo? O que faz Moçambique ser “único” deve ser dinheiro da droga.
Três macacos sábios
Excepto uma única condenação, a dos Estados Unidos da América, a comunidade internacional –
doadores, credores e agências internacionais – escolheram ficar em silêncio sobre o tráfico de heroina.
Até à crise causada pela revelação em 2016 da dívida secreta de 2 biliões de US$, Moçambique era
um menino bonito da indústria da ajuda, introduzindo o neoliberalismo e encorajando exploração de
gás e carvão por corporações estrangeiras. Os funcionários dos doadores queriam continuava a pintar
este quadro de uma história de sucesso e a gastar o dinheiro da ajuda, por isso não queriam sacudir o
barco com histórias de tráfico de drogas regulado. E a regulação estava a funcionar, evitando guerras
entre famílias envolvidas no comércio de drogas ao mesmo tempo que limitava a quantidade de
heroina que ficava em Moçambique.
Aparentemente o primeiro relatório público do comércio regulado de heroina estava contido no meu
39 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative
14
artigo publicado em 2001 pelo Metical, um jornal de Maputo por fax.40 Em Abril de 2002, Peter Gastrow,
autor do novo relatório, e Marcelo Mosse, citaram esse artigo quando falaram numa conferência em
Pretoria: “Há uma convicção alargada de que, com dinheiro suficiente, os traficantes podem comprar
imunidade contra investigação e perseguição pela justiça. A relativa impunidade com que alguns dos
traficantes de sucesso operam é muitas vezes o resultado das suas estreitas ligações com figuras de
alto nível no governo ou no partido Frelimo. A um nível mais baixo, os funcionários das alfândegas são
subornados para facilitar a entrada e saida das drogas do país. ... Os ‘oligarcas’ moçambicanos parecem
ser as milionárias redes do crime organizado que conseguiram assegurar a protecção política e que
operam em paralelo com o estado com relativa impunidade.”41
Nos finais desse ano, Teodato Hunguana deputado e figura sénior e respeitada na Frelimo, falando
no Parlamento em Novembro de 2002 avisou contra o perigo de o Estado cair nas mãos do crime
organizado. “Os vários grupos e redes de tráfico de droga são empresas bem organizadas, talvez
melhor organizadas do que as estruturas do Estado. … Ao tráfico de droga está associada, em especial,
a lavagem de dinheiro. Há indicadores que apontam para lucros na ordem dos milhões de dólares por
ano, provenientes daquele tráfico, a avaliar pelas mansões e carros luxuosos ostentados em Maputo e
em algumas outras cidades. Parte desse dinheiro é, por certo, reinvestido em negócios legais geradores
de lucro, para afastar suspeitas futuras.” E adiantou que, se os patrões do crime organizado continuam
impunes e intocáveis, e conseguem manter as suas fontes de reprodução, ele vai tornar-se cada vez
mais forte e tomar conta do próprio estado.42
No ano seguinte um dos mais proeminentes juizes moçambicanos, Augusto Paulino43, usou estas
palavras numa palestra em Portugal em que cita Hunguana e o meu artigo de 2001 e avisou que os
vários grupos e redes de traficantes são empresas bem organizadas, talvez mais bem organizadas que
as próprias estruturas do Estado. Disse ainda que o tráfico de drogas está associado particularmente
à lavagem de dinheiro e falou dos indícios que apontam para lucros da ordem dos milhões de US$
por ano, provenientes do tráfico, o que explica as mansões e automóveis luxuosos em Maputo e
algumas outras cidades. Parte deste dinheiro é reinvestido em negócios legais e lucrativos para
prevenir suspeitas no futuro, disse o juiz Paulino. Estes grupos criminosos ligados ao tráfico de drogas,
roubo de automóveis e assaltos armados, acrescentou o juiz, gozam de impunidade e protecção
porque servem os interesses de pessoas bem colocadas no poder e outros porque estão infiltrados
nas unidades das forças de polícia.
Paulino foi Procurador Geral de Justiça de 2007 a 2014, e um dos seus sucessos foi a condenação de
Almerinho Manhenje, que tinha sido Ministro do Interior entre 1996 e 2005 e foi sentenciado, em 2011,
a dois anos de cadeia. O Procurador anterior tinha declinado as acusações mesmo havendo provas
de que milhões de US$ tinham sido desviados do Ministério. Mas o sucesso de Paulino foi de curto
40 Joseph Hanlon, “O grande negócio da droga”, Metical 1017, 28 June 2001. Em português e inglês (“Drugs now biggest business”) em http://www.open.
ac.uk/technology/Moçambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.Moçambique/files/pics/d135483.pdf
41 Peter Gastrow e Marcelo Mosse, “Moçambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks”, Seminário no Instituto de Estudos de Segurança
Regional. Crime organizado, corrupção e governação, na região da SADC, Pretoria, 18-19 de Abril 2002.
42 Teodato Hunguana falando no Parlamento na semana de 25-29 de Novº de 2002 tal como foi citado no Domingo 1 December 2002, como citado
em Augusto Paulino, na palestra “Criminalidade Global e insegurança local - um caso de Moçambique”, apresentada na conferência “Direito e Justiça no
Século XXI”, Combra, Portugal, 30 de Maio 2003. http://www.ces.uc.pt/direitoXXI/comunic/AugustoPaulino.pdf
43 Augusto Paulino foi o juiz no julgamento do assassino do jornalista Carlos Cardoso em 2002; Augusto Paulino, “Criminalidade Global e insegurança
local - um caso de Moçambique”.
15
alcance. As acusações foram por água abaixo e Paulino nunca conseguiu trazer a julgamento nenhum
dos grande negociantes de droga.
No discurso de Coimbra, Paulino seguiu o hábito moçambicano de só se falar de questões quentes
fora do país e cá dentro não se tem conhecimento de nenhum debate público sobre o tráfico de
drogas em Moçambique. Num encontro de doadores pouco depois da publicação do meu artigo em
2001, foi decidido dizer simplesmente que tudo o que eu possa ter escrito sobre tráfico de heroina
não era verdade mesmo que a informação tivesse vindo em parte das suas embaixadas. O relatório
de Gastrow e Mosse dedicava à cocaina e ao haxixe em Moçambique cerca de uma página para
cada, mas sobre heroina diz apenas: “Não foi possível obter mais detalhes” mas Peter Gastrow era na
altura o Director na Cidade do Cabo do Instituto para Estudos de Segurança, com bons contactos
internacionais, e Marcelo Mosse era um os melhores jornalistas investigativos de Moçambique. No
entanto parece que nenhum se sentia preparado para falar da heroina.
A Crown Agents foi contratada para gerir e reestruturar o serviço aduaneiro durante a década de 1996
a 2006. Tinham mais de 70 empregados e receberam poderes pouco habituais de administração. Foime
dito informalmente por um funcionário sénior da Crown Agents que as instruções que receberam
foi apenas de aumentar as receitas. Implicitamente a Crown Agents concordou em não se imiscuir em
importações impróprias desde que não houvesse evasão de impostos, e a heroina era um exemplo. Os
relatórios dos doadores sobre reformas fiscais seguiram todos esta linha, referindo apenas o aumento
das receitas e nunca mencionando drogas. Um estudo do Banco Mundial de 2004 44 dizia que “uma
componente chave de todo o processo de uma reforma económica foi a decisão do Ministro do
Plano e Finanças de reformar e modernizar os serviços aduaneiros, em primeiro lugar para melhorar
a capacidade do governo de aumentar a colecta de receitas … Antes da reforma a corrupção era
galopante”. Mas a ‘corrupção’ só se referia à subavaliação e má classificação das importações com o
objectivo de reduzir a imposição de taxas. Não se mencionavam drogas. Uma avaliação da corrupção
em Moçambique da USAID de 200545 dizia que o âmbito e escala da corrupção em Moçambique era
motivo para alarme. “Há alegações de possível conivência ou mesmo envolvimento activo de indivíduos
dentro do governo ou do partido no governo em actividade criminosa” incluindo o tráfico de drogas,
lavagem de dinheiro e usurpação de fundos públicos. Mas drogas não eram subsequentemente
mencionadas. Contrabando só era citado em relação a tabaco e açucar importado em competição
com a indústria doméstica. Definitivamente, a reforma do fisco foi considerada somente em termos
de aumentar as receitas.
O único a quebrar este consenso diplomático foi Todd Chapman, Encarregado de Negócios na
Embaixada dos EUA em Maputo entre 2007 e 2010. Foi visto como um franco-atirador que não
cooperava com outros embaixadores, nomeadamente ao interromper uma reunião pública entre
embaixadores e a Comissão Nacional de Eleições, CNE, em 2009. Aparentemente, a razão foi porque
sentiu que os outros embaixadores não estavam a exercer suficiente pressão sobre a Frelimo. Parecia
que tinha atrás de si o Departamento de Estado e deixou Moçambique para ir para o Afeganistão.
44 Anthony Mwangi, “Moçambique”, em Luc de Wulf e José B Sokol, eds, Customs Modernization Initiatives: Case Studies, Washington DC: World Bank,
2004, pp 50-56 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14911
45 USAID, “Corruption Assessment: Moçambique final report”, 16 Dez 2005.
16
O seu criticismo a Guebuza reflectia a opinião diplomática geral, mas ao fazer da questão das drogas
o tema de, pelo menos, cinco telexes46 para Washington, Chapman parece ter quebrado fileiras. É
provável que os seus telexes e outras intervenções tenham empurrado os EUA a declarar MBS um
“barão da droga”. Mas outros doadores não foram atrás e pouco mais foi dito sobre heroina.
Foi-me dito por fontes norte-americanas que a principal razão para a designação de MBS como
narcotraficante, a 1 de Junho de 2010, partiu dos EUA. Acreditam que ele estava a fazer um jogo para
entrar no mercado dos EUA. Quando apenas fazia negócio com a Europa não havia muito interesse
nele, mas movimentações para entrar nos EUA tinham de ser travadas. Dentro da Embaixada norteamericana,
era apoiado devido à preocupação de que Guebuza estava a centralizar poder e que o
dinheiro estava a ir mais para os seus bolsos e dos seus filhos do que para o partido.
Mas Chapman e a designação de MBS parecem ter tido inicialmente pouco impacto em Maputo.
Durante algum tempo os estrangeiros deixaram de usar o Centro Comercial mas não tardaram em
voltar. E não parece ter havido qualquer pressão diplomática ou do governo para agir contra MBS.
O representante moçambicano na ONU, Pedro Comissário, na sessão 59 da Comissão de Narcóticos,
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, em Viena a 14 de Março de 2016, enfatizava só a educação e o controlo
do consumo doméstico e não fazia qualquer menção ao controlo da importação e exportação.
O “Mozambique 2017 Crime & Safety Report” do Overseas Security Advisory Council , OSAC, presidido
pelo director do Serviço de Segurança Diplomático, do Departamento de Estado dos EUA, quase não
menciona drogas,47 e em vez disso avisa que “uma das maiores ameaças à segurança pessoal são os
veículos automoveis” seguidas de “aumento da actividade criminosa violenta.” Chama a atenção no
entanto para o problema dizendo: “O narco-trafico é é um grande problema. O contínuo narco-tráfico
atavés de Moçambique, com ligações a sindicatos internacionais de crime organizado e organizações
terroristas, é uma tendência em curso. A considerável riqueza associada ao negócio de drogas, ajudada
pela corrupção e envolvimento de alguns funcionários do governo, desestabiliza a segurança.”
E aparentemente as drogas não estão sendo apreendidas. O gabinete das Nações Unidas para Drogas
e Crime faz a compilação das estatísticas de apreensão de drogas,48 e esta regista que em seis anos,
de 2010 a 2015 inclusive, as autoridades moçambicanas apanharam 55 toneladas de marijuana, 8
toneladas de haxixe e 90 Kgs de cocaine. Mas neste período só houve duas apreensões de heroina, 4.3
Kgs em 2011 e 1 Kg em 2015. Os dados de Moçambique são ligeiramente diferentes, mostrando apenas
13 Kgs apreendidos nos cinco anos que vão de 2012 a 2016.49 Considerando as grandes quantidades
de heroina apreendidas ao atravessar a fronteira para a Africa do Sul, a sugestão é de que a heroina é
deixada passar.
46 Do WikiLeaks: 1 July 2009, Maputo 000713; 9 Novº 2009, Maputo 001277; 16 Novº 2009, Maputo 001291; 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080; 28 Jan 2010,
Maputo 000086. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html
47 US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “Moçambique 2017 Crime & Safety Report” 14 de Março de 2017, https://www.osac.gov/
pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21453
48 https://data.unodc.org
49 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative, Apêndice 3.
17
Mudando sistemas dentro de Moçambique
A posição de Moçambique numa rota de tráfico não mudou muito durante 25 anos: a heroina
é processada no Afeganistão, vai sobretudo para o Paquistão e depois por mar para o Norte de
Moçambique, por terra para a África do Sul e depois para a Europa. Mas a partir de 2010, um certo
número de factores internos e externos alteraram a forma do negócio, criando espaço para uma nova
e mais moderna estrutura, descentralizada, e trabalhando em paralelo com o sistema MBS.
Outras actividades criminosas
Em 2015, Mark Shaw, Director da Iniciativa Global contra o Crime Organizado Transnacional, em
Genebra, notou que na África Austral: “Nomeie um importante mercado criminoso, como drogas,
espécies bravias protegida, mineração ilegal ou viaturas roubadas, e haverá evidência de apoio e
protecção do Estado. Isto é a característica comum em toda a região.” E acrescentou que “uma das
razões porque não temos um retrato mais completo do crime organizado para a região da África
Austral, é porque o fenómeno é notoriamente difícil de investigar … Os actores funcionários do Estado
também se sentem muitas vezes nervosos ao dar informação sobre o ‘real’ crime organizado porque
este está quase sempre próximo do poder político.”50
Em Moçambique, o curto período pós-independência estabeleceu padrões morais elevados, mas a
guerra civil e o mercado liberalizado do pós-guerra trouxeram uma série de actividades ilegais: entrada
de combustível e de carros roubados, exportação de pedras preciosas e madeira preciosa, marfim e
produtos marinhos. Houve uma gama de redes, a maioria delas com ligações tanto a funcionários
locais como pessoas de alto nível na Frelimo.
Uma das maiores alterações no cenário público do crime foram os raptos de pelo menos 100 membros
da comunidade de origem asiática, desde 2011. Nini Satar, anteriormente ligado a agiotagem e desfalque
bancário e condenado pelo assassinato do jornalista Carlos Cardoso, foi também ligado aos raptos e
tem claras ligações à polícia e ao judiciário. Mahomed Bashir Ayoob, membro de uma das famílias do
negócio da droga e marido de uma das filhas de MBS, foi acusado em 2012 de estar envolvido nos
raptos mas foi autorizado a deixar Moçambique para o Dubai e depois para Hong Kong. O Procurador
Marcelino Vilanculos que estava a investigar os raptos, foi assassinado a 11 de Abril de 2016. Os raptos
geraram milhões de US$ pagos em resgates e algum deste dinheiro poder ser proveniente do negócio
da droga. Não é claro até que ponto estes raptos reflectem divisões dentro da comunidade Asiática
dos negócios e qual a extensão das ligações entre as redes de raptos e as famílias da droga.
Mudança de expectativas
A descoberta de uma das maiores reservas de gás natural em África no ano de 2010, parece ter
contrariado a designação de MBS, no mesmo ano, como barão da droga. Os altos preços do petróleo
e do gás inspiraram visões de riqueza nunca antes sonhadas e os doadores queriam encorajar
50 Mark Shaw, “New networks of power: why organised crime is the greatest long-term threat to security in the SADC region”, em Antoni van
Nieuwkerk e Catherine Moat (eds), Southern African Security Review, Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015, pp 177, 181. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
bueros/mosambik/12932-20170302.pdf
18
investimento estrangeiro, e continuaram a considerar Moçambique como o menino bonito. Os preços
altos do petróleo e gás continuaram até 2015.
Ao mesmo tempo ocorreram mudanças dentro da Frelimo. Primeiro, o Presidente Guebuza parecia
estar a distribuir recursos entre um grupo sempre restrito de favoritos e a elite da Frelimo estava
irritada por ser excluida dos apetecíveis fundos do “saco azul”. Segundo, os fundos secretos pareciam
mais pequenos. O rendimento local total do negócio podia ser até 100 milhões de US$ por ano, mas
o quinhão do partido Frelimo seria muito menos do que isso. Em comparação com a imensa riqueza
do gás, o negócio da droga parecia já não valer a pena.
Mas em 2015 o castelo de cartas foi seriamente sacudido. A onda anti-Guebuza dentro do partido
levou a que Filipe Nyusi fosse nomeado como o candidato de compromisso à presidência. A forma
como Guebuza concentrava dinheiro e poder causavam considerável descontentamento dentro da
elite da Frelimo levando a mais descentralização. O Presidente Filipe Nyusi iniciou a sua presidência
em Janeiro de 2015 e nunca houve nenhum relato atribuindo-lhe ligações com MBS; as ligações
com o partido pareciam ser agora a níveis inferiores e mais descentralizadas além de que, em parte,
a protecção deixou de se fazer sentir.
Há indicações de que figuras seniores da Frelimo, incluindo o Presidente Nyusi, querem reduzir algum
do comércio ilegal mais ganancioso. Parece haver mais vontade da Procuradoria da República para
estar atenta às actividades anti-corrupção e anti-droga. Um indicador foi o governo estar a estancar a
exportação ilegal das madeiras mais preciosas que, durante uma década, foi controlada a alto nível.51
Estas são mudanças reais embora ainda limitadas.
O colapso do preço do gás despoletou a descoberta em 2016/2017 das dívidas secretas que tinham
sido organizadas em 2013/2014 por Guebuza quando estava convicto que os lucros do gás as iriam
pagar. Os doadores ficaram irritados e ofendidos e subitamente Moçambique já não era o menino
querido; a ajuda de apoio ao orçamento foi cortada e os doadores começaram a procurar lixo debaixo
do tapete. Isto por sua vez trouxe uma crise económica, com o governo com sérias dificuldades de
tesouraria, e a pedir mais empréstimos para pagar as contas.
Agora precisa dos negociantes da droga para que usem uma parte dos seus lucros na compra de
títulos do tesouro. E a Frelimo está a braços com problemas de dinheiro, debaixo de tensão crescente
para encontrar o financiamento das eleições que estão para vir.
Pondo travão a MBS
MBS e a sua rede continuam a ser os maiores no tráfico, mas agora com as asas cortadas. Expondo-o
como ‘barão da droga’ parece ter tido pouco impacto imediato e as mudanças de 2015 aparentemente
foram mais importantes. Depois de ter sido acusado de ser ‘barão da droga’ MBS não se fez notar durante
uns tempos mas a 18 de Setembro de 2014 já se sentava na mesa principal, separado do candidato
a Presidente Filipe Nyusi por algumas cadeiras, num jantar de angariação de fundos organizado pela
associação de homens de negócios CTA. O Africa Confidential de 10 de Outubro de 2014 escrevia
51 Agência de Investigação Ambiental, “First Class Crisis: China’s Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Moçambique’s Miombo Forests”, London, July
2014, https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/First-Class-Crisis-English-FINAL.pdf
19
que “a presença de Bashir enviou uma mensagem explícita: ele continua a ser incontornável quando
se trata de financiar o partido.” A verdade é que a era Guebuza tinha chegado ao fim e o que parece
provável é que MBS se fez convidado. Mas publicamente ele não parece ser bem visto junto do novo
grupo de Nyusi.
Aparentemente, debaixo da asa benevolente de Guebuza, MBS e seus apaniguados forçaram demasiado
os seus limites. E o revés maior veio a 11 e Novembro de 2016 quando o Banco de Moçambique mandou
dissolver e liquidar um dos bancos comerciais mais pequenos, o Nosso Banco, na base de que estava
descapitalizado, com “uma estrutura económica e financeira insustentável”, e afectado por “graves
problemas de gestão e liquidez”.52 O Nosso Banco foi estabelecido em 1999 com o nome de Banco
Mercantil e de Investimento, tendo mudado o nome para Nosso Banco em 2015. Os seus accionistas
principais eram instituições públicas como o Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social, INSS, com 77% e a
empresa pública de electricidade, EDM, com 16%. A empresa do partido Frelimo, SPI, tinha 4% e Alfred
Kalisa, homem de negócios ruandês, um dos fundadores do Banco e seu primeiro CEO, tinha 2%.53
O Nosso Banco era um dos dois bancos inteiramente moçambicano, sem qualquer ligação a bancos
estrangeiros. Os bancos que transaccionam com os EUA não podem ter clientes acusados de serem
‘barões de droga” pelo governo norte-americano, impedindo assim MBS e o Maputo Shopping de usar
os bancos tradicionais. Era o único banco com uma ATM no Maputo Shopping, depois dos bancos
maiores terem fechado as suas delegações em 2010. O Nosso Banco recebia avultados depósitos de
MBS que, segundo se diz, veio a perder dezenas de milhões de US$ no colapso. Mas Momade Rassul
foi citado como o maior devedor, com um empréstimo de 30 milhões de US$ garantidos com um
prédio de menos valor e que os auditores questionaram.54 Tinha sido muito especulado, incluindo
pelo semanário Savana de 25 de Novembro 2016, que Moçambique pode ter sido pressionado pelos
EUA para fechar o Nosso Banco. É plausível se se pensa que Moçambique foi capaz de resistir às
pressões dos doadores e em particular os norte-americanos devido às receitas dos minérios e do gás
e do investimento, incluindo da Americana Anadarko, mas isto mudou depois da revelação das dívidas
ocultas em 2016.
A 29 de Junho de 2017, Momade Rassul foi detido em Maputo e acusado de lavagem de dinheiro,
enriquecimento ilícito e fraude fiscal.55 Foi posteriormente liberto sob caução. Ao mesmo tempo
ocorreu o escândalo da South African Public Investment Corporation investindo 83 milhões de US$
numa refinaria não-operacional, propriedade da companhia SeS sediada em Nacala e propriedade de
Rassul.56 Parece que Rassul ultrapassou os limites e a sua protecção foi-lhe retirada.
MBS ainda viaja para dentro e fora de Maputo. Mas o encerramento do Nosso Banco forçou-o a usar
bancos of-shore o que significa que passa cada vez menos tempo no pais. Mas claramente ele ainda
controla parte do negócio da heroina no sudoeste africano e continua a ser o maior traficante em
Moçambique.
52 Paul Fauvet, “A second Mozambican bank fails”, Maputo: AIM em Inglês, 11 de Novembro de 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201611120110.html
53 O Presidente ruandês, Paul Kagame, a 2 de Agosto de 2009 perdoou Kalisa, que estava a cumprir uma sentença de seis anos de cadeia por corrupção
e abuso de funções quando foi presidente e CEO do antigo Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry (BCDI) quando concedeu empréstimos a si
próprio e à sua família. Ignatius Suuna, “Alfred Kalisa gets Presidential Pardon”, New Times, 3 Agosto 2010, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/22599/
54 AIM Inglês 26 de Novembro 2016, http://clubofMoçambique.com/news/uba-bank-management-criticises-cta-chief-Moçambique/
55 Procuradoria Provincial da República - Nampula, Comunidado de Imprensa n° 02/PPRN/2017, http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
Moçambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf
56 Sello Theletsane, “R1bn Oil Deal Mess: PIC Boss Matjila Sued”, Weekly Xposé, 26 July 2017. http://weeklyxpose.co.za/2017/07/26/r1bn-oil-deal-messpic-boss-matjila-sued/
20
Redes mais fexíveis e a ‘gig economy’
As mudanças na Frelimo estão a acontecer quando há mudanças globais nas estruturas do comércio
legal e ilegal e precisamente numa altura em que aumentam as remessas de heroina em parte porque
maior repressão ao tráfico na Tanzânia e no Quénia mudaram a rota de uma parte significativa do tráfico
de heroina na África Oriental para o Norte de Moçambique. Este aumento, e talvez algum do tráfico
anteriormente controlado por MBS, mudaram para uma forma completamente nova funcionando em
paralelo. Uma fonte chamou a isto uma mudança do crime organizado para “crime desorganizado”;
eu vejo-a mais como a adopção da “gig economy”, biscate, ou modelo Uber/Airbnb - um mercado
de trabalho caracterizado pela prevalência de contratos de curto prazo ou trabalho freelance em
oposição a empregos permanentes.
Há duas décadas, barões da droga pelo mundo fora eram figuras públicas com poder político, vistos
como beneméritos e interessados em desenvolver as suas comunidades. MBS seguia este modelo.
Quando o Presidente Armando Guebuza inaugurou o Maputo Shopping a 22 de Junho de 2006, levou
como oferta 50 cadeiras de rodas e 100 000 cadernos escolares. 57 Mas expôs-se e, paulatinamente, os
barões de drogas conhecidos foram capturados. Isto levou a uma mudança para os barões de droga
clandestinos. Aconteceu ao mesmo tempo que a economia dominante ia abandonando os empregos
permanentes em troca de contratos de curto termo ou outras formas de precariedade. Dentro de
Moçambique, a corrupção generalizada na polícia e aparelho de estado tornou mais rápido e fácil usar
o habitual suborno da polícia do que a protecção política de alto nível. Finalmente, os “smartphones”
e “apps” possibilitaram a comunicação electrónica. A disponibilidade e acessibilidade fácil a uma boa
cobertura de telefonia móvel no Norte de Moçambique desde cerca de 2015, faz deste um modelo
sensato para fazer expandir aqui o negócio da heroina.
O modelo MBS foi estabelecido com base num comércio aparentemente legítimo a operar através
de companhias de comércio oficiais e usando os seus armazéns, hoteis e pessoal. O novo modelo é
mais solto e flexível, usando motoristas, pescadores, serviços de entrega, exactamente como se faz
em Nova York ou Londres. As pessoas são contratadas e pagas para um trabalho específico, muitas vez
as tarefas são dadas por telefone usando WhatsApp ou Blackberry, que são codificados. Por vezes os
que são recrutados já estão envolvidos no comércio ilegal da madeira, marfim, combustível, bebidas
alcoólicas e cigarros.
A rede é controlada além fronteiras, particularmente a partir dos Emiratos Árabes Unidos e Dubai, a
seguir à detenção de figuras chave na África Oriental; e há controladores locais, a nivel mais baixo que
MBS ou os Ayoob. Abaixo deles há os subornadores e facilitadores, que são moçambicanos originários
ou tanzanianos, particularmente muçulmanos que falam Suaíli, portanto capazes de comunicar e se
integrar nas comunidades locais. Os controladores podem ser paquistaneses e há relatos de pequenos
grupos de rapazes paquistaneses a estabelecerem em Quelimane e outras cidades, empresas de venda
de peças sobressalentes importadas. Tanto o antigo estilo da rede MBS como a nova “gig economy”
estão a movimentar heroina através de Moçambique, mas os nossos informadores discordaram sobre
qual é o sistema dominante.
57 “Maputo Shopping Center: um exemplo de investimento”, Noticias, 23 June 2006.
21
Conclusão
Moçambique é um importante país de trânsito de heroina e o rasto desta heroina passa pelo
Afeganistão-Paquistão-Moçambique-África do Sul-Europa. As estimativas são que 10 a 40 toneladas
ou mais de heroina passam por ano por esta rota. Este tráfico poderia ainda acrescentar à economia
local 100 milhões de US$ anuais em dinheiro corrupto e está claramente a ter impacto sobre um
Estado já corrupto. O tráfico parece estar em crescimento após a acção repressiva das autoridades no
Quénia e Tanzânia que obrigam ao desvio do produto para Moçambique.
O negócio foi estabelecido a partir da década de 90 por Mohamed Bachir Suleman, MBS, e controlado
ao mais alto nível pelos Presidentes Chissano e Guebuza, indo o dinheiro para o partido Frelimo,
figuras seniores da Frelimo e funcionários na polícia e autoridades fiscais. Tem havido até agora um
silêncio surpreendente por parte da comunidade internacional porque os doadores têm estado
interessados em tratar Moçambique como uma história de sucesso e porque a regulação do negócio
parece funcionar, pelo menos a nível doméstico.
Este quadro pode estar a mudar porque a imagem de Moçambique foi manchada pela dívida secreta
de 2 biliões de US$ dos quais metade não está devidamente localizado. Há também uma preocupação
crescente em relação ao contrabando do marfim e outros recursos da natureza. Os doadores estão
a retirar a sua ajuda e já não precisam de tratar Moçambique como a sua história de sucesso ou filho
querido. Entretanto os mais altos na Frelimo e o Presidente Filipe Nyusi parecem distanciar-se do
negócio da heroina e permitem alguma repressão ao tráfico.
Mas os telemóveis e o WhatsApp permitiram que emergisse um segundo tipo de tráfico agora
descentralizado. E a corrupção generalizada significa que os novos traficantes podem comprar o
apoio a niveis mais locais e já não necessitam de apadrinhamento politico. Pode agora ser demasiado
tarde para o estado e partido no governo mudarem. A corrupção tornou-se endémica e a Frelimo
precisa de patrocinadores que o apoiem. O dinheiro deste patrocínio vem de drogas, comissões sobre
contratos e dinheiro desviado de projectos. Os partidos da oposição não estão a ameaçar a corrupção
e parecem querer o poder apenas para também beneficiar dela.
Pelas suas próprias razões a comunidade internacional permitiu que a Frelimo e o Estado fossem
corruptos. A maioria porém, agora parece querer simplesmente afastar-se mantendo apenas o
envolvimento suficiente para garantir o acesso aos recursos naturais.
Joseph Hanlon é membro honorário no Departamento de Desenvolvimento Internacional, Escola
de Economia e Ciência Política de Londres (LSE). É Editor do Boletim sobre o processo político em
Moçambique, publicado pelo Centro de Integridade Pública, CIP, e co-Autor de diversos livros incluindo
“Galinhas e Cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento”.
Parceiros:
Rua Fernão Melo e Castro,
Bairro da Sommerschild, nº 124
Tel: (+258) 21 499916 | Fax: (+258) 21 499917
Cel: (+258) 82 3016391
@CIP.Mozambique @CIPMoz
www.cipmoz.org | Maputo - Moçambique
CENTRO DE INTEGRIDADE PÚBLICA
Anticorrupção - Transparência - Integridade
Informação Editorial
Director: Edson Cortez
Equipa técnica: Anastácio Bibiane, Baltazar
Fael, Borges Nhamire, Celeste Filipe, Edson
Cortez, Egídio Rego, Fátima Mimbire, Inocência
Mapisse, Jorge Matine, Stélio Bila
Propriedade: Centro de Integridade Pública
Maquetização: Liliana Mangove
International Development ISSN 1470-2320 Working Paper Series 2018 No.18-190 The Uberization of Mozambique's heroin trade Joseph Hanlon Published: July 2018 Department of International Development London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street Tel: +44 (020) 7955 7425/6252 London Fax: +44 (020) 7955-6844 WC2A 2AE UK Email: J.Hanlon@lse.ac.uk Website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/home.aspx Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 1 NOTE of explanation to Working Paper editors: The Geneva-based Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime will publish in February or March: "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", by Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw. I am one of the most cited experts on Mozambique and I did the Mozambique background paper for the report, which I have permission to update and publish. If possible, I would like to post it as a working paper at the same time the main paper is issued. A version in Portuguese will be issued by the Public Integrity Centre in Mozambique at the same time. But we need to hold them to wait for Global Initiative. This has been cleared by Ken Shadlen, Maria Lopez-Uribe and Jean Paul Faguet with a request for additions, which have been made. Note there is one photograph of very poor quality. The only thing that is important is that it is possible to read the "555". Joseph Hanlon The Uberization of Mozambique's heroin trade By Joseph Hanlon, Visiting Senior Fellow, LSE Department of International Development j.hanlon@lse.ac.uk Date: Must be held for release of the linked Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime paper. Acknowledgement: This research was partly funded and facilitated by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, as background for their paper "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", by Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw. Thanks to Global Initiative for permission to publish the more detailed background paper here. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 2 The Uberization of Mozambique's heroin trade By Joseph Hanlon, Visiting Senior Fellow, LSE Department of International Development j.hanlon@lse.ac.uk Abstract: Mozambique is a significant heroin transit centre and the trade has increased to 40 tonnes or more per year, making it a major export which contributes up to $100 mn per year to the local economy. For 25 years the trade has been controlled by a few local trading families and tightly regulated by senior officials of Frelimo, the ruling party, and has been largely ignored by the international community which wanted to see Mozambique as a model pupil. But the position is changing and Mozambique may be coming under more donor pressure. Meanwhile the global move toward the gig economy and the broader corruption of Mozambican police and civil service makes it easier to organise alternative channels, with local people hired by mobile telephone for specific tasks. Mozambique is part of a complex chain which forms the east African heroin network. Heroin goes from Afghanistan to the Makran coast of Pakistan, and is taken by dhow to northern Mozambique. There, the Mozambican traffickers take it off the dhows and move it more than 3000 km by road to Johannesburg, and from there others ship it to Europe. Keywords: Mozambique, heroin, drugs, transnational crime, smuggling, Whatsapp Heroin has been one of Mozambique's largest exports for two decades and the trade is increasing. Heroin is produced in Afghanistan and shipped through Pakistan, then moved by sea to east Africa and particularly northern Mozambique. 1 From there it is taken by road to Johannesburg, from which it is sent to Europe. This basic route has remained unchanged for 25 years. Estimates vary from 10 to 40 tonnes or much more of heroin moving through Mozambique each year. With an export value of $20 million per tonne2 , heroin is probably the country's largest or second largest export (after coal).3 It is estimated that more than $2 mn per tonne says in Mozambique, as profits, bribes, and payments to senior Mozambicans. Heroin arrives on dhows 20-100 km off the coast. The Mozambican role is to take it from the dhows, move it by small boat to the coast and then by road to warehouses, and finally take it by road 3000 km to Johannesburg, South Africa. The 10-40 t/y estimate is from dhows only, and further significant amounts of heroin also arrive in containers of other imports, particularly at the northern port of Nacala. Until recently, the trade was carried out by south-Asian-origin families based in the north of Mozambique and was tightly regulated by the most senior figures in Frelimo. The trade has been well known since 2001 when an article was published in Metical, and it said heroin was then Mozambique's largest export.4 Frelimo regulation means there have been no drug wars between the trading families, and little heroin remains in Mozambique.5 With one exception (the United 1 UNODC, "Market analysis of plant-based drugs", World Drugs Report 2017 Booklet 3, p 18; European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, "EU Drugs Market Report 2016", Lisbon: 2016, pp 86-7; United States Department of State, "2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume I", Washington, 2017, p 252; "The Smack Track", The Economist, 15 Jan 2015. 2 Highly variable. Similarly, the street price in Europe ranges from $30 to $300 per gram - $30 mn to $300 mn per tonne. 3 Mozambique's five largest official exports in 2016 were: $687 mn coal, $378 mn electricity, $378 mn aluminium, $370 mn gas & oil, and $ 208 mn tobacco. 4 Joseph Hanlon, "O grande negócio da droga", Metical 1017, 28 June 2001. Metical was the widely-read faxed newsletter started by Carlos Cardoso, who was assassinated in 2000. In Portuguese and English ("Drugs now biggest business") on http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d13 5483.pdf 5 In terms of transit, heroin is the only important drug. Herbal cannabis produced in Mozambique is exported to South Africa, there is a hashish trade (linked to the heroin trade), and mandrax (Methaqualone) is manufactured for South Africa and factories in Maputo are regularly raided, for example Noticias 7 April 2017. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 3 States in 2009-10), the international community has chosen to ignore the regulated heroin trade - other issues ranging from natural gas to corruption have been seen as more important. Heroin production is increasing in Afghanistan. But tighter control of transit through eastern Europe is moving the trade to southern routes, and more controls in Kenya and Tanzania has moved sea landings south to northern Mozambique. The trade appears to be increasing significantly. This, in turn, led to an investigation by the Geneva-based Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, just published: "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", by Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw.6 The report argues that the heroin trade has "political protection" and that "in Mozambique, we find a tight integration between ruling party figures and traffickers." The report continues: "individuals in Frelimo have become implicated in criminal activities, and … the party’s own system for generating funds relies on a lack of the rule of law." Despite the heroin trade being well known to embassies, it was only on 1 June 2010 that US President Barack Obama designated Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) as a "drugs kingpin", making it illegal for US citizens, US companies, and businesses which operate in the US to conduct financial or commercial transactions with him or three of his businesses. MBS is a major businessman and trader, and he works with at least three other south-Asian origin trading families. They use their own facilities and staff and mix illegal and legal commerce. MBS is believed to still control a large part of the heroin trade through Mozambique, but his position and that of linked families may have diminished. On the other hand, there is a move in East Africa which reflects the global trend of Uber and Airbnb, away from using established business networks and warehouses, to a looser system of freelance workers controlled via WhatsApp and BlackBerry. Meanwhile petty corruption within Mozambique has become so endemic that the heroin trade can run on bribes and no longer needs political patrons. This leads to what one of my sources7 described as a move to "disorganised crime", which appears to be handling much of the new increase in heroin trade. This working paper is based on the background paper on Mozambique written for Global Initiative by Joseph Hanlon.8 This working paper has five sections. The first section looks at MBS, the biggest heroin trader, medium-size traders, and at political patronage. The second section is about the national and international politics of Mozambique's regulated heroin trade. The third section sets out what is known about the physical heroin trade and movements within Mozambique. The final sections look at the recent growth of a parallel unregulated trade in Mozambique and at the global context of a criminal gig economy. Mozambique's own drug baron President Joaquim Chissano was the guest of honour at the wedding of the second son of Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) on 19 April 2001. An article in the biggest weekly newspaper, Savana (27 April 2001), described the wedding was as "sumptuous" and said there were 10,000 guests from all over the world. These three are not treated as important by the control authorities. Within Mozambique, alcohol and cannabis are the main drugs and there is not a large market for hard drugs; heroin and cocaine are consumed locally (crack is available on the street in Maputo) but not in large quantities. Heroin appears to be mainly smoked rather than injected. 6 Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, http://globalinitiative.net/ and https://enactafrica.org Hereafter: Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 7 The Global Initiative report notes that "In order to encourage candour and to protect our sources" they did not give names, and in some cases we do not gives names here. 8 With thanks to two Mozambican journalists. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 4 For a country less than a decade out of war, this was massive and ostentatious spending. MBS was also known as a major contributor to Frelimo. He is one of Mozambique’s most prominent and wealthiest businessmen and his wealth did not come only from importing refrigerators and washing machines for his Kayum Centre. Also in 2001, I was briefed by an international drugs control official that his business, Grupo MBS, was the main heroin trader in Mozambique. Links to MBS were passed on to Armando Guebuza when he was elected President in 2004. He twice publicly visited MBS's Maputo Shopping Centre (22 June 2006 and for the official opening 8 May 2007). The $32 mn complex was then the largest in Mozambique, and Guebuza praised it a model of private investment.9 MBS was reported to have made a $1 million contribution to President Armando Guebuza's 2009 electoral campaign.10 But those links may have been through Guebuza's children. In 16 November 2009 and 25 January 2010 cables, Todd Chapman, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, alleged that MBS "has direct ties to President Guebuza and former President Chissano" and that MBS is the coordinator of heroin going through Mozambique and perhaps southern Tanzania. Then on 1 June 2010, US President Barack Obama designated MBS as a "drugs kingpin", making it illegal for US citizens, US companies, and businesses which operate in the US to conduct financial or commercial transactions with him or three of his businesses, Grupo MBS, Kayum Centre and Maputo Shopping Centre. The US Department of the Treasury stated that "Mohamed Bachir Suleman is a large-scale narcotics trafficker in Mozambique, and his network contributes to the growing trend of narcotics trafficking and related money laundering across southern Africa. … Suleman leads a well-financed narcotics trafficking and money laundering network in Mozambique."11 In the next section we point out that this was a unique intervention, even though the international community knows about the heroin trade. The close link between MBS and Chissano is said to reflect a complex relationship. The heroin trade was regulated at the highest level. Chissano is said to have regularly met personally with MBS, and probably with the heads of the other heroin trading families. MBS was publically identified as a major donor to Frelimo. It has been widely assumed that there was an agreement to regulate the trade. There have never been drug wars between the heroin families and no convictions - and in the past two decades, no arrests - of senior figures in the heroin and hashish trades, and no seizures of heroin passing through the regulated trade. The Ministry of Interior, police and customs receive their commissions and assist the trade. Frelimo receives a substantial amount of money for operating costs and election expenses, and one assumes some members of the Frelimo leadership personally receive a part. Chissano had been Frelimo head of security since 1966, and he had the personal contacts needed to organise and regulate the trade. There is no direct evidence of high level regulation, and any witnesses to such meetings are unlikely to speak out. It is speculated that part of the deal is that the heroin is intended for international transit and the traders agree that little stays in Mozambique. In the early 2000s, the military housing zone in central Maputo became known as "Columbia" because drugs were so readily available, and some the children of the elite because heroin users. This was widely publicised and then suddenly heroin became less available. Did Chissano tell MBS to stop selling locally? Clearly something happened, because cocaine and particularly crack are still readily available, suggesting lack of regulation of the cocaine trade. Other players Although MBS is a big man in Mozambique, he is part of a chain running from the Indian subcontinent. Under MBS, Global Initiative identifies three linked families with businesses in Nacala 9 Noticias 23 June 2006, AIM English 9 May 2007. 10 Savana on-line, 20 Oct 2009. 11 U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Entities Owned By Drug Kingpin Mohamed Bachir Suleman", press release TG-729, 1 June 2010. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 5 and Nampula. Gulam Rassul Moti and the Ayoob family were also named Todd Chapman, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, in a 16 November 2009 cable. Although he cannot be trusted on names or detail, 12 Chapman sent reports to Washington later released as part of WikiLeaks, and on heroin they seem broadly correct.13 Gulam Rassul Moti14 is owner of Moti Commercial and Moti Rent a Car and has kept a low profile, but he seems to have been one of the early entrants into the trade. In August 1997, 12 tonnes of hashish was seized in Quisanga, Cabo Delgado, and Gulam Rassul Moti was arrested in connection with this case. This was his second arrest in connection with drugs – he had earlier been named in connection with the smuggling of hashish to the US and Europe from the port of Nacala in containers disguised as tea. He was acquitted. Political parties have the right to import goods for their own use duty free. In 2012 and 2013 Rassul Trading imported for Frelimo 3000 motorcycles, 7000 freezers and 5000 tyres. But the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP, Public Integrity Centre) found that most were being sold in Rassul Trading shops. 15 It was a mark of the close links with Frelimo. A fire in a Rassul Trading warehouse in Nacala in February 2014 allegedly destroyed 50 containers with 5000 motorbikes.16 Global Initiative mentions claims that heroin had been important in the fuel tanks of some of the motorbikes.17 The second group is the Ayoob family. Momed Khalid Ayoob owned hotels, tourist installations and car companies as well as Modas Niza and Real Câmbios. In October 2008 Zambeze18 reported that Khalid Ayoob had been arrested in Portugal in 1987 for possession of heroin, but managed to escape two years later, and that his brother Macsud was jailed in Portugal for drug trafficking in 1990. Zambeze also said the family had invested tens of millions of dollars in Maputo hotels. Macsud Ayoob was detained in 2002 at Maputo airport, in possession of over $1 million in banknotes being taken to Dubai. Brother Momed Khalid Ayoob was arrested on 1 December 2010 by the Swazi Police in possession of Rand 18 million ($2.6 mn) in banknotes. He was taking the money from Mozambique to Dubai, in violation of both Mozambican and Swazi exchange legislation. Momed was shot and killed in Maputo on 20 April 2012. His widow Reyma Ayoob was kidnapped in 2014 and released after 22 days after her family paid a ransom. 12 Paul Fauvet, "Renamo brings WikiLeaks back to parliament", AIM English 28 April 2011. Chapman correctly pointed to President Armando Guebuza's extensive business interests, but hugely exaggerated and was wrong on companies and ownerships when those could easily have been checked. On the drugs issue, in a 1 July 2009 cable he cited an article by me (“Long time commentator on Mozambique Joseph Hanlon”) as being from May 2009, when it was actually a redistributed article first published by me in Metical in 2001. 13 From WikiLeaks: 16 Nov 2009 MAPUTO 001291, 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080; https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html Chapman alleged that "Domingos Tivane, Chief of the Customs Service, was a significant recipient of bribes from narcotraffickers, and he recently purchased real estate in Maputo valued at well beyond what his government salary should be able to afford." Tivane was dismissed as customs head in 2013. 14 Also known as Ghulamo; listed only as Gulam Rassul as owner of Moti. 15 Borges Nhamire and Lázaro Mabunda, "Isenções aduaneiras do Partido Frelimo", Centro de Integridade Pública, 13 May 2014, http://www.cip.org.mz/historico/article.asp?lang=&sub=iafl&docno=303; Borges Nhamire and Lázaro Mabunda, "Importação ilegal de viaturas: a máfia que custa milhões ao Estado", Centro de Integridade Pública Moçambique: CIP Newsletter 1, March, 2014, https://www.cipmoz.org/images/Documentos/PPP/295_CIP_Newsletter_n01_2014- importacao_ilegal_de_viaturas.pdf, page 5. 16 Arlindo Chissale, "Incendio de altas proporções destrói acima de 50 contentores de motorizadas", CAIC Diario, 25 Fevereiro 2014, https://www.caicc.org.mz/diario/?p=3520; "Incêndio destrói cinco mil motas", Noticias, 27 Fevereiro 2014, http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/11632-incendio-destroicinco-mil-motas.html?device=desktop 17 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 18 Luís Nhachote, "Traficante de droga procurado em Portugal", Zambeze 1 Oct 2008. http://manueldearaujo.blogspot.co.uk/2008/10/traficantes-de-droga-tm-estatuto.html and http://muliquela.blogspot.co.uk/p/mohamad-khalid-ayoob-momad-aiuba-irmao.html Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 6 The third family is headed by Momad Rassul (also known as Momad Rassul Abdul Rahim) and is only named by Global Initiative, which notes that "there is no proven link between Rassul and the drug trade". He was arrested and released on $130,000 bail on 7 July 2017 on charges including smuggling, money laundering, illicit enrichment and tax fraud.19 He owns S&S Group (with major vegetable oil factories and other companies), and ARJ Group (cement and Nacala Container Park).20 There appears to be an attempt to convert drug money into legal assets within Mozambique. In the past decade there has been major construction of hotels in Nampula city and office and residential high rise buildings in Maputo. In 2007 Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) opened Mozambique's largest shopping centre, Maputo Shopping. There is also luxury residential construction in Maputo, Nampula and beach areas near Nampula such as Chocas Mar, which is linked to Asian-origin trading families. Although there is no direct evidence, it has always been believed that this is partly funded by drug profits, as well as other illegal activities. Tourist investment has been significant and would be useful because it is possible to claim more patronage than actually occurs, for example at a hotel, and use this to hide future drug profits. Hotels also provide a safe base for drug couriers. Global Initiative points to the glitzy but mostly empty hotels in Nampula and elsewhere.21 An important investment area for drug money is stocks and bonds - the buyer can pay cash with few questions asked, but then when the shares or bonds are sold the proceeds are treated as legitimate money. Until recently, the Bank of Mozambique had no difficulty in finding domestic investors willing to buy government bonds. And on 7 June 2001 the chairman of the Mozambican Stock Exchange (BVM), Jussub Nurmamade, said that the BVM's rapid growth was "unique". "We started with $3 mn, and that's hardly two years ago", he told journalists, and predicted that by the end of 2001 $100 mn would be invested in listed companies plus government treasury bonds and bank bonds. How can an economy as small as Mozambique's find $100 million in such a short time? What makes Mozambique "unique" must be drug money. Three wise monkeys Except for the one condemnation of MBS by the United States, the international community - donors, lenders and international agencies - have chosen to remain silent on heroin trafficking. Until the crisis caused by the 2016 revelation of the $2 bn secret debt, Mozambique was a favoured child of the aid industry, introducing neoliberalism and encouraging exploitation of coal and gas by foreign corporations. Donor staff wanted to continue to paint this picture of a success story and to continue the aid spending, so they did not want to rock the boat with stories of regulated drug dealing. And the regulation was working, preventing wars between the drug trading families while also limiting the amount of heroin that stayed in Mozambique. Apparently the first public report of the regulated heroin trade was my report in 2001 in Metical, a Maputo newsletter.22 In April 2002, Peter Gastrow (co-author of the new report) and Marcelo Mosse cited that report when they told a Pretoria conference: "There is a widely-held belief that with sufficient money, traffickers can buy immunity from investigation and prosecution. The relative impunity with which some of the successful traffickers operate is often a result of their close connections with individuals at the highest levels of government or the Frelimo party. At a lower level, customs officials are bribed to facilitate the entry and removal of drugs from the country … 19 http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mozambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf and http://www.1maomz.com/en/2017/08/05/nacala-way-3-momade-rassul-in-troubles-in-rsa/ 20 The Tiger Centre electronics and white goods store in Maputo is owned by four brothers from the family: Mohamed Sabir Gulam Rassul, Abdul Gafur Rassul, Momade Asslam, and Mahebub Gulam Rassul. There were failed attempts to kidnap the last two in 2012 and 2016. (AIM Eng 19 Dec 2016). Mohamed Sabir Gulam Rassul and other family members are owners of a number of hotels. 21 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 22 Joseph Hanlon, "O grande negócio da droga", Metical 1017, 28 June 2001. In Portuguese and English ("Drugs now biggest business") on http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d13 5483.pdf Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 7 The Mozambican 'oligarchs' appear to be the wealthy organised criminal networks that have secured political protection and that operate parallel to the state with relative impunity." 23 Later that year, speaking in parliament in November 2002, Teodato Hunguana, a respected senior Frelimo figure, warned of the danger "of the state falling permanently into the clutches of organised crime". If the organised crime leaders "remain protected and untouchable, and are able to maintain their sources of reproduction, then they will become increasingly powerful and take ownership of the state itself."24 The next year, one of Mozambique's most prominent judges Augusto Paulino25, used a speech in Portugal in which he quoted Hunguana and my 2001 article and in which he warned that "the various drug trafficking groups and networks are well-organized enterprises, perhaps better organized than state structures … Drug trafficking is associated, in particular, with money laundering. There are indicators that point to profits in the order of millions of dollars per year, coming from that traffic, which explain the mansions and luxurious cars in Maputo and in some other cities. Part of that money is certainly reinvested in profit-making legal business to ward off future suspicions." Three criminal groups with "links to drug trafficking, vehicle theft and armed robbery … enjoy impunity and protection because they served the interests of well-placed people in power and others because they were infiltrated into units of the police forces." Paulino was attorney general from 2007 to 2014, and one of his successes was the conviction of Almerinho Manhenje, who had been interior minister 1996-2005 and was sentenced to two years in jail for corruption in 2011. The previous attorney general had declined to bring charges even though there was evidence of millions of dollars being diverted from the ministry. But Paulino's success was only limited. The charges against Manhenje had been watered down, and Paulino never succeeded in bringing to trial any of the major drug dealers. In his Coimbra speech Paulino was following a Mozambican tradition of only raising hot issues in speeches outside the country, and there seems to have been no public discussion of the drugs trade inside Mozambique. At a donor meeting soon after the publication of my 2001 article, it was decided to say simply that I what I wrote about the heroin trade was not true - even thought the information had come partly from some of their embassies. And this has largely continued. The Crown Agents were contracted to manage and reform the customs service during a decade, 1996-2006; they had up to 70 staff and were given unusual management powers. I was told informally by a senior Crown Agents official that the brief was purely to increase revenue. Implicitly, then, the Crown Agents agreed not to deal with improper imports which were not evading tariffs, such as heroin. And donors' reports on customs reform all took this line, only referring to revenue increases and never mentioning drugs. A 2004 World bank study26 reported: "A key component in the overall process of economic reform was the 1995 decision by the Minister of Planning and Finance to reform and modernize the customs service, primarily to improve the government's revenue raising capacity. … Before the reform, corruption was rampant". But the "corruption" only referred to undervaluing and misclassifying imports to reduce the duties paid; there was no mention of drugs. The 2005 USAID "Corruption Assessment: Mozambique"27 said that the scale and scope of corruption in Mozambique are cause for alarm. There are "allegations of possible 23 Peter Gastrow and Marcelo Mosse, "Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks", Institute for Security Studies Regional Seminar - Organised crime, corruption and governance in the SADC Region, Pretoria, 18-19 April 2002. 24 Teodato Hunguana speaking in parliament week of 25-29 November 2002 (exact date not known), as quoted in Domingo 1 December 2002, as cited in Augusto Paulino, "Criminalidade Global e insegurança local - a caso de Moçambique", paper presented at a conference "Direito e Justiça no Século XXI", Combra, Portugal, 30 May 2003. http://www.ces.uc.pt/direitoXXI/comunic/AugustoPaulino.pdf 25 Augusto Paulino was the judge in the 2002 trial of the assassin of journalist Carlos Cardoso; Augusto Paulino, "Criminalidade Global e insegurança local - a caso de Moçambique". 26 Anthony Mwangi, "Mozambique", in Luc de Wulf and José B Sokol, eds, Customs Modernization Initiatives: Case Studies, Washington DC: World Bank, 2004, pp 50-56 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14911 27 USAID, "Corruption Assessment: Mozambique final report", 16 December 2005. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 8 collusion or even active involvement of individuals within government or the ruling party in criminal activity, including drug trafficking, money laundering and theft of public funds." But drugs were not subsequently mentioned. Smuggling was only cited in terms of imported tobacco and sugar competing with foreign-owned domestic companies. Customs reform was seen only in terms of increasing revenue. The one break with the diplomatic consensus was Todd Chapman, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, 2007-2010. He was seen as a loose cannon who did not cooperate with other ambassadors, for example disrupting a public meeting between ambassadors and the National Elections Commission (CNE) in 2009, apparently because he felt the other ambassadors were not putting enough pressure on Frelimo. He seemed to have state department backing, and left Mozambique to go to Afghanistan. His criticism of Guebuza reflected the general diplomatic view, but in taking up drugs in at least five cables28 to Washington, Chapman appears to have broken ranks. It seems likely that his cables and other interventions did push the US to declare MBS a "drugs kingpin". But other donors did not follow his lead, and little more was said about heroin. I was told by US sources that the main reason for the designation on 1 June 2010 was US based - they believed that MBS was making a play to enter the US market. When he was only trading to Europe there was not much interest, but the move to the US needed to be stopped. But Chapman and the designation of MBS seems to have had little initial impact in Maputo. For a short period foreigners stopped using Maputo Shopping, but soon returned. And there seems to have been no diplomatic pressure on government to take action against MBS. A statement by the Mozambican representative to the UN, Pedro Comissário to the 59th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna on 14 March 2016 entirely stressed education and controlling the domestic consumption of drugs, and made no mention of controlling import and export. The "Mozambique 2017 Crime & Safety Report" of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), chaired by the director of the US Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, hardly mentions drugs,29 and instead warns "one of the greatest personal safety threats is motor vehicles," followed by "increased violent criminal activity." It does, however, note: "Narco-trafficking is a major, on-going problem. Continued narcotics trafficking through Mozambique, with links to international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations, is an on-going trend. The considerable wealth associated with the drug trade, aided by corruption and involvement of some government officials, destabilizes security." And it does appear that drugs are not being seized. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime compiles drug seizure statistics, 30 which report that for the six years 2010-15 (inclusive) Mozambican authorities seized 55 tonnes of marijuana, 8 tonnes of hashish, and 90 kg of cocaine. But in that period, there was only two seizures of heroin, 4.3 kg in 2011 and 1 kg in 2015. Mozambique's own data are slightly different, showing just 13 kg seized in the five years 2012-16.31 Considering the large seizures of heroin crossing the border into South Africa, this does suggest that heroin is allowed to pass. Heroin trade routes 28 From WikiLeaks: 1 July 2009, Maputo 000713; 9 Nov 2009, Maputo 001277; 16 Nov 2009, Maputo 001291; 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080; 28 Jan 2010, Maputo 000086. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html 29 US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, "Mozambique 2017 Crime & Safety Report" 14 March 2017, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21453 30 https://data.unodc.org 31 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative, Appendix 3. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 9 Mozambique is a transit centre for heroin. Like any commodity, there is a supply chain and there are points between the producer and final buyer where the commodity must be warehoused to await an order or be repacked to satisfy an order, which is Mozambique's role. The chain is that heroin hydrochloride (white powder or grey crystal blocks) is produced in Afghanistan, passes through Pakistan (and Iran) and is moved to northern Mozambique. It is warehoused and repacked and then goes by road to Johannesburg. From there it is sent to Europe. Following a spate of adulterated heroin some years ago, buyers now demand heroin with a brand of a known Afghan supplier. Heroin is increasingly in branded 1 kg packets with labels such as handshake, Tokapi, Africa Demand, and 555. Increasingly as part of the decentralised trade, European buyers may make the purchase directly from a Dubai dealer and demand a brand, but the shipments may be of mixed orders which are separated in Johannesburg or in the Mozambique warehouse according to instructions sent by WhatsApp or Blackberry. 1 kg heroin packets with 555 and a logo. Photo of drugs seized after crossing from Mozambique to South Africa, from The Hawks, South Africa's Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation Mozambique is 2300 km long (SW-NE) but there is only a single north-south road, the N1 - and this road is essential for the heroin transit trade. The 1982-92 war cut that road and devastated the economy. The war ended with the 1992 peace accord and by 1995 the N1 was reopened and there was substantially more north-south commerce, which soon included heroin in transit.32 This section looks at the three routes to Mozambique (sea, container, and road), the passage through Mozambique, and shipment via South Africa. Arrival: by sea For centuries, traders with sailing dhows have used the monsoon winds to follow trading routes along the coasts from Pakistan to East Africa. Motorized wooden dhows now cross the Arabian 32 Carina Bruwer of the University of Cape Town has done two articles on this: "Heroin trafficking through South Africa: why here and why now?", The Conversation, 15 August 2017, https://theconversation.com/heroin-trafficking-through-south-africa-why-here-and-why-now-81627 and "From Afghanistan to Africa: Heroin trafficking in East Africa and the Indian Ocean", Daily Maverick 21 June 2016, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-06-21-from-afghanistan-to-africa-heroin-trafficking-in-eastafrica-and-the-indian-ocean/#.WddWs9N953R Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 10 sea directly although they still avoid the June-August monsoon period of high winds and storms.33 Heroin is picked up from the Makran coast of Iran and Pakistan and transported to traditional trading destinations on the coast of Kenya, Tanzania, and northern Mozambique. Usually these are motorized wooden Jelbot dhows built in the United Arab Emirates and designed for sea-going fishing. Their length of 15-23 metres allows them to travel at sea but remain small enough to be difficult to spot from satellite pictures or patrol vessels. They have concealed compartments which can carry 100-1000 kg of heroin, but if stopped pretend to be fishing vessels. Combined Maritime Forces which patrol the Western Indian Ocean region seized over 9.3 tonnes of heroin on dhows in the three years 2013-6.34 I was told that 3 tonnes of heroin had been seized from dhows in the Indian Ocean in the first half of 2017. Mozambique has no operational navy or coast guard, so there are few checks on smuggling or illegal fishing.35 It is estimated that dhows arrive at least weekly, except during the three month monsoon season, which points to landings of 10-40 tonnes of heroin per year. The dhows anchor 20-100 km offshore and are met by a flotilla of small boats that take the cargo to various spots along the coast. The coast of Cabo Delgado is favoured because it is the farthest north. The transfer is most easily done in the area north of Pemba with the Quirimbas islands along the coast. These are calm areas with significant small boat traffic, with boats normally landing on the beach. Quisanga north of Pemba is just a small beach that has become a busy port for small boats going to Ibo and Quirimba islands and for fishing, and it became an important landing point for heroin. Perhaps it became too well known and there has been a shift to the coast south of Pemba with good beaches with sand dunes which make it easy to conceal the landing. There are relatively few drug seizures in Mozambique - but the larger and more publicised seizures of hashish give an indication of drug routes, and in August 1997, 12 tonnes of hashish was seized in Quisanga. Dhows go as far south as Angoche (a 19th century slave trading port) in Nampula province where there are also islands.36 In 2012 police seized 187 kilos of "hashish" buried in the back yard of a house in Angoche. The spokesperson for the Nampula Provincial Police Command, Inacio Dina, said: “What we know is that these drugs come from a ship that anchored some miles from islands off the Angoche coast. The drugs are then brought ashore on smaller, hired boats.” Global Initiative argues that the Mozambique government has been suppressing evidence of the heroin trade, and that some "hashish" seizures may actually have been heroin. Arrivals: in containers Asian trading families37 bringing in containers of goods has always provided a route to import heroin, because there is little screening of arriving cargo; some trading companies' cargoes are not 33 Julian Whitewright, "The maritime rhythms of the Indian Ocean monsoon", University of Southampton mooc, http://moocs.southampton.ac.uk/shipwrecks/2014/10/02/maritime-rhythms-indian-ocean-monsoon/ 34 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), press release 4 November 2016, "Indian Ocean: 'Colombo Declaration. adopted to coordinate anti-drugs efforts". https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/November/indian-ocean_-colombo-declaration-adopted-tocoordinate-anti-drugs-efforts.html 35 In 2013-14 Mozambique took $2 bn in secret loans, ostensibly to create a coastal protection system. The Mozambique Channel between Mozambique and Madagascar has no regular military patrols and thus is open to smuggling, piracy (once only), and perhaps most importantly, illegal fishing. The deal involved $2 bn in loans organised in secret by Credit Suisse and the Russian bank VTB. A subsequent audit by Kroll showed that more than half of the $2 bn could not be accounted for. 36 There have been several reports of drugs being landed much further south, near Bazaruto and other islands off the coast of Vilanculos, Inhambane, but this seems uncommon. Reports include cocaine and heroin washed up on the shore (presumably from a failed transfer between boats), and of a boat carrying hashish which ran aground on rocks in June 2000 with 16 tonnes of hashish packed into tins which then washed ashore. The nine Pakistanis who escaped the shipwreck were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. 37 In the colonial era, urban commerce was largely restricted to white Portuguese and rural trade to people of Asian origin. At independence, most white Portuguese left and trade shifted, with people of Asian origin moving from rural areas to towns and cities. This racial division of trade, with its roots in colonial history, still shapes commerce - both legal and illegal - today. At independence, many of the south-Asian-origin families were unsure what would happen in Mozambique and carefully divided their families, with some members Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 11 inspected, and bribes would solve any problems. Pakistan is a major exporter of rice and Mozambique imports significant amounts of Pakistani rice, so heroin has been included in rice containers sent to Nacala and Pemba. Pemba is a relatively small port, handling fewer than 15,000 containers per year - although this is changing with the gas developments - and Pemba is not normally a grain port, so containers of rice were seen as unusual and were noticed. The small deep water port has long been a focus of illegal traffic, for the export of containers of hard woods, wildlife and marine products, and the import of heroin and hashish. Management of ports was privatized after 2000, but Pemba was the one port which was retained under the control of the state ports and railways company CFM (Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique) and it was clear that high officials did not want outsiders in the port. Nacala is said to be the deepest port in eastern Africa, and it is a major container port with a rail link to northern Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and now the coal mines of Tete. Management of the port is through a joint venture in which CFM plays a major role, but this is a major container port so it cannot be closed off in the same way as Pemba. Instead there are groups of warehouses controlled by Asian-origin trading families and with very tight private security and less linked to the port. These are being used for imported white goods - refrigerators, etc - as well as motorcycles and other goods which are openly under-invoiced to reduce duties. It is believed that these are also used to import heroin, for example in motorcycle fuel tanks, and the warehouses are also used to store heroin awaiting orders from South Africa and Europe. The families cited as being involved in the heroin trade and all based in Nampula and Nacala, which are only 160km apart. Both Nacala and Beira ports are deeply corrupted so any problems with illegal trade are settled with money. Containers for Malawi go through both ports and on their arrival in Malawi some show obvious evidence of having been opened and reclosed in port, with smuggled goods having been removed. Containers are said to be used for a number of smuggled commodities: stolen cars from Europe to South Africa, explosives for illegal mining, weapons for illegal wildlife trade, alcohol and tobacco - and thus are probably used for heroin as well. Global Initiative interviewed employees of the scanner company in Maputo and Nacala ports who said they were forbidden to scan the containers being imported by certain protected traders.38 There are no estimates of how much heroin is imported in this way. However the ports of Karachi and Dubai, which were open 15 years ago, have now been forced to install scanning equipment, which may be reducing the heroin traffic in containers. Nevertheless, container traffic of heroin is probably significant. Arrival: Overland Some heroin comes overland, by road from Tanzania. In March 2013 Mozambican police seized 600 kg of heroin in 5 kg bags at Namoto border post - near the coast and on the road between Mtwara in Tanzania and Palma in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. The seizure was proudly reported by the police and published in the national press, but never appeared in government statistics. Malva Brito, Cabo Delgado provincial police spokesperson, said the drug was destined for South Africa, and was being carried on a Toyota Hiace small truck with Democratic Republic of Congo number plates39 which appeared to be unladen, but had a secret compartment under the frame. Brito explained that the height of the tailgate and a strange aroma aroused the attention of the police, who searched the vehicle. This is the only reported seizure on this route.40 maintaining businesses in Mozambique (and building links with Frelimo) while other members went to Portugal and still others went to Dubai, India and Pakistan. These links have been maintained and have been important for money laundering and the heroin, hashish and mandrax trades. 38 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 39 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 40 There was one other media report. Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative cite the government daily Noticias (13 June 2015) reporting 13 Kg of heroin sized in Montepuez. The seizure does not appear in any official records. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 12 The Global Initiative report says that "a reliable source told the authors that they had seen test results from the Customs Department that confirmed it was heroin, yet the drug was recorded as N-Acetylanthranilic Acid by the provincial authorities" and a seizure of 604 kg of N-Acetylanthranilic Acid does appear in the 2013 provincial records.41 N-Acetylanthranilic Acid is used in the synthesis of methaqualone (mandrax), which is treated as a less important drug than heroin and is reported, so the false labelling is evidence of trying to conceal the heroin trade. Traffic on this route is probably small. The roads are bad and there is limited other traffic, making heroin smugglers more noticeable. But it has been noted that the global traffickers are not supplying the small Mozambican market, and it is suggested that this is being supplied by small traders from Tanzania. By road to South Africa Drugs are sent by road to the south of Mozambique and then to South Africa; the N1 is the only road from north to south. Maputo is 2200 km by the N1 from Nacala and another 550-600 km to Johannesburg, depending on the route. From the north of Mozambique to Nacala is another 650 km. So the drug may travel 3300 km to get to Johannesburg. The importers use different initial patterns. The MBS organised crime network moves the drugs to warehouses in Nacala port or to other warehouses of the south Asian trading families, such as the S&S industrial complex in Nacala, or warehouses in Nampula 160 km from Nacala, which are all tightly guarded. The newer decentralised or "disorganised crime" networks are said to prefer inland locations and are following more Latin American models, with locations with little traffic and where access can be guarded, for example from surrounding hills. There are many police check points on the roads and requests for bribes are common. It is said that early heroin shipments on the N1 were accompanied by the police in order to pass the checkpoints. As mobile telephone signals became better along the main roads, drivers were given a telephone number of a police official or Frelimo party figure to phone if they were stopped. This may still be used for MBS-linked shipments. But Mozambique has now become so corrupted that the freelance drivers working for the new networks are simply given money to bribe the police and other officials; their fee for the job is any money they do not spend in bribes. Unlike other countries, transporters are not paid in product and little of the heroin stays in Mozambique. Transport is typically in a specially prepared vehicle. Light pickups (known as bakkies), 4x4 cars, and Toyota Hilux pickups might carry 20-100 kg, and specially prepared larger trucks can carry 100-200 kg. We can gain some sense of this from seizures. In January 2018 and May and June 2017, South Africa authorities reported stopping three trucks on rural roads from southern Mozambique crossing into South Africa.42 At Golela border post with Swaziland on 24 January 2018 a truck was stopped with 200 kg of heroin and the Mozambican driver arrested and on 4 May 2017 a bakkie was stopped with 145 kg of heroin, in both cases in 1 kg bags. A similar amount was found in a truck at the Kosi Bay border post on 12 June 2017. Not apparently reported was a flatbed lorry caught in 2017 at a truck stop on the N4 from Maputo to Johannesburg with 100 kg of heroin under the plates of the flat bed. In the first half of 2016 police reported seizing a Nissan NP 200 pickup with $20,000 and 93 bags of heroin weighing 1 kg each behind door panels, a Toyota Prado with 50 kg of heroin hidden in the fuel tank, 58 kg hidden in an Opel Corsa pickup, and 38 kg hidden in a Toyota Hilux.43 41 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 42 A truck was stopped with 200 kg of heroin at the Golela border post between South Africa and Swaziland on 24 January 2018. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-25-man-arrested-after-policefind-multi-million-rand-heroin-haul/ A truck was stopped with 145 kg of heroin in 1 kg bags at Golela border post on 4 May 2017, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-seize-more-than-r100m-worth-ofdrugs-at-swazi-sa-border-20170505, and a similar amount in a truck at the Kosi Bay border post on 12 June 2017, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/three-arrested-r100m-worth-heroin-seized-indrug-bust-9784596. Both border posts are on rural roads from the very south of Mozambique to South Africa. 43 Jana Boshoff, "Middelburg situated on popular drug route", Middleburg Observer, 25 July 2017, https://mobserver.co.za/69733/middelburg-situated-popular-drug-route/ and Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 13 Also, many trucks carry cargo from South Africa to Mozambique and return empty, and some carry illegal cargo, including heroin, on the return trip. 44 There are no seizures on the Mozambican side of the border. Partly it is corruption. In late July the entire police force at Ponta do Ouro, the Mozambique side of Kosi Bay, were suspended, supposedly for corruption including harassing tourists and local traders with their demands for money45. But the President of the Mozambique Revenue Authority, Amelia Nankhare, told a team of the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group in July 2017 that a lack of funding meant there was a lack of scanners which made it impossible to implement border controls, so most illegal products were seized on the other side of the border.46 Johannesburg and beyond Most heroin that arrives in South Africa is in transit, but increasing amounts stay behind and this is increasing vigilance at the borders. Use of heroin itself exists but is not widespread in South Africa, although it may be increasing and may be responsible for the increase gang wars in Cape Town. The main concern is the growing use of nyaope (also called unga and whoonga) which is a mix of heroin and cannabis, and sometimes other drugs. It is smoked and use has grown substantially in the past five years. It gives a very short high but is very cheap, at less than $1 per hit. In the early years of the trade, heroin was sent directly to ports, notably Durban and, to a lesser extent, Maputo, where it was put into containers. This has changed and Johannesburg has become the warehousing and transhipment point. City Deep Container Terminal in Johannesburg is Africa’s biggest inland dry port, with a capacity of 400 000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) per year. Containers are carried by rail to the ports and shipped without further customs inspection, because City Deep is considered a port. However it is notoriously corrupt, so containers with heroin pass unnoticed. And even the police admit the extensive corruption at O R Tambo international airport.47 Thus it is easiest for heroin to go through City Deep and O R Tambo. Because of the secrecy of the heroin trade, apparently well-informed sources disagreed as to whether most heroin was shipped to Europe by sea in containers or by air. South Africa is mainly interested in stopping heroin entering the country (in order to reduce local use) and there are few checks on exports. There have only been two reported export seizures, one on each route. In 2009, 150 kg of heroin was intercepted in a shipment of tourist souvenirs at Heathrow airport, London, on a flight from South Africa; the trail was traced back to Durban and then Mozambique, where the South Africa organised crime unit, the Hawks, said the heroin had been packed with the curios.48 And in June 2017 police in Overberg, 250 km from Cape Town, seized 963 kg of heroin, one the largest seizures ever. It was in 253 packets of heroin in pallets of cases of wine destined for export. The seizure seems to have been entirely by accident. The container was being transported and the load shifted; farmworkers began to repack the container when they found some cases of wine had been replaced by heroin. The seizure was made on the Belgian-owned Eerste Hoop wine estate,49 and was intended for shipment to Antwerp, Belgium. https://www.facebook.com/policepicsandclips/photos/a.467274603397847.1073741829.440736009385040/5 35476389911001/?type=3&theater 44 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 45 MediaFax 2 Aug 2017 46 Draft report of the ESAAMLG high level mission to the Republic of Mozambique, 26-28 July 2017, Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group. 47 Thando Kubheka, "Mbalula committed to fighting corruption at OR Tambo airport", Eyewitness News, 22 July 2017, http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/22/mbalula-committed-to-fighting-corruption-at-or-tambo-airport 48 "South African Hawks in drugs bust," BBC News, 16 Sept 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8259456.stm; "SA centre of £75 million drugs haul", New Zimbabwe, 18 Sept 2009, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-999- SA+centre+of+%C2%A375+million+drug+haul/news.aspx 49 Initially incorrectly identified in the media as cocaine. Aron Hyman, "Heroin-smuggling plot 'foiled by sharpeyed workers on Cape wine farm'," Sunday Times Live, 23 June 2017; Caryn Dolley, "Police make massive R500m cocaine bust in Overberg town" and "Inside SA's 'biggest' drug bust – 5 things that have emerged so Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 14 Heroin is shipped in containers of non-perishable solid goods - wine, stone, tiles, etc - which is easier to escape scanning and easier to leave for longer in a European port. Note that the Overberg seizure was of a container going directly to a port, and not via City Deep, suggesting some packing is done by the shippers and in some cases heroin is added to containers without the shippers knowing. Changing systems within Mozambique Mozambique's position in a trafficking route has not changed much in 25 years - heroin in processed in Afghanistan, goes mainly to Pakistan and by sea to northern Mozambique, overland to South Africa, and then to Europe. But since 2010, a number of external and internal factors have reshaped the trade, creating space for a new and more modern decentralized structure working in parallel to the MBS system. Other criminal activities In 2015, Mark Shaw, Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime in Geneva, noted that in southern Africa: "Name a prominent criminal market: drugs, endangered species, illegal mining or stolen vehicles, and there will be evidence of state support and protection. This is a critical development: it is the common feature of criminal commodity markets across the region." And he adds that "one of the reasons why a fuller picture of organised crime does not exist for the Southern African region is that the phenomenon is notoriously difficult to research. … Official state actors are also often nervous to provide information on 'real' organised crime, because that is almost always very close to political power."50 Mozambique's short post-independence period set high moral standards, but the war and then the post-war open market period brought a range of illegal activities: bringing in fuel and stolen cars, and exporting gemstones, precious wood, ivory and animal and marine products. There were a range of networks but most with links to both local officials and to high level Frelimo people. One of the most public changes in the crime scene was kidnapping, of at least 100 members of the Asian-origin community since 2011. Nini Satar (linked to earlier loan sharking and bank embezzlement and convicted of killing journalist Carlos Cardoso) has been linked to the kidnappings, and there are clear links into the police and judiciary. Mahomed Bakhir Ayoob, part of one of the drug trading families and son-in-law of MBS, was charged in 2012 with being involved in the kidnappings but was allowed to leave Mozambique for Dubai and then Hong Kong. Prosecutor Marcelino Vilanculos who was investigating the kidnappings was murdered on 11 April 2016. The kidnappings have generated millions of dollars in ransoms and some of that money must be coming from the drugs trade. It is unclear to what extent these kidnapping reflect division within the Asian business community, and the extent of the links between the kidnapping networks and the drug families.51 Changing expectations The discovery of one of the Africa's largest reserves of natural gas in 2010 seems to have counteracted the naming of MBS as a drugs kingpin in the same year. High oil and gas prices led to visions of previously undreamed of wealth and donors wanted to encourage foreign investment far", News24, 22 June 2017. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2017-06-23-heroin-smuggling-plot-foiled-bysharp-eyed-workers-on-cape-wine-farm/; http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/inside-sas-biggest-drugbust-5-things-that-have-emerged-so-far-20170626 50 Mark Shaw, "New networks of power: why organised crime is the greatest long-term threat to security in the SADC region", in Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and Catherine Moat (eds), Southern African Security Review 2015, Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015, pp 177, 181. http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/mosambik/12932-20170302.pdf 51 On 23 April 2018 a man admitted ordering the kidnapping of an Indian businessman and told a police organised press conference that he had done so because he hoped to obtain a ransom large enough to pay off a $110,000 debt to "the owner of Maputo Shopping Centre" - MBS. Paul Fauvet, "Kidnapper hoped to export money to pay off debt", AIM English, 24 Apr 2018. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 15 and continued to treat Mozambique as a favoured child. Oil and gas prices continued high until 2015. At the same time there were changes within Frelimo. First, President Guebuza seemed to be directing resources to an ever smaller group of cronies, and the Frelimo elite was angry at being excluded from the slush fund. Second, the slush fund seemed smaller. Total local income from the heroin trade could be up to $100 mn per year, but the Frelimo party share would be much less than that. Compared to the vast gas wealth, the drugs trade was beginning to seem less important. But in 2015 the house of cards was seriously shaken. The anti-Guebuza wave within the party led to the naming of Filipe Nyusi as the compromise presidential candidate. The way in which Guebuza concentrated money and power caused substantial discontent within the Frelimo elite, leading to more decentralization. President Filipe Nyusi took office in January 2015, and there are no reports of him having the same personal links with MBS; party links seem to now be at lower and more decentralised levels and it does seem that some of the protection has been withdrawn. There are indications that senior Frelimo people, including President Nyusi, want to curb some of the more rapacious illegal trading. There seems to be more willingness, albeit still limited, of the attorney general's office to be involved in anti-drug and anti-corruption activities. One marker is the ban on the illegal export of hard woods which had been controlled for a decade at high level.52 These changes are real, but still small. The gas price collapse partly triggered the 2015/16 discovery of $2 billion in secret loans that had been organised in 2013/14 by Guebuza on the assumption that gas profits would pay the debt. Donors were offended and angry and suddenly Mozambique was no longer the spoiled child; budget support aid was cut and donors started to look under the carpet. That, in turn, has created an economic crisis, with the government seriously short of money, and increasingly borrowing to pay its bills. It needs the drug dealers to use some their profits to buy government bonds. And Frelimo will be under increasing pressure to fund upcoming elections. Curbing MBS MBS and his network remain the biggest, but with their wings cut. Naming him as a drug kingpin seems to have had little immediate impact, and the 2015 changes seem to have been more important. After he was named as a kingpin MBS kept his head down for a while, but on 18 September 2014 he was at the head table, just a few seats away from Presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi, at a fund-raising dinner for Frelimo organised by the main business association, the CTA. As Africa Confidential (10 Oct 2014) commented, "Bashir's attendance sent a clear message: that he remains an important financier of the party." However this was the end of the Guebuza era, and it was interpreted as MBS having pushed his way in. He seems not to be publicly acceptable to the new Nyusi group. It appears that under the benevolent wing of Guebuza, MBS and his cohorts may have overextended themselves. A major blow came on 11 November 2016 when the Bank of Mozambique ordered the dissolution and liquidation of one of the country’s smaller commercial banks, Nosso Banco (Our Bank), saying it was under capitalized, had an “unsustainable economic and financial structure” and was suffering from “serious liquidity and management problems”.53 Nosso Banco was set up in 1999 under the name Banco Mercantil e de Investmentos, and changed its name to Nosso Banco in 2015. Its main shareholders were public institutions, the social security system (Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social, INSS, 77%) and the public electricity company EDM (16%). The Frelimo Party company, SPI, owned 4% and the Rwandan 52 Environmental Investigation Agency, "First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests", London, July 2014, https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/FirstClass-Crisis-English-FINAL.pdf 53 Paul Fauvet, "A second Mozambican bank fails", Maputo: AIM English, 11 November 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201611120110.html Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 16 businessman Alfred Kalisa, one of the bank’s founders and its first chair, owned 2%.54 Nosso Banco was one of two totally locally-owned Mozambican banks and thus was without international ties. Banks which do business in the US cannot have as clients anyone named as a drugs kingpin by the US, which meant that MBS and Maputo Shopping could not use most banks. Thus it was the only bank with an ATM in MBS's Maputo Shopping after two major banks closed their branches there in 2010. Nosso Banco received substantial deposits from MBS, who is said to have lost tens of millions of dollars in the collapse. But Momade Rassul was reported to be the biggest debtor to it, with a loan of $30 mn guaranteed against a building valued at less, and which had been questioned by auditors.55 It has been widely speculated, including by Savana (25 November 2016), that Mozambique may have come under pressure from the US to close the bank. This is plausible, because Mozambique had been able to resist donor and particularly US pressure because of mineral and gas revenues and investments (including by a US company, Anadarko), but this changed with the revelation of the secret debt in 2016. On 29 June 2017, Momade Rassul was arrested in Maputo and charged with money laundering, illegal enrichment, and tax fraud.56 He was later released on bail. At the same time there was a scandal about the South African Public Investment Corporation putting $83 mn into a nonoperating oil refinery owned by Rassul's S&S in Nacala.57 It does look as if he was over-extended and his protection was withdrawn. MBS still travels in and out of Mozambique. But the closure of Nosso Banco has forced him to use off-shore banks, which may also mean he spends less time at home. But he clearly is still controlling part of the south-east Africa heroin trade and remains the most important trafficker in Mozambique. Looser networks and the 'gig economy' The changes in Frelimo are happening when there are global changes in the structures of legal and illegal commerce and just at a time when heroin shipments are increasing, in part because crackdowns in Tanzania and Kenya have shifted a significant part of the East African heroin traffic south to northern Mozambique. This increase, and perhaps some of the trade previously controlled by MBS, have shifted to an entirely new channel running in parallel. One source called it a shift from organised crime to "disorganised crime"; I see it more as the adoption of the gig economy or Uber/Airbnb model. Two decades ago, drug barons across the world were public figures with political power, seen as beneficent and interested in developing their communities. MBS followed that model. When President Armando Guebuza opened Maputo Shopping on 22 June 2006, he was given 50 wheelchairs and 100,000 school notebooks.58 But that also left them exposed; slowly the public drug lords were captured. That led to a shift to clandestine drug barons. That came about at the same time as the main-stream economy was moving away from permanent jobs, toward short and zero hours contracts, and other forms of casualization. Within Mozambique, the generalised corruption in police and the state apparatus made ordinary bribes to police and others faster and easier than high level political protection. Finally smartphones and apps make electronic communication possible. The wide availability of good mobile telephone coverage in northeast 54 Rwandan President Paul Kagame on 2 August 2009 pardoned Kalisa, who has been serving a six-year prison sentence for corruption and abuse of office when CEO and Chair of the former Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry (BCDI) when he gave illegal loans to himself and his family. Ignatius Ssuuna, "Alfred Kalisa gets Presidential Pardon", New Times, 3 Aug 2010, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/22599/ 55 AIM English 26 November 2016, http://clubofmozambique.com/news/uba-bank-management-criticises-ctachief-mozambique/ 56 Procuradoria Provincial da República - Nampula, Comunidado de Imprensa n° 02/PPRN/2017, http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mozambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf 57 Sello Theletsane, "R1bn Oil Deal Mess: PIC Boss Matjila Sued", Weekly Xposé, 26 July 2017. http://weeklyxpose.co.za/2017/07/26/r1bn-oil-deal-mess-pic-boss-matjila-sued/ 58 "Maputo Shopping Center: um exemplo de investimento", Noticias, 23 June 2006. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 17 Mozambique since about 2015 makes this a sensible model for the expansion of the heroin trade there. The MBS model was built on a basis of apparently legitimate trade operating through their official trading companies and using their own warehouses, hotels, and staff. The new model is looser and more flexible, using drivers, fishers and others for individual pick-ups and deliveries - just like delivery services in New York or London. People are contracted and paid for specific jobs, and often assigned by mobile phone using WhatsApp or BlackBerry, which are encrypted.59 Thus a driver of a boat owner may just receive a WhatsApp message telling them to go to a particular point to collect a heroin parcel - just like calling an Uber taxi. Sometimes those employed are already involved in the illegal trade of timber, ivory, fuel, liquor, and cigarettes. The network is controlled from abroad, particularly from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Dubai (following arrests of key figures in East Africa), and there are local controllers (at a lower levels than MBS or the Ayoobs), with fixers or facilitators below them, who are black Mozambicans or Tanzanians, particularly Muslim Kiswahili speakers (who are able to talk with local people and fit in). The controllers may be Pakistani and there are reports of small groups of young Pakistani men setting up car parts importing businesses in Quelimane and elsewhere. Both the old-style MBS network and the new gig economy are moving heroin through Mozambique, but our informants disagreed as to which system is now dominant. The criminal "gig economy" The Brookings Institution defines the gig economy "as the matching of freelance workers or service providers to customers on a digital platform or marketplace." 60 They use US census data on "nonemployer firms", that is, they have no employees. They are increasing rapidly and are mostly in the rooms and rides sector - in other words Uber, Lyft and Airbnb. In 2014 there were 145 mn payroll employees compared to 24 million nonemployer firms in the US (14% of the total). A study by McKinsey in October 2016 estimated that 20-30% of the labour force in both the US and EU was made up of independent workers who were self-employed or doing temporary work, and who often lack the unemployment insurance, workers compensation and disability insurance that traditional workers have.61 International criminal networks have adopted social media and the gig economy, in part because it allows network members to be isolated from each other and be coordinated without knowing many other network members. Messages are sent by encrypted services, notably Viber and Whatsapp62 , but also Signal, Wire, Telegram, Wickr and others. The drug trade has not been well studied in this respect, but there have been press reports. A US border patrol agent in San Diego County, California, was arrested in 2016 for picking up backpacks of drugs along the Mexican border fence and delivering them to another safe location. He was told of the drop locations on WhatsApp.63 The use of WhatsApp to send photos was shown by the 18 October 2017 conviction of Heathrow Airport, London, baggage handlers. A suitcase with 3 kg of cocaine was arriving on a flight to 59 Although both BlackBerry and WhatsApp are encrypted, some drug cartels do not trust the security of WhatsApp because it is owned by the US company Facebook, and there has been a return to Blackberry, which is owned by a Canadian company. 60 Ian Hathaway and Mark Muro, "Tracking the gig economy: New numbers." Brookings Institution, Washington DC, October 13, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-the-gig-economy-newnumbers/ 61 Elaine Pofeldt, "McKinsey Study: Gig-Economy Workforce Is Bigger Than Official Data Shows in U.S., Europe", Forbes, 10 Oct 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/elainepofeldt/2016/10/10/mckinsey-studyindependent-workforce-is-bigger-than-official-data-shows-in-u-s-europe 62 Whatsapp is owned by Facebook and there have been rumours that the encryption is not secure. John E Dunn, Thomas Macaulay & Tamlin Magee. "Best secure mobile messaging apps", Techworld, 12 Feb 2018, https://www.techworld.com/security/best-secure-mobile-messaging-apps-3629914/#r3z-addoor 63 Kristina Davis, "Border Patrol agent arrested on bribery, drug trafficking charges", The San Diego UnionTribune, 15 Dec 2016, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-border-bribery-20161215- story.html Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 18 Terminal 3. The baggage handler received a photo of the suitcase on WhatsApp and he picked up the bag; that evening after he left work he gave the bag to a taxi driver who was waiting just outside the airport for further delivery to Birmingham. The deal from Brazil to Birmingham was done by individual contractors given their jobs on WhatsApp.64 Whatsapp and the gig economy are used for other criminal activities. Islamic State (ISIS) raised substantial amounts of money selling historic artefacts, and even had an antiquities office in Manbij, Syria. Sales and exports were coordinated on Whatsapp.65 From a standpoint of encrypted social media and the gig economy, the best studied has been people smuggling.66 Smugglers advertise on Facebook and other social media with a telephone number that must be contacted by an encrypted message service such as Viber or Whatsapp. Europol estimates that "90% of migrants arriving in the EU use facilitation services at some point during their journey," and that "the criminal turnover associated with migrant smuggling to and within the EU is between €3-6 billion for 2015 alone."67 Danielle Hickman of the US Department of Justice reports that people smuggling organizations "do not have a traditional 'closed system' structure - these operations are more commonly composed of loose international alliances involving facilitators. Even if working in concert, they may not necessarily know each other or be in the same country. Also, the downstream infrastructure is not necessarily composed of components of one organization. Rather, it tends to be a network of freelance and independent contractors consisting of recruiters, money collectors, document providers, travel agencies, transporters, and in some cases, corrupt foreign officials." 68 Studies in Turkey confirm that the people smuggling business is carried out not by hierarchal and mafia-like organizations, but by "flexible organizations operating on the basis of division of labour," with "loose alliances of domestic groups working together".69 They are like multi-national companies using local subcontractors. There are higher level controllers, often of people of the same nationality as the migrants and who have built a reputation in that country or on Facebook. They then use a well developed network of facilitators along the smuggling route. Hickman notes that members of smuggling organizations use Whatsapp to notify arrival and coordinate fee payments (often the client gives the fee up front to an agreed banker and orders part to be released after each stage of the journey is successfully completed) and to communicate changes in smuggling routes. Smuggling involves many handovers at borders and to drivers, boat captains, and people with safe houses. The route from Pakistan via Turkey to Europe involves at least 19 handovers.70 Whatsapp photos make handovers easier. Facilitators use the photographs to immediately identify their 64 Nic Brunetti, "Heathrow Airport baggage handler Dev Anand of Langley plotted to smuggle drugs into UK with three others," Slough & South Bucks Observer, 20 Oct 2017 http://www.sloughobserver.co.uk/news/15609529.Heathrow_Airport_baggage_handler_plotted_to_smuggle_ drugs_into_UK/ 65 Joe Parkinson, Ayla Albayrak & Duncan Mavin, "Syrian ‘Monuments Men’ Race to Protect Antiquities as Looting Bankrolls Terror", Wall Street Journal, 10 Feb 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-monumentsmen-race-to-protect-antiquities-as-looting-bankrolls-terror-1423615241 66 Interpol says "A broad distinction can be made between people smuggling and human trafficking. In general, the individuals who pay a smuggler in order to gain illegal entry to a country do so voluntarily whereas the victims of human trafficking are often duped or forced into entering another country." https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/People-smuggling 67 European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC), "Migrant smuggling in the EU," 2016, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/migrant-smuggling-in-eu 68 Danielle Hickman, "Combatting Transnational Smuggling Organizations: An Introductory Overview", U.S. Attorneys' Bulletin 85, p 65 (2017) 69 Oguzhan Omer Demir, Murat Sever & Yavuz Kahya, "The Social Organisation of Migrant Smugglers in Turkey: Roles and Functions", Eur J Crim Policy Res 23, pp 371–391 (2017), DOI 10.1007/s10610-016- 9326-x 70 Elif Özmenek Çarmikli & Merve Umay Kader, "Migrant Smuggling in Turkey: The ‘Other’ Side of the Refugee Crisis", International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), Ankara, Report no. 45, April 2016. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 19 clients when they exit an aircraft, vehicle, or boat. In turn, the facilitators show the photographs to the client to prove they are the correct "contact" and will assist them in the next leg of the journey.71 The gig economy - the Uber economy - using local subcontractors and Whatsapp is being adopted by international smugglers of drugs, people and other goods. Mozambique's heroin transit traffic is part of a much larger global shift. Conclusion Mozambique is an important heroin transit country, with a heroin trail that goes AfghanistanPakistan-Mozambique-South Africa-Europe. An estimated 10-40 tonnes or more of heroin passes through each year. This could be adding $100 million per year in corrupt money to the local economy, and is clearly having an impact on an already corrupted state. The trade seems to be increasing as crackdowns in Kenya and Tanzania are diverting heroin through Mozambique. The trade was built up from the 1990s by Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) and controlled at the highest level, including Presidents Chissano and Guebuza, with money going to the Frelimo party, senior Frelimo figures, and officials in the police and customs authorities. There has been a surprising silence by the international community, which has occurred until now because donors have wanted to treat Mozambique as a success story and because the regulation of the trade appears to work, at least domestically. This picture may be changing, because Mozambique's image has been tarnished by the $2 bn in secret loans, at least half of which has not been accounted for. Also there is growing concern about ivory and other natural resource smuggling. Donors are moving their aid away and no longer need to treat Mozambique as their success story and favoured child. Meanwhile the top of Frelimo and President Filipe Nyusi appear to be distancing themselves from the heroin trade and allowing some crackdowns. But mobile telephones and Whatsapp have allowed a second decentralised heroin traffic to emerge. Just like hiring an Uber taxi, the heroin traders can send a WhatsApp message and hire a boat to take their heroin to the beach and a bakkie to drive it to Johannesburg. And the widespread corruption means the new heroin traffickers can buy support at more local levels and do not need political patronage. It may now be too late for the corrupted state and ruling party to change. Corruption has become endemic, and Frelimo has become dependent on patronage for its support. Money for patronage comes from drugs, commissions on contracts, and money siphoned off aid projects. Opposition parties are not challenging corruption, and appear to want power only in order to eat as well. For their own reasons, the international community allowed Frelimo and the state to be corrupted.72 For the most part, they now appear to be willing to simply walk away - keeping only enough involvement to ensure access to natural resources. Joseph Hanlon is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, London. He is editor of the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin and co-author of several books on Mozambique, most recently Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique. j.hanlon@lse.ac.uk 71 Danielle Hickman. 72 Joseph Hanlon, 2017, ‘Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique’s US$2.2 billion secret debt deal’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 753–770.
This project is funded by the European Union Issue 04 | June 2018 POLICY BRIEF Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw Summary In recent years, the volume of heroin shipped from Afghanistan along a network of maritime routes in East and Southern Africa appears to have increased considerably. An integrated regional criminal market has developed; shaping and shaped by political developments. Africa is now experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use worldwide, and a spectrum of criminal networks and political elites in East and Southern Africa are substantially enmeshed in the trade. New policy approaches are urgently needed. Key points • Responses should address the challenge as a cross-border criminal system. • Progressive action should be targeted in major drug hubs along the southern route, focusing on vulnerable areas and potential sources of regional instability, such as northern Mozambique. • The relationship between politics, business and organised crime must be adequately researched and addressed. • Vetted private sector actors should be engaged to prevent or reverse the criminalisation of key ports. • Support must be increased for community-based initiatives that mitigate the effects of drug use. • Programming interventions to reduce violence in the most vulnerable communities affected by the heroin trade in Southern and East Africa should be considered. This brief focuses on: 2 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Since 2010, several large seizures of heroin by the Combined Maritime Force – a 32-member-state naval partnership that conducts maritime security operations aimed at countering terrorism and narcotics smuggling – have confirmed that the East African coast is now a significant geographical link in the global heroin trade.1 Heroin is being shipped from Afghanistan to the east coast of Africa along a maritime route known as the ‘southern route’. This is in reality a network of routes stretching along East and Southern Africa, with drug consignments eventually making their onward way to countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and, to a limited extent, North America. The southern route has gained popularity in recent years because the land-based drug-trafficking route to western Europe via the Balkans has become increasingly difficult for traffickers to navigate owing to conflict and increased law enforcement.2 This has diverted some illegal drug flows to the Indian Ocean and onwards to the east coast of Africa. Although traffickers using the southern route have their own challenges to contend with, such as piracy off the coast of Somalia and the anti-drug operations of the Combined Maritime Force, the volume of trade along this route appears to be increasing. Previous estimates have suggested that 22 to 40 tonnes of heroin a year were being trafficked through East Africa.3 However, although the actual volumes cannot be estimated with certainty, our research indicates that the figure may now be higher. Multilateral institutions and northern donors have tended to focus is on how heroin that transits the southern route enters markets in Europe4.This perspective, however, tends to downplay or even ignore the impact of the heroin trade on the transit countries in Africa. Our research has, instead, focused on the political economy of the southern route. It looks more closely at the characteristics of the heroin flows in the region and how the narcotics trade has become embedded in Kenyan, Tanzanian, Mozambican and South African society. This research is the culmination of four months of qualitative research based on over 240 interviews conducted in seven countries, the full findings of which appear in an ENACT research paper.5 This brief summarises this analysis and highlights several concerning conclusions, below. The southern route and criminal governance along the east coast of Africa In countries all along the eastern seaboard of Africa, from Somalia to South Africa, the heroin trade has become embedded in local communities and linked to political elites. The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy based on the transit of heroin from Afghanistan to the West, and with a spin-off trade for local consumption. The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy Along this trafficking route, much of the heroin is first shipped to Africa on motorised, wooden seagoing dhows built in the United Arab Emirates designed for fishing. The vessels are loaded with between 100 kg and 1 000 kg consignments of contraband off the Makran coast of southern Pakistan. The dhows anchor off the coast of Africa in international waters, and flotillas of small boats collect the heroin and ferry it to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload it into small commercial harbours. Dozens of such sites are used for landing the consignments along the entire eastern coastline – from north of Kismayo, Somalia, to Angoche, Mozambique. This route is used all year round apart from during the three-month monsoon period. While this dhow-based heroin trade has been identified for several years, significantly, the present research suggests that transit traffickers have also made use of containers at various deep-water container ports along the coast. Several ports have fallen under substantial criminal influence and are used to transship a number of other illicit goods, such as elephant ivory and timber. Most of the heroin that passes through East and southern African is destined for markets in the West, which are far more profitable than the African markets.6 The transit heroin trade is a bulk trade: though shipments are sometimes broken down into smaller consignments in an effort to avoid detection, much heroin transported this way is moved in units of Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 3 tens or even hundreds of kilograms at a time. As such, the transit economy relies on international ports and highways, and, to a lesser extent, air links. The trade also relies on high-level political protection, so that those involved can benefit from ready access to infrastructure, such as ports along the route, which are ostensibly important to national security and so should be well guarded and controlled by governments. Initially, the political protection secured for this trade seems to have emerged out of simple transactions between drug traffickers and political figures who exert control over ports, customs and law enforcement. Heroin traders using this transit route need to arrange for these ports to be permeable, and ensure their illicit goods are neither seized nor linked to criminal cases against them. Over time, these transactions have evolved in different ways along the coast. In Kenya, drug traffickers have decided to campaign directly for political office. In Mozambique, drug traffickers have consolidated their hold over the market in a remarkably resilient and longstanding quid pro quo with the political elite. In these countries, heroin profits play a discrete and identifiable role in providing campaign and patronage finance to political figures. Tanzania, meanwhile, is currently going through a series of reforms under President Magufuli that are substantially disrupting criminal-political relationships in the country, with signs that this is having the effect of displacing criminal figures to other parts of the region. In South Africa heroin has not been directly linked to political figures, although prominent figures in the broader drug trade have. Along this route, not all heroin is in transit, however. East and southern Africa have a much larger consumer market than is commonly acknowledged. This local market gets some of its supply from ‘leakage’ from the transit trade – through in-kind payments to drivers, fishermen, the police, etc. – and through small-scale theft from bulk consignments. But there is also some indication that bigger players arrange their own supplies directly from Pakistan or from the kingpins of the transit trade. In South Africa, in particular, the consumer market for heroin is large and growing, and this phenomenon is being driven by more organised local and international networks, which have spawned a secondary heroin trade. The 2017 World Drug Report noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally, and this has been attributed to Africa’s role in the southern route.7 In Kenya there are almost 55 000 people who inject heroin (the consumption method that carries the highest health risks associated with this drug), over 32 000 in Tanzania and over 75 000 in South Africa8. The numbers of people smoking heroin, which, for many, will lead to injecting later, are much higher. In most of these countries, the rates of HIV among people who inject drugs are several times higher than among the rest of the population, and there are astronomically high rates of hepatitis C in this group.9 Despite a heartening trend that is seeing drug users’ rights and their access to health services being placed at the centre of drug treatment approaches in several locations, there are nevertheless gaps in such interventions. Coverage rates of harm-reduction services in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, are still low, according to World Health Organization indicators,10 and neither South Africa nor Mozambique offers evidencebased treatment options, such as opioid-substitution therapy, through the public-health system. Regionally, there are also gaps in the collection of key data, while legal frameworks are punitive for drug users, with lawenforcement responses that are harsh on users and small dealers, but ineffective against major traffickers. The 2017 World Drug Report noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally Cities with the biggest consumer markets – like Mombasa, Cape Town and the Johannesburg–Pretoria metropolitan area – are also beset with violence associated with the drug trade. For example, residents in Mombasa say that local gangs have mushroomed over the last few years to give protection to heroin barons. Drug traffickers hire indiscriminately from among the unemployed in Mombasa’s slums. When job opportunities fall – such as after election periods, or when drug barons are imprisoned – these ‘violent entrepreneurs’, to use a term that seems apt, become predatory and turn to extortion and robbery in the local community.11 At the same time, and in the midst of widespread impunity for the people who organise and profit from the drug trade, lynching of drug users by anti-crime vigilante groups has also become commonplace. 4 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast In South Africa, nyaope and unga use has also led to an increase in crime, with addicts financing their habit by resorting to mugging, theft of electrical copper cables and other criminal activities.12 More significantly, however, in gang-controlled areas levels of violence have seen huge increases, related both to an influx of guns13 and dramatic gang wars over drug turf. The Cape Town murder rate spiralled upwards from around 2011 and has only recently stabilised – although at extremely high levels – making the city one of the most violent cities in the world, on a par with several Latin American capitals.14 The heroin trade is therefore linked, both directly and indirectly, to a number of serious developments in the East and southern African region. These include sustaining undemocratic political figures and parties, the role of the trade in making key ports porous, the empty hotels and undeveloped land that serve as fronts for laundering drug money, the spread of HIV and hepatitis C, and violence in the communities caught up in heroin consumer markets. This policy brief puts forward a number of recommendations, cautions and ideas on how best to respond to the heroin trade in southern and East Africa.15 The regional integration of the heroin trade raises several critical challenges for both civil-society and law-enforcement responses. There are also, however, important opportunities for action that must be grasped now. Policy recommendations Conventional wisdom would hold that the immediate response to the heroin trade should come in the form of decisive action from national political leaders and a crackdown by law enforcement. However, one needs to be aware of the inherent difficulty of working with government institutions that are heavily implicated in organised-crime activities, unless there is an internal faction motivating for change. Likewise, building capacity among law-enforcement agencies where there is deeply systemic corruption is often futile – and sometimes very counterproductive. Such engagements often rely for their success on timing related to political openings. Such openings may exist in South Africa in the medium term. Tanzanian law-enforcement officials have also expressed, at least informally, a desire for regional cooperation, but it is not clear what the position of their political leaders is. Even in these cases, caveats about engaging with security forces that are deemed to flout human rights must apply. The lack of success of militarised ‘war on drugs’ type strategies that have been applied in other contexts must also be taken into account. Lastly, given the integration of the coastal economy, the disruption and inevitable displacement of criminal networks in one country will only have the effect of shifting them to places that are unprepared to respond. Although these may seem like gloomy prospects, there is an argument that a better starting point to address the challenges would be to gain a sound understanding of where effort is likely to have the most impact, and then to design programmes that build powerful alliances between not just key elites and lawenforcement agencies, but also civil-society figures. Some recommendations for how to go about this are discussed in this brief; these are categorised into three areas: • Taking a regional approach • Tackling the links between the hidden economy and politics • Building coalitions for change around local effects Taking a regional approach Address the challenge as a regional criminal system A key objective of this brief is to highlight the crossborder nature of this coastal criminal economy and to emphasise the need to think holistically about responses. From a development perspective, this means thinking about cross-border illicit flows as part of an integrated regional system – one with jointly shared knock-on effects and impacts. One of the findings of this study is that the countries enmeshed in this system do not think about the challenge in this way. It should be a key aim, however, of development funding and partnership programmes to encourage such a regional approach. There are multiple ways to support such a conceptual shift: funding a single regional think tank or regional pressure groups, supporting the establishment of a coastal commission (similar to an initiative currently operating in West Africa) and drawing on the inputs of all the countries affected by the challenge. The point is to fashion a Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 5 SOUTH AFRICA KENYA Nairobi (Inland Container Depot) TANZANIA Dar es Salaam SOMALIA Mogadishu MOZAMBIQUE Maputo N © S Ballard (2017) Indian Ocean Pemba Nacala Lamu Mombasa Cape Town Johannesburg (Tambo International & City Deep Inland Container Port) Durban Arusha Angoche Nampula Tanga Stone Town (Zanzibar) Kismayo UGANDA Ras Afun Cape Guardafui Kampala Capital city Town Small port / town Border Zone Corridor km 0 600 ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE BOTSWANA NAMIBIA Corridor (uncertain) Dhow routes Entebbe Indicative overview of sea- and land-based heroin routes across the eastern African coastal states Source: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, based on interviews across the region, September 2017 6 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast response that draws on these linkages and uses the language of solidarity between affected parties and countries. In this sense, political developments in Tanzania (and potentially in the medium term in South Africa too) may provide new openings for such a wider regional anti-trafficking response. Leverage from within the region, for the sake of the region, will also be crucial Leverage from within the region, for the sake of the region, will also be crucial. At least two of the governments in this region, Mozambique and Tanzania, are highly resistant to Western intervention, especially in issues that cut so closely to politics and security. And, given that regional cooperation is in any case necessary to address these regional flows, attempts should be made to encourage cooperative efforts among the countries in the region. For example, South Africa wields hefty political and economic clout in southern Africa, and to a lesser extent in East Africa, and is also particularly hard hit by the downwind effects of the heroin trade. Exposing these effects in South Africa, and facilitating regional dialogue, might therefore encourage the South African government to apply pressure on other regional states to address the situation. But, to achieve this, networks that include both government and civil-society actors from the countries across the region must be built. Build regional (coastal) enforcement networks Interviews conducted with law-enforcement representatives at different points along the East African coast suggest that official forms of regional cooperation are extremely weak. South African officials, for example, suggested that they struggle to engage with their Mozambican counterparts. Despite these difficulties – and the fact that political protection often prevents effective law-enforcement responses to organised crime – it remains crucial to build networks of professional practice and solidarity across the region. Although these may lie dormant in some cases until political change allows effective action, they are an important investment for the future. Building regional solidarity among honest officials also provides a source of protection for their actions. At the same time, it is also crucial to ensure that bridges are built between civil-society and key members within the regional law-enforcement community. This is not to compromise actors on either side of the divide, but to recognise that civil society and the media are increasingly a spur to law-enforcement action. This is a trend that is likely to continue. Focus on the areas most vulnerable to instability One of the conclusions emerging clearly from this work is the vulnerability of northern Mozambique. Here, and largely off the radar, a significant local drug-trafficking economy has developed, facilitated by government corruption and indifference. In this context, there is much to gain by seeking ways to build better relations and networks, and to gather more information on the local political economy, including its connections to illicit markets. Many analyses have pointed to lack of development as the cause of organised crime, but, in fact, the opposite is true Many analyses have pointed to lack of development as the cause of organised crime, but, in fact, the opposite is true. Infrastructure, such as roads and ports, provides the physical means for moving and handling illicit commodities (in the absence of effective regulation and enforcement, that is). In that respect, northern Mozambique – with its potential for economic growth derived from its oil and gas reserves – is particularly vulnerable. With a shift in trafficking southward from Tanzania, this part of the region is increasingly becoming a major hub of illicit activity. Preventive action is required now if the area is not to become a wider source of instability and a regional platform for criminal activity. The problem is still manageable but early action is needed. At the most basic level, the first step would be to increase engagement with local communities and build stronger networks of civil society in the region. Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 7 Identify hubs and lever change within them At a macro-level a region-wide programme should identify geographic points, or key hubs, on which to focus. Hubs are choke points where multiple illicit flows merge to either leave or enter a political territory, to be processed (whether that involves physical adulteration or the transformation of hard cash into electronic transfers) or transferred from one transport mode to another (e.g. from sea to land, or truckloads being broken down into smaller packages for onward transport). Crucial hubs in this regional criminal economy are Mombasa (Kenya), Nacala and Nampula (northern Mozambique), City Deep (an area of Johannesburg) and the Port of Cape Town. Targeted investments to make these places less permeable to criminal elements may bear fruit in several areas, diminishing not only heroin flows, but also illegal trafficking of wildlife or other natural-resource commodities. However, these interventions should not necessarily take the form of improving state control or increasing state efficiency, as prominent state actors are often key players in illegal trade, and greater control and better technology may well only serve to facilitate their business. Instead, they should entail creative ways of empowering licit actors with an interest in ‘clean’ and functioning ports. Forming alliances with vetted privatesector agents is one possibility. Tackling the links between the hidden economy and politics Grasp the nettle of party-political funding The growth of the illicit economy in Africa, and particularly along its east coast, coincided with the establishment of a series of fragile democracies. Perhaps one of the most striking conclusions of this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a source of party-political funding in the various countries that are involved in the coastal criminal economy. Such funding is used not only for inter-party election campaigns, but also for positioning within political movements (intra-party). Illicit funds or grey funds have been a source of ‘easy money’ in several places. One direct result has been the alignment of political interests (and the interests of the political elite) and the illicit economy, including drug trafficking. One cannot overemphasise the impact of this hidden economy: interview after interview raised the issue directly or indirectly. Although much more needs to be understood about the relationships between party politics and illicit trade, the outlines of the challenge are clear. One of the most striking conclusions of this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a source of party-political funding Grasping the nettle of party-political funding may be very difficult, but it is of crucial importance in separating licit political activities from underworld influence. A response would need to encourage and sustain a debate on the subject, and build more effective civil-society coalitions in each country, and perhaps even across the region. Understand the nexus between politics, business and crime Linked to the issue of political party funding, current development approaches have amassed a large body of research pointing to the value of marketdriven interventions – including entrepreneurialism, innovation and the role of the private sector – in creating employment and alleviating poverty. Yet there is poor understanding of how the drive to create a business elite and to privatise state-owned enterprises has facilitated the growth of organised crime in Africa. In East Africa, figures who move between the spheres of business, politics and crime stand out as key to helping us understand which institutions facilitate illicit flows. Understanding how they sustain themselves may provide useful clues on how to better insulate government from the forces that promote corruption within it. Action here must include an engagement with legitimate business actors, provide support to financial journalism (where the market fails to do so) and exposing such ‘crossover’ actors to external scrutiny. 8 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Building coalitions for change around local effects Understand the impact of heroin at local level in coastal cities Across the region under analysis here there are significant gaps in the strategic information collected about drug use. Comprehensive surveys of drug users, drug prices and methods of drug use are not only necessary for mounting a proper public-health response, but also provide a powerful platform for national discussions of the role of the heroin trade in society. Therefore encouraging and supporting druguse surveys among these coastal communities would be crucial in raising awareness and acting as a lever to government action. The current momentum towards harm-reduction approaches in the region could be a starting point for building a broader civil-society response. Health activists and public-health professionals can use their networks to generate debate, and to develop a response that also includes the input and support of people who use drugs themselves. Community leaders as potential allies This study has uncovered the degree to which, in many places, the illicit economy has co-opted elected leaders, partly because of their need to raise money to finance their political parties, yet, across the region, the authors engaged with religious and community leaders who expressed their deep concern about the impact of drug use on, in particular, young people.16 The human face of heroin addiction is often visible in many places, with dirty and emaciated users conspicuous in several coastal cities. Addiction is seen to drive local crime and is disruptive of family and social life. Communities are taking their own initiatives with little external support, including setting up so-called ‘sober houses’ and running anti-drug campaigns. Support (including financial support) for such initiatives, which would build messages of solidarity across coastal communities and focus community leaders on best practice from elsewhere, would be a unique and timely regional response. It is important to instil the philosophy and practices of harm reduction into community drug efforts at an early stage. This is particularly the case in those initiatives run by local religious groups, which, while sometimes remarkably enlightened, have the potential for abuse without effective regulation or guidance. Reduce violence associated with illicit markets The levels of violence associated with these coastal markets vary considerably. Either way, focusing on violence directly linked to illicit economies will provide a way in which the immediate impacts, particularly for poor and excluded people, can be mitigated. Levels of violence have reached extreme proportions in Cape Town, and there have been few successful interventions As indicated, perhaps the most extreme levels of violence linked to this coastal criminal economy now occur at its most southern point – in Cape Town. Violence here is linked to developments much further north and this will be increasingly the case if the current influx of Tanzanian traffickers becomes a more established feature of the local drug economy. Levels of violence have reached extreme proportions in Cape Town, and there have been few successful interventions. There are numerous programming options available, one of which would be to build solidarity between community leaders in cities like Mombasa dealing with similar issues along the coast. A focus on the Cape gangs is also essential to cut off their connections to the wider regional economy and protect the poorest and most marginalised residents of the city. Promote public dissemination of information about criminal networks In conclusion, and most critically, there is a need for much greater understanding among the public of the nature and impact of organised crime in southern and East Africa, let alone how to identify it. Here, journalists are at the front line – exposing, through their investigations, the operations of organised criminal groups and their connections to politics. The work of the media plays an important role in educating the public about what organised crime looks like in their Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 9 country. This is key, as it is not always easy distinguish between corruption and legal business activities. Unfortunately, investigative journalism is underfunded and its practitioners are often poorly protected from the repercussions of their highly sensitive work. Media and civil-society action is almost always a catalyst for lawenforcement investigations Media and civil-society action is almost always a catalyst for law-enforcement investigations, or even, in the most serious cases, a political response. Raising the profile of organised-crime issues – and especially their impact on service delivery, the local environment, instability and levels of violence – elevates them in public discource, so that they cannot be ignored by political actors. Conclusion The growth of the heroin trade along the southern route has been driven, in part, by the growth in opium production in Afghanistan over the last 16 years. The most recent figure for the area under poppy production was estimated at 328 000 hectares in 2017, a 63 per cent increase against the previous year. This staggering rise in production is likely to increase the flow of heroin along all routes even further. It is a reminder, if one was needed, of just how ‘joined-up’ the global criminal economy is. And Africa is not immune. The heroin that passes through the countries of the southern route is not just in transit. The coastal criminal economy has been developing for about three decades, through some formative processes of economic liberalisation, globalisation, and shifts and transitions towards multiparty democracy. As such, it has both been shaped by, and in turn, shaped politics across the region. The city of Mombasa shows the dangers of neglecting this phenomenon any longer. There, drug traffickers have become so comfortable and free from scrutiny that they have run for political office – and won. Meanwhile, in marginalised slum areas where rates of heroin use are high and residents fear both men providing security for drug dealers and the impact of heroin use on their own families, people who use heroin are murdered by vigilante groups. Other places, most notably in our assessment northern Mozambique, have become particularly vulnerable. Prevention is much better than cure. If actors with a progressive vision for how to tackle the heroin trade do not lead a response, then actors with a harsher view will. At a recent meeting that the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime hosted, representatives from civil society, government bodies and law enforcement from around the region expressed firm views that approaches that strengthen democracy, the rights of people who use drugs and the needs of affected communities must be placed at the centre of the response. As our recommendations here suggest, it is time to bring together actors along the East African coast to begin to counter the harmful impacts of the heroin trade. 10 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Notes 1 A Cole, Heroin trafficking in the Indian Ocean: Trends and responses, Galle Dialogue, 1–2 December 2014. 2 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC world drug report 2015, Vienna: UNODC, 2015, Preface; UNODC, Afghan opiate trafficking through the Southern Route, Vienna: UNODC, 2015. 3 J Wright, Transnational organized crime in Eastern Africa: A threat assessment, Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 4 Herion transiting this route is also transported to other countries, including Asian markets and some Indian Ocean island states. 5 Six researchers were commissioned to conduct research locally between July and August 2017. An external expert team then visited several town and cities in the same areas over three weeks in September 2017, verifying and triangulating information with previously consulted sources, as well as conducting further interviews. Several return trips and telephone calls were made by the expert team to assess the work of the local researchers and to follow up with a range of interlocutors. In addition to the interviews in the core countries of analysis – Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa – some were also conducted in the Seychelles and Pakistan in October and November 2017 to gain a better understanding of the routes into Africa, and almost 50 were conducted in Uganda in an attempt to understand internal linkages. See our full report for more details. 6 The economics of this are evident: in Pakistan, a gram of heroin costs approximately US$3 and in Kenya around US$20, whereas in the UK it costs US$61 and in Denmark US$213. See drug prices listed on Havoscope. com. These prices are as of 16 November 2017. 7 UNODC, World drug report 2017 booklet 3, Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 8 Information provided by the countries in question to the UNODC as per reporting requirements for Annual Report Questionaires for the World Drug Report. 9 Several East African countries have shown some progressive leadership in their public-health responses to injecting drug use. Both Kenya and Tanzania (including Zanzibar) have placed harm reduction at the centre of their response. 10 S Larney et al, Global, regional, and country-level coverage of interventions to prevent and manage HIV and hepatitis C among people who inject drugs: A systematic review, The Lancet, 5:12, 2017, e1208–e1220. 11 This phenomenon was noted by respondents with direct experience of such attacks at our expert group meeting in Nairobi on 13 November 2017. See also M Schuberth, The impact of drug trafficking on informal security actors in Kenya, Africa Spectrum, 49:3, 2014, 55–81. 12 Nyaope is a cocktail of various drugs and other ingredients that has become widespread in South Africa; unga is a highly addictive heroin-based drug. 13 Reportedly, guns have been taken illegally from police armouries in the Western Cape and sold to gangsters since 2010. See C Dolley, Western Cape cop, gun dealer arrested in massive firearms probe, News24,10 October, 2017, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ western-cape-cop-gun-dealer-arrested-in-massivefirearms-probe-20171010. 14 The most recent homicide figures for 2016/17 show 63 deaths per 100 000 citizens – that against 42 per 100 000 in 2009/10. The Cape Town figure is double the national average. This data is from the Institute of Safety Governance and Criminology at the University of Cape Town. It draws on South African Police Service data but because city boundaries don’t match police ones, it has to be recalculated. 15 And, indeed beyond: many other countries along the southern route are also affected by these dynamics. 16 When visiting one religious leader, for example, we found his waiting room full of locals seeking support for family members who had become addicted to cheap heroin. publications infographics original analysis explainers trend reports Subscribe to ENACT ENACT works to enhance Africa’s response to transnational organised crime. Receive the latest analysis and research, delivered directly to your inbox: 1. Go to www.enact.africa 2. Click on ‘Connect’, then ‘Subscribe’ 3. Select the topics you’re interested in, click ‘Subscribe’ About the authors Mark Shaw is the director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GI TOC) and senior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics International Drug Policy Project. He was until recently National Research Foundation Professor of Justice and Security at the University of Cape Town’s Centre of Criminology, where he is now an adjunct professor. He formally worked in several capacities at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Peter Gastrow is a senior adviser at GI TOC. He lives in Cape Town and has practiced as an advocate of the Supreme Court, served as a parliamentarian, and as adviser to the South African minister of police. Organised crime has been his main research focus since he served as the Cape Town director of the Institute for Security Studies, and as a senior fellow at the International Peace Institute in New York. Simone Haysom is a senior analyst at GI TOC and a visiting academic at the Department of African Studies at the University of Oxford. She has previously worked as researcher at the Overseas Development Institute in London, and spent several years working as a consultant on issues related to forced displacement, urban development, organised crime and policing. About ENACT ENACT builds knowledge and skills to enhance Africa’s response to transnational organised crime. ENACT analyses how organised crime affects stability, governance, the rule of law and development in Africa, and works to mitigate its impact. ENACT is implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime. Acknowledgements ENACT is funded by the European Union (EU). This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. Cover image: © Africa Studio – Adobe Stock The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views or position of the European Union, or the ENACT partnership. Authors contribute to ENACT publications in their personal capacity. © 2018, ENACT. Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in ENACT, its partners, the EU and the author, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the author and the ENACT partnership. This project is funded by the European Union
International Development ISSN 1470-2320 Working Paper Series 2018 No.18-190 The Uberization of Mozambique's heroin trade Joseph Hanlon Published: July 2018 Department of International Development London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street Tel: +44 (020) 7955 7425/6252 London Fax: +44 (020) 7955-6844 WC2A 2AE UK Email: J.Hanlon@lse.ac.uk Website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/home.aspx Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 1 NOTE of explanation to Working Paper editors: The Geneva-based Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime will publish in February or March: "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", by Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw. I am one of the most cited experts on Mozambique and I did the Mozambique background paper for the report, which I have permission to update and publish. If possible, I would like to post it as a working paper at the same time the main paper is issued. A version in Portuguese will be issued by the Public Integrity Centre in Mozambique at the same time. But we need to hold them to wait for Global Initiative. This has been cleared by Ken Shadlen, Maria Lopez-Uribe and Jean Paul Faguet with a request for additions, which have been made. Note there is one photograph of very poor quality. The only thing that is important is that it is possible to read the "555". Joseph Hanlon The Uberization of Mozambique's heroin trade By Joseph Hanlon, Visiting Senior Fellow, LSE Department of International Development j.hanlon@lse.ac.uk Date: Must be held for release of the linked Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime paper. Acknowledgement: This research was partly funded and facilitated by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, as background for their paper "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", by Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw. Thanks to Global Initiative for permission to publish the more detailed background paper here. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 2 The Uberization of Mozambique's heroin trade By Joseph Hanlon, Visiting Senior Fellow, LSE Department of International Development j.hanlon@lse.ac.uk Abstract: Mozambique is a significant heroin transit centre and the trade has increased to 40 tonnes or more per year, making it a major export which contributes up to $100 mn per year to the local economy. For 25 years the trade has been controlled by a few local trading families and tightly regulated by senior officials of Frelimo, the ruling party, and has been largely ignored by the international community which wanted to see Mozambique as a model pupil. But the position is changing and Mozambique may be coming under more donor pressure. Meanwhile the global move toward the gig economy and the broader corruption of Mozambican police and civil service makes it easier to organise alternative channels, with local people hired by mobile telephone for specific tasks. Mozambique is part of a complex chain which forms the east African heroin network. Heroin goes from Afghanistan to the Makran coast of Pakistan, and is taken by dhow to northern Mozambique. There, the Mozambican traffickers take it off the dhows and move it more than 3000 km by road to Johannesburg, and from there others ship it to Europe. Keywords: Mozambique, heroin, drugs, transnational crime, smuggling, Whatsapp Heroin has been one of Mozambique's largest exports for two decades and the trade is increasing. Heroin is produced in Afghanistan and shipped through Pakistan, then moved by sea to east Africa and particularly northern Mozambique. 1 From there it is taken by road to Johannesburg, from which it is sent to Europe. This basic route has remained unchanged for 25 years. Estimates vary from 10 to 40 tonnes or much more of heroin moving through Mozambique each year. With an export value of $20 million per tonne2 , heroin is probably the country's largest or second largest export (after coal).3 It is estimated that more than $2 mn per tonne says in Mozambique, as profits, bribes, and payments to senior Mozambicans. Heroin arrives on dhows 20-100 km off the coast. The Mozambican role is to take it from the dhows, move it by small boat to the coast and then by road to warehouses, and finally take it by road 3000 km to Johannesburg, South Africa. The 10-40 t/y estimate is from dhows only, and further significant amounts of heroin also arrive in containers of other imports, particularly at the northern port of Nacala. Until recently, the trade was carried out by south-Asian-origin families based in the north of Mozambique and was tightly regulated by the most senior figures in Frelimo. The trade has been well known since 2001 when an article was published in Metical, and it said heroin was then Mozambique's largest export.4 Frelimo regulation means there have been no drug wars between the trading families, and little heroin remains in Mozambique.5 With one exception (the United 1 UNODC, "Market analysis of plant-based drugs", World Drugs Report 2017 Booklet 3, p 18; European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, "EU Drugs Market Report 2016", Lisbon: 2016, pp 86-7; United States Department of State, "2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume I", Washington, 2017, p 252; "The Smack Track", The Economist, 15 Jan 2015. 2 Highly variable. Similarly, the street price in Europe ranges from $30 to $300 per gram - $30 mn to $300 mn per tonne. 3 Mozambique's five largest official exports in 2016 were: $687 mn coal, $378 mn electricity, $378 mn aluminium, $370 mn gas & oil, and $ 208 mn tobacco. 4 Joseph Hanlon, "O grande negócio da droga", Metical 1017, 28 June 2001. Metical was the widely-read faxed newsletter started by Carlos Cardoso, who was assassinated in 2000. In Portuguese and English ("Drugs now biggest business") on http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d13 5483.pdf 5 In terms of transit, heroin is the only important drug. Herbal cannabis produced in Mozambique is exported to South Africa, there is a hashish trade (linked to the heroin trade), and mandrax (Methaqualone) is manufactured for South Africa and factories in Maputo are regularly raided, for example Noticias 7 April 2017. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 3 States in 2009-10), the international community has chosen to ignore the regulated heroin trade - other issues ranging from natural gas to corruption have been seen as more important. Heroin production is increasing in Afghanistan. But tighter control of transit through eastern Europe is moving the trade to southern routes, and more controls in Kenya and Tanzania has moved sea landings south to northern Mozambique. The trade appears to be increasing significantly. This, in turn, led to an investigation by the Geneva-based Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, just published: "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", by Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw.6 The report argues that the heroin trade has "political protection" and that "in Mozambique, we find a tight integration between ruling party figures and traffickers." The report continues: "individuals in Frelimo have become implicated in criminal activities, and … the party’s own system for generating funds relies on a lack of the rule of law." Despite the heroin trade being well known to embassies, it was only on 1 June 2010 that US President Barack Obama designated Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) as a "drugs kingpin", making it illegal for US citizens, US companies, and businesses which operate in the US to conduct financial or commercial transactions with him or three of his businesses. MBS is a major businessman and trader, and he works with at least three other south-Asian origin trading families. They use their own facilities and staff and mix illegal and legal commerce. MBS is believed to still control a large part of the heroin trade through Mozambique, but his position and that of linked families may have diminished. On the other hand, there is a move in East Africa which reflects the global trend of Uber and Airbnb, away from using established business networks and warehouses, to a looser system of freelance workers controlled via WhatsApp and BlackBerry. Meanwhile petty corruption within Mozambique has become so endemic that the heroin trade can run on bribes and no longer needs political patrons. This leads to what one of my sources7 described as a move to "disorganised crime", which appears to be handling much of the new increase in heroin trade. This working paper is based on the background paper on Mozambique written for Global Initiative by Joseph Hanlon.8 This working paper has five sections. The first section looks at MBS, the biggest heroin trader, medium-size traders, and at political patronage. The second section is about the national and international politics of Mozambique's regulated heroin trade. The third section sets out what is known about the physical heroin trade and movements within Mozambique. The final sections look at the recent growth of a parallel unregulated trade in Mozambique and at the global context of a criminal gig economy. Mozambique's own drug baron President Joaquim Chissano was the guest of honour at the wedding of the second son of Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) on 19 April 2001. An article in the biggest weekly newspaper, Savana (27 April 2001), described the wedding was as "sumptuous" and said there were 10,000 guests from all over the world. These three are not treated as important by the control authorities. Within Mozambique, alcohol and cannabis are the main drugs and there is not a large market for hard drugs; heroin and cocaine are consumed locally (crack is available on the street in Maputo) but not in large quantities. Heroin appears to be mainly smoked rather than injected. 6 Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw "The Heroin Coast: The political economy of heroin trafficking along the eastern African seaboard", Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, http://globalinitiative.net/ and https://enactafrica.org Hereafter: Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 7 The Global Initiative report notes that "In order to encourage candour and to protect our sources" they did not give names, and in some cases we do not gives names here. 8 With thanks to two Mozambican journalists. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 4 For a country less than a decade out of war, this was massive and ostentatious spending. MBS was also known as a major contributor to Frelimo. He is one of Mozambique’s most prominent and wealthiest businessmen and his wealth did not come only from importing refrigerators and washing machines for his Kayum Centre. Also in 2001, I was briefed by an international drugs control official that his business, Grupo MBS, was the main heroin trader in Mozambique. Links to MBS were passed on to Armando Guebuza when he was elected President in 2004. He twice publicly visited MBS's Maputo Shopping Centre (22 June 2006 and for the official opening 8 May 2007). The $32 mn complex was then the largest in Mozambique, and Guebuza praised it a model of private investment.9 MBS was reported to have made a $1 million contribution to President Armando Guebuza's 2009 electoral campaign.10 But those links may have been through Guebuza's children. In 16 November 2009 and 25 January 2010 cables, Todd Chapman, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, alleged that MBS "has direct ties to President Guebuza and former President Chissano" and that MBS is the coordinator of heroin going through Mozambique and perhaps southern Tanzania. Then on 1 June 2010, US President Barack Obama designated MBS as a "drugs kingpin", making it illegal for US citizens, US companies, and businesses which operate in the US to conduct financial or commercial transactions with him or three of his businesses, Grupo MBS, Kayum Centre and Maputo Shopping Centre. The US Department of the Treasury stated that "Mohamed Bachir Suleman is a large-scale narcotics trafficker in Mozambique, and his network contributes to the growing trend of narcotics trafficking and related money laundering across southern Africa. … Suleman leads a well-financed narcotics trafficking and money laundering network in Mozambique."11 In the next section we point out that this was a unique intervention, even though the international community knows about the heroin trade. The close link between MBS and Chissano is said to reflect a complex relationship. The heroin trade was regulated at the highest level. Chissano is said to have regularly met personally with MBS, and probably with the heads of the other heroin trading families. MBS was publically identified as a major donor to Frelimo. It has been widely assumed that there was an agreement to regulate the trade. There have never been drug wars between the heroin families and no convictions - and in the past two decades, no arrests - of senior figures in the heroin and hashish trades, and no seizures of heroin passing through the regulated trade. The Ministry of Interior, police and customs receive their commissions and assist the trade. Frelimo receives a substantial amount of money for operating costs and election expenses, and one assumes some members of the Frelimo leadership personally receive a part. Chissano had been Frelimo head of security since 1966, and he had the personal contacts needed to organise and regulate the trade. There is no direct evidence of high level regulation, and any witnesses to such meetings are unlikely to speak out. It is speculated that part of the deal is that the heroin is intended for international transit and the traders agree that little stays in Mozambique. In the early 2000s, the military housing zone in central Maputo became known as "Columbia" because drugs were so readily available, and some the children of the elite because heroin users. This was widely publicised and then suddenly heroin became less available. Did Chissano tell MBS to stop selling locally? Clearly something happened, because cocaine and particularly crack are still readily available, suggesting lack of regulation of the cocaine trade. Other players Although MBS is a big man in Mozambique, he is part of a chain running from the Indian subcontinent. Under MBS, Global Initiative identifies three linked families with businesses in Nacala 9 Noticias 23 June 2006, AIM English 9 May 2007. 10 Savana on-line, 20 Oct 2009. 11 U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Entities Owned By Drug Kingpin Mohamed Bachir Suleman", press release TG-729, 1 June 2010. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 5 and Nampula. Gulam Rassul Moti and the Ayoob family were also named Todd Chapman, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, in a 16 November 2009 cable. Although he cannot be trusted on names or detail, 12 Chapman sent reports to Washington later released as part of WikiLeaks, and on heroin they seem broadly correct.13 Gulam Rassul Moti14 is owner of Moti Commercial and Moti Rent a Car and has kept a low profile, but he seems to have been one of the early entrants into the trade. In August 1997, 12 tonnes of hashish was seized in Quisanga, Cabo Delgado, and Gulam Rassul Moti was arrested in connection with this case. This was his second arrest in connection with drugs – he had earlier been named in connection with the smuggling of hashish to the US and Europe from the port of Nacala in containers disguised as tea. He was acquitted. Political parties have the right to import goods for their own use duty free. In 2012 and 2013 Rassul Trading imported for Frelimo 3000 motorcycles, 7000 freezers and 5000 tyres. But the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP, Public Integrity Centre) found that most were being sold in Rassul Trading shops. 15 It was a mark of the close links with Frelimo. A fire in a Rassul Trading warehouse in Nacala in February 2014 allegedly destroyed 50 containers with 5000 motorbikes.16 Global Initiative mentions claims that heroin had been important in the fuel tanks of some of the motorbikes.17 The second group is the Ayoob family. Momed Khalid Ayoob owned hotels, tourist installations and car companies as well as Modas Niza and Real Câmbios. In October 2008 Zambeze18 reported that Khalid Ayoob had been arrested in Portugal in 1987 for possession of heroin, but managed to escape two years later, and that his brother Macsud was jailed in Portugal for drug trafficking in 1990. Zambeze also said the family had invested tens of millions of dollars in Maputo hotels. Macsud Ayoob was detained in 2002 at Maputo airport, in possession of over $1 million in banknotes being taken to Dubai. Brother Momed Khalid Ayoob was arrested on 1 December 2010 by the Swazi Police in possession of Rand 18 million ($2.6 mn) in banknotes. He was taking the money from Mozambique to Dubai, in violation of both Mozambican and Swazi exchange legislation. Momed was shot and killed in Maputo on 20 April 2012. His widow Reyma Ayoob was kidnapped in 2014 and released after 22 days after her family paid a ransom. 12 Paul Fauvet, "Renamo brings WikiLeaks back to parliament", AIM English 28 April 2011. Chapman correctly pointed to President Armando Guebuza's extensive business interests, but hugely exaggerated and was wrong on companies and ownerships when those could easily have been checked. On the drugs issue, in a 1 July 2009 cable he cited an article by me (“Long time commentator on Mozambique Joseph Hanlon”) as being from May 2009, when it was actually a redistributed article first published by me in Metical in 2001. 13 From WikiLeaks: 16 Nov 2009 MAPUTO 001291, 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080; https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html Chapman alleged that "Domingos Tivane, Chief of the Customs Service, was a significant recipient of bribes from narcotraffickers, and he recently purchased real estate in Maputo valued at well beyond what his government salary should be able to afford." Tivane was dismissed as customs head in 2013. 14 Also known as Ghulamo; listed only as Gulam Rassul as owner of Moti. 15 Borges Nhamire and Lázaro Mabunda, "Isenções aduaneiras do Partido Frelimo", Centro de Integridade Pública, 13 May 2014, http://www.cip.org.mz/historico/article.asp?lang=&sub=iafl&docno=303; Borges Nhamire and Lázaro Mabunda, "Importação ilegal de viaturas: a máfia que custa milhões ao Estado", Centro de Integridade Pública Moçambique: CIP Newsletter 1, March, 2014, https://www.cipmoz.org/images/Documentos/PPP/295_CIP_Newsletter_n01_2014- importacao_ilegal_de_viaturas.pdf, page 5. 16 Arlindo Chissale, "Incendio de altas proporções destrói acima de 50 contentores de motorizadas", CAIC Diario, 25 Fevereiro 2014, https://www.caicc.org.mz/diario/?p=3520; "Incêndio destrói cinco mil motas", Noticias, 27 Fevereiro 2014, http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/11632-incendio-destroicinco-mil-motas.html?device=desktop 17 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 18 Luís Nhachote, "Traficante de droga procurado em Portugal", Zambeze 1 Oct 2008. http://manueldearaujo.blogspot.co.uk/2008/10/traficantes-de-droga-tm-estatuto.html and http://muliquela.blogspot.co.uk/p/mohamad-khalid-ayoob-momad-aiuba-irmao.html Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 6 The third family is headed by Momad Rassul (also known as Momad Rassul Abdul Rahim) and is only named by Global Initiative, which notes that "there is no proven link between Rassul and the drug trade". He was arrested and released on $130,000 bail on 7 July 2017 on charges including smuggling, money laundering, illicit enrichment and tax fraud.19 He owns S&S Group (with major vegetable oil factories and other companies), and ARJ Group (cement and Nacala Container Park).20 There appears to be an attempt to convert drug money into legal assets within Mozambique. In the past decade there has been major construction of hotels in Nampula city and office and residential high rise buildings in Maputo. In 2007 Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) opened Mozambique's largest shopping centre, Maputo Shopping. There is also luxury residential construction in Maputo, Nampula and beach areas near Nampula such as Chocas Mar, which is linked to Asian-origin trading families. Although there is no direct evidence, it has always been believed that this is partly funded by drug profits, as well as other illegal activities. Tourist investment has been significant and would be useful because it is possible to claim more patronage than actually occurs, for example at a hotel, and use this to hide future drug profits. Hotels also provide a safe base for drug couriers. Global Initiative points to the glitzy but mostly empty hotels in Nampula and elsewhere.21 An important investment area for drug money is stocks and bonds - the buyer can pay cash with few questions asked, but then when the shares or bonds are sold the proceeds are treated as legitimate money. Until recently, the Bank of Mozambique had no difficulty in finding domestic investors willing to buy government bonds. And on 7 June 2001 the chairman of the Mozambican Stock Exchange (BVM), Jussub Nurmamade, said that the BVM's rapid growth was "unique". "We started with $3 mn, and that's hardly two years ago", he told journalists, and predicted that by the end of 2001 $100 mn would be invested in listed companies plus government treasury bonds and bank bonds. How can an economy as small as Mozambique's find $100 million in such a short time? What makes Mozambique "unique" must be drug money. Three wise monkeys Except for the one condemnation of MBS by the United States, the international community - donors, lenders and international agencies - have chosen to remain silent on heroin trafficking. Until the crisis caused by the 2016 revelation of the $2 bn secret debt, Mozambique was a favoured child of the aid industry, introducing neoliberalism and encouraging exploitation of coal and gas by foreign corporations. Donor staff wanted to continue to paint this picture of a success story and to continue the aid spending, so they did not want to rock the boat with stories of regulated drug dealing. And the regulation was working, preventing wars between the drug trading families while also limiting the amount of heroin that stayed in Mozambique. Apparently the first public report of the regulated heroin trade was my report in 2001 in Metical, a Maputo newsletter.22 In April 2002, Peter Gastrow (co-author of the new report) and Marcelo Mosse cited that report when they told a Pretoria conference: "There is a widely-held belief that with sufficient money, traffickers can buy immunity from investigation and prosecution. The relative impunity with which some of the successful traffickers operate is often a result of their close connections with individuals at the highest levels of government or the Frelimo party. At a lower level, customs officials are bribed to facilitate the entry and removal of drugs from the country … 19 http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mozambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf and http://www.1maomz.com/en/2017/08/05/nacala-way-3-momade-rassul-in-troubles-in-rsa/ 20 The Tiger Centre electronics and white goods store in Maputo is owned by four brothers from the family: Mohamed Sabir Gulam Rassul, Abdul Gafur Rassul, Momade Asslam, and Mahebub Gulam Rassul. There were failed attempts to kidnap the last two in 2012 and 2016. (AIM Eng 19 Dec 2016). Mohamed Sabir Gulam Rassul and other family members are owners of a number of hotels. 21 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 22 Joseph Hanlon, "O grande negócio da droga", Metical 1017, 28 June 2001. In Portuguese and English ("Drugs now biggest business") on http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/pics/d13 5483.pdf Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 7 The Mozambican 'oligarchs' appear to be the wealthy organised criminal networks that have secured political protection and that operate parallel to the state with relative impunity." 23 Later that year, speaking in parliament in November 2002, Teodato Hunguana, a respected senior Frelimo figure, warned of the danger "of the state falling permanently into the clutches of organised crime". If the organised crime leaders "remain protected and untouchable, and are able to maintain their sources of reproduction, then they will become increasingly powerful and take ownership of the state itself."24 The next year, one of Mozambique's most prominent judges Augusto Paulino25, used a speech in Portugal in which he quoted Hunguana and my 2001 article and in which he warned that "the various drug trafficking groups and networks are well-organized enterprises, perhaps better organized than state structures … Drug trafficking is associated, in particular, with money laundering. There are indicators that point to profits in the order of millions of dollars per year, coming from that traffic, which explain the mansions and luxurious cars in Maputo and in some other cities. Part of that money is certainly reinvested in profit-making legal business to ward off future suspicions." Three criminal groups with "links to drug trafficking, vehicle theft and armed robbery … enjoy impunity and protection because they served the interests of well-placed people in power and others because they were infiltrated into units of the police forces." Paulino was attorney general from 2007 to 2014, and one of his successes was the conviction of Almerinho Manhenje, who had been interior minister 1996-2005 and was sentenced to two years in jail for corruption in 2011. The previous attorney general had declined to bring charges even though there was evidence of millions of dollars being diverted from the ministry. But Paulino's success was only limited. The charges against Manhenje had been watered down, and Paulino never succeeded in bringing to trial any of the major drug dealers. In his Coimbra speech Paulino was following a Mozambican tradition of only raising hot issues in speeches outside the country, and there seems to have been no public discussion of the drugs trade inside Mozambique. At a donor meeting soon after the publication of my 2001 article, it was decided to say simply that I what I wrote about the heroin trade was not true - even thought the information had come partly from some of their embassies. And this has largely continued. The Crown Agents were contracted to manage and reform the customs service during a decade, 1996-2006; they had up to 70 staff and were given unusual management powers. I was told informally by a senior Crown Agents official that the brief was purely to increase revenue. Implicitly, then, the Crown Agents agreed not to deal with improper imports which were not evading tariffs, such as heroin. And donors' reports on customs reform all took this line, only referring to revenue increases and never mentioning drugs. A 2004 World bank study26 reported: "A key component in the overall process of economic reform was the 1995 decision by the Minister of Planning and Finance to reform and modernize the customs service, primarily to improve the government's revenue raising capacity. … Before the reform, corruption was rampant". But the "corruption" only referred to undervaluing and misclassifying imports to reduce the duties paid; there was no mention of drugs. The 2005 USAID "Corruption Assessment: Mozambique"27 said that the scale and scope of corruption in Mozambique are cause for alarm. There are "allegations of possible 23 Peter Gastrow and Marcelo Mosse, "Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks", Institute for Security Studies Regional Seminar - Organised crime, corruption and governance in the SADC Region, Pretoria, 18-19 April 2002. 24 Teodato Hunguana speaking in parliament week of 25-29 November 2002 (exact date not known), as quoted in Domingo 1 December 2002, as cited in Augusto Paulino, "Criminalidade Global e insegurança local - a caso de Moçambique", paper presented at a conference "Direito e Justiça no Século XXI", Combra, Portugal, 30 May 2003. http://www.ces.uc.pt/direitoXXI/comunic/AugustoPaulino.pdf 25 Augusto Paulino was the judge in the 2002 trial of the assassin of journalist Carlos Cardoso; Augusto Paulino, "Criminalidade Global e insegurança local - a caso de Moçambique". 26 Anthony Mwangi, "Mozambique", in Luc de Wulf and José B Sokol, eds, Customs Modernization Initiatives: Case Studies, Washington DC: World Bank, 2004, pp 50-56 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14911 27 USAID, "Corruption Assessment: Mozambique final report", 16 December 2005. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 8 collusion or even active involvement of individuals within government or the ruling party in criminal activity, including drug trafficking, money laundering and theft of public funds." But drugs were not subsequently mentioned. Smuggling was only cited in terms of imported tobacco and sugar competing with foreign-owned domestic companies. Customs reform was seen only in terms of increasing revenue. The one break with the diplomatic consensus was Todd Chapman, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Maputo, 2007-2010. He was seen as a loose cannon who did not cooperate with other ambassadors, for example disrupting a public meeting between ambassadors and the National Elections Commission (CNE) in 2009, apparently because he felt the other ambassadors were not putting enough pressure on Frelimo. He seemed to have state department backing, and left Mozambique to go to Afghanistan. His criticism of Guebuza reflected the general diplomatic view, but in taking up drugs in at least five cables28 to Washington, Chapman appears to have broken ranks. It seems likely that his cables and other interventions did push the US to declare MBS a "drugs kingpin". But other donors did not follow his lead, and little more was said about heroin. I was told by US sources that the main reason for the designation on 1 June 2010 was US based - they believed that MBS was making a play to enter the US market. When he was only trading to Europe there was not much interest, but the move to the US needed to be stopped. But Chapman and the designation of MBS seems to have had little initial impact in Maputo. For a short period foreigners stopped using Maputo Shopping, but soon returned. And there seems to have been no diplomatic pressure on government to take action against MBS. A statement by the Mozambican representative to the UN, Pedro Comissário to the 59th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna on 14 March 2016 entirely stressed education and controlling the domestic consumption of drugs, and made no mention of controlling import and export. The "Mozambique 2017 Crime & Safety Report" of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), chaired by the director of the US Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, hardly mentions drugs,29 and instead warns "one of the greatest personal safety threats is motor vehicles," followed by "increased violent criminal activity." It does, however, note: "Narco-trafficking is a major, on-going problem. Continued narcotics trafficking through Mozambique, with links to international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations, is an on-going trend. The considerable wealth associated with the drug trade, aided by corruption and involvement of some government officials, destabilizes security." And it does appear that drugs are not being seized. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime compiles drug seizure statistics, 30 which report that for the six years 2010-15 (inclusive) Mozambican authorities seized 55 tonnes of marijuana, 8 tonnes of hashish, and 90 kg of cocaine. But in that period, there was only two seizures of heroin, 4.3 kg in 2011 and 1 kg in 2015. Mozambique's own data are slightly different, showing just 13 kg seized in the five years 2012-16.31 Considering the large seizures of heroin crossing the border into South Africa, this does suggest that heroin is allowed to pass. Heroin trade routes 28 From WikiLeaks: 1 July 2009, Maputo 000713; 9 Nov 2009, Maputo 001277; 16 Nov 2009, Maputo 001291; 25 Jan 2010, Maputo 000080; 28 Jan 2010, Maputo 000086. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO1291_a.html 29 US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, "Mozambique 2017 Crime & Safety Report" 14 March 2017, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21453 30 https://data.unodc.org 31 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative, Appendix 3. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 9 Mozambique is a transit centre for heroin. Like any commodity, there is a supply chain and there are points between the producer and final buyer where the commodity must be warehoused to await an order or be repacked to satisfy an order, which is Mozambique's role. The chain is that heroin hydrochloride (white powder or grey crystal blocks) is produced in Afghanistan, passes through Pakistan (and Iran) and is moved to northern Mozambique. It is warehoused and repacked and then goes by road to Johannesburg. From there it is sent to Europe. Following a spate of adulterated heroin some years ago, buyers now demand heroin with a brand of a known Afghan supplier. Heroin is increasingly in branded 1 kg packets with labels such as handshake, Tokapi, Africa Demand, and 555. Increasingly as part of the decentralised trade, European buyers may make the purchase directly from a Dubai dealer and demand a brand, but the shipments may be of mixed orders which are separated in Johannesburg or in the Mozambique warehouse according to instructions sent by WhatsApp or Blackberry. 1 kg heroin packets with 555 and a logo. Photo of drugs seized after crossing from Mozambique to South Africa, from The Hawks, South Africa's Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation Mozambique is 2300 km long (SW-NE) but there is only a single north-south road, the N1 - and this road is essential for the heroin transit trade. The 1982-92 war cut that road and devastated the economy. The war ended with the 1992 peace accord and by 1995 the N1 was reopened and there was substantially more north-south commerce, which soon included heroin in transit.32 This section looks at the three routes to Mozambique (sea, container, and road), the passage through Mozambique, and shipment via South Africa. Arrival: by sea For centuries, traders with sailing dhows have used the monsoon winds to follow trading routes along the coasts from Pakistan to East Africa. Motorized wooden dhows now cross the Arabian 32 Carina Bruwer of the University of Cape Town has done two articles on this: "Heroin trafficking through South Africa: why here and why now?", The Conversation, 15 August 2017, https://theconversation.com/heroin-trafficking-through-south-africa-why-here-and-why-now-81627 and "From Afghanistan to Africa: Heroin trafficking in East Africa and the Indian Ocean", Daily Maverick 21 June 2016, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-06-21-from-afghanistan-to-africa-heroin-trafficking-in-eastafrica-and-the-indian-ocean/#.WddWs9N953R Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 10 sea directly although they still avoid the June-August monsoon period of high winds and storms.33 Heroin is picked up from the Makran coast of Iran and Pakistan and transported to traditional trading destinations on the coast of Kenya, Tanzania, and northern Mozambique. Usually these are motorized wooden Jelbot dhows built in the United Arab Emirates and designed for sea-going fishing. Their length of 15-23 metres allows them to travel at sea but remain small enough to be difficult to spot from satellite pictures or patrol vessels. They have concealed compartments which can carry 100-1000 kg of heroin, but if stopped pretend to be fishing vessels. Combined Maritime Forces which patrol the Western Indian Ocean region seized over 9.3 tonnes of heroin on dhows in the three years 2013-6.34 I was told that 3 tonnes of heroin had been seized from dhows in the Indian Ocean in the first half of 2017. Mozambique has no operational navy or coast guard, so there are few checks on smuggling or illegal fishing.35 It is estimated that dhows arrive at least weekly, except during the three month monsoon season, which points to landings of 10-40 tonnes of heroin per year. The dhows anchor 20-100 km offshore and are met by a flotilla of small boats that take the cargo to various spots along the coast. The coast of Cabo Delgado is favoured because it is the farthest north. The transfer is most easily done in the area north of Pemba with the Quirimbas islands along the coast. These are calm areas with significant small boat traffic, with boats normally landing on the beach. Quisanga north of Pemba is just a small beach that has become a busy port for small boats going to Ibo and Quirimba islands and for fishing, and it became an important landing point for heroin. Perhaps it became too well known and there has been a shift to the coast south of Pemba with good beaches with sand dunes which make it easy to conceal the landing. There are relatively few drug seizures in Mozambique - but the larger and more publicised seizures of hashish give an indication of drug routes, and in August 1997, 12 tonnes of hashish was seized in Quisanga. Dhows go as far south as Angoche (a 19th century slave trading port) in Nampula province where there are also islands.36 In 2012 police seized 187 kilos of "hashish" buried in the back yard of a house in Angoche. The spokesperson for the Nampula Provincial Police Command, Inacio Dina, said: “What we know is that these drugs come from a ship that anchored some miles from islands off the Angoche coast. The drugs are then brought ashore on smaller, hired boats.” Global Initiative argues that the Mozambique government has been suppressing evidence of the heroin trade, and that some "hashish" seizures may actually have been heroin. Arrivals: in containers Asian trading families37 bringing in containers of goods has always provided a route to import heroin, because there is little screening of arriving cargo; some trading companies' cargoes are not 33 Julian Whitewright, "The maritime rhythms of the Indian Ocean monsoon", University of Southampton mooc, http://moocs.southampton.ac.uk/shipwrecks/2014/10/02/maritime-rhythms-indian-ocean-monsoon/ 34 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), press release 4 November 2016, "Indian Ocean: 'Colombo Declaration. adopted to coordinate anti-drugs efforts". https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/November/indian-ocean_-colombo-declaration-adopted-tocoordinate-anti-drugs-efforts.html 35 In 2013-14 Mozambique took $2 bn in secret loans, ostensibly to create a coastal protection system. The Mozambique Channel between Mozambique and Madagascar has no regular military patrols and thus is open to smuggling, piracy (once only), and perhaps most importantly, illegal fishing. The deal involved $2 bn in loans organised in secret by Credit Suisse and the Russian bank VTB. A subsequent audit by Kroll showed that more than half of the $2 bn could not be accounted for. 36 There have been several reports of drugs being landed much further south, near Bazaruto and other islands off the coast of Vilanculos, Inhambane, but this seems uncommon. Reports include cocaine and heroin washed up on the shore (presumably from a failed transfer between boats), and of a boat carrying hashish which ran aground on rocks in June 2000 with 16 tonnes of hashish packed into tins which then washed ashore. The nine Pakistanis who escaped the shipwreck were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. 37 In the colonial era, urban commerce was largely restricted to white Portuguese and rural trade to people of Asian origin. At independence, most white Portuguese left and trade shifted, with people of Asian origin moving from rural areas to towns and cities. This racial division of trade, with its roots in colonial history, still shapes commerce - both legal and illegal - today. At independence, many of the south-Asian-origin families were unsure what would happen in Mozambique and carefully divided their families, with some members Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 11 inspected, and bribes would solve any problems. Pakistan is a major exporter of rice and Mozambique imports significant amounts of Pakistani rice, so heroin has been included in rice containers sent to Nacala and Pemba. Pemba is a relatively small port, handling fewer than 15,000 containers per year - although this is changing with the gas developments - and Pemba is not normally a grain port, so containers of rice were seen as unusual and were noticed. The small deep water port has long been a focus of illegal traffic, for the export of containers of hard woods, wildlife and marine products, and the import of heroin and hashish. Management of ports was privatized after 2000, but Pemba was the one port which was retained under the control of the state ports and railways company CFM (Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique) and it was clear that high officials did not want outsiders in the port. Nacala is said to be the deepest port in eastern Africa, and it is a major container port with a rail link to northern Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and now the coal mines of Tete. Management of the port is through a joint venture in which CFM plays a major role, but this is a major container port so it cannot be closed off in the same way as Pemba. Instead there are groups of warehouses controlled by Asian-origin trading families and with very tight private security and less linked to the port. These are being used for imported white goods - refrigerators, etc - as well as motorcycles and other goods which are openly under-invoiced to reduce duties. It is believed that these are also used to import heroin, for example in motorcycle fuel tanks, and the warehouses are also used to store heroin awaiting orders from South Africa and Europe. The families cited as being involved in the heroin trade and all based in Nampula and Nacala, which are only 160km apart. Both Nacala and Beira ports are deeply corrupted so any problems with illegal trade are settled with money. Containers for Malawi go through both ports and on their arrival in Malawi some show obvious evidence of having been opened and reclosed in port, with smuggled goods having been removed. Containers are said to be used for a number of smuggled commodities: stolen cars from Europe to South Africa, explosives for illegal mining, weapons for illegal wildlife trade, alcohol and tobacco - and thus are probably used for heroin as well. Global Initiative interviewed employees of the scanner company in Maputo and Nacala ports who said they were forbidden to scan the containers being imported by certain protected traders.38 There are no estimates of how much heroin is imported in this way. However the ports of Karachi and Dubai, which were open 15 years ago, have now been forced to install scanning equipment, which may be reducing the heroin traffic in containers. Nevertheless, container traffic of heroin is probably significant. Arrival: Overland Some heroin comes overland, by road from Tanzania. In March 2013 Mozambican police seized 600 kg of heroin in 5 kg bags at Namoto border post - near the coast and on the road between Mtwara in Tanzania and Palma in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. The seizure was proudly reported by the police and published in the national press, but never appeared in government statistics. Malva Brito, Cabo Delgado provincial police spokesperson, said the drug was destined for South Africa, and was being carried on a Toyota Hiace small truck with Democratic Republic of Congo number plates39 which appeared to be unladen, but had a secret compartment under the frame. Brito explained that the height of the tailgate and a strange aroma aroused the attention of the police, who searched the vehicle. This is the only reported seizure on this route.40 maintaining businesses in Mozambique (and building links with Frelimo) while other members went to Portugal and still others went to Dubai, India and Pakistan. These links have been maintained and have been important for money laundering and the heroin, hashish and mandrax trades. 38 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 39 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 40 There was one other media report. Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative cite the government daily Noticias (13 June 2015) reporting 13 Kg of heroin sized in Montepuez. The seizure does not appear in any official records. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 12 The Global Initiative report says that "a reliable source told the authors that they had seen test results from the Customs Department that confirmed it was heroin, yet the drug was recorded as N-Acetylanthranilic Acid by the provincial authorities" and a seizure of 604 kg of N-Acetylanthranilic Acid does appear in the 2013 provincial records.41 N-Acetylanthranilic Acid is used in the synthesis of methaqualone (mandrax), which is treated as a less important drug than heroin and is reported, so the false labelling is evidence of trying to conceal the heroin trade. Traffic on this route is probably small. The roads are bad and there is limited other traffic, making heroin smugglers more noticeable. But it has been noted that the global traffickers are not supplying the small Mozambican market, and it is suggested that this is being supplied by small traders from Tanzania. By road to South Africa Drugs are sent by road to the south of Mozambique and then to South Africa; the N1 is the only road from north to south. Maputo is 2200 km by the N1 from Nacala and another 550-600 km to Johannesburg, depending on the route. From the north of Mozambique to Nacala is another 650 km. So the drug may travel 3300 km to get to Johannesburg. The importers use different initial patterns. The MBS organised crime network moves the drugs to warehouses in Nacala port or to other warehouses of the south Asian trading families, such as the S&S industrial complex in Nacala, or warehouses in Nampula 160 km from Nacala, which are all tightly guarded. The newer decentralised or "disorganised crime" networks are said to prefer inland locations and are following more Latin American models, with locations with little traffic and where access can be guarded, for example from surrounding hills. There are many police check points on the roads and requests for bribes are common. It is said that early heroin shipments on the N1 were accompanied by the police in order to pass the checkpoints. As mobile telephone signals became better along the main roads, drivers were given a telephone number of a police official or Frelimo party figure to phone if they were stopped. This may still be used for MBS-linked shipments. But Mozambique has now become so corrupted that the freelance drivers working for the new networks are simply given money to bribe the police and other officials; their fee for the job is any money they do not spend in bribes. Unlike other countries, transporters are not paid in product and little of the heroin stays in Mozambique. Transport is typically in a specially prepared vehicle. Light pickups (known as bakkies), 4x4 cars, and Toyota Hilux pickups might carry 20-100 kg, and specially prepared larger trucks can carry 100-200 kg. We can gain some sense of this from seizures. In January 2018 and May and June 2017, South Africa authorities reported stopping three trucks on rural roads from southern Mozambique crossing into South Africa.42 At Golela border post with Swaziland on 24 January 2018 a truck was stopped with 200 kg of heroin and the Mozambican driver arrested and on 4 May 2017 a bakkie was stopped with 145 kg of heroin, in both cases in 1 kg bags. A similar amount was found in a truck at the Kosi Bay border post on 12 June 2017. Not apparently reported was a flatbed lorry caught in 2017 at a truck stop on the N4 from Maputo to Johannesburg with 100 kg of heroin under the plates of the flat bed. In the first half of 2016 police reported seizing a Nissan NP 200 pickup with $20,000 and 93 bags of heroin weighing 1 kg each behind door panels, a Toyota Prado with 50 kg of heroin hidden in the fuel tank, 58 kg hidden in an Opel Corsa pickup, and 38 kg hidden in a Toyota Hilux.43 41 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 42 A truck was stopped with 200 kg of heroin at the Golela border post between South Africa and Swaziland on 24 January 2018. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-25-man-arrested-after-policefind-multi-million-rand-heroin-haul/ A truck was stopped with 145 kg of heroin in 1 kg bags at Golela border post on 4 May 2017, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-seize-more-than-r100m-worth-ofdrugs-at-swazi-sa-border-20170505, and a similar amount in a truck at the Kosi Bay border post on 12 June 2017, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/three-arrested-r100m-worth-heroin-seized-indrug-bust-9784596. Both border posts are on rural roads from the very south of Mozambique to South Africa. 43 Jana Boshoff, "Middelburg situated on popular drug route", Middleburg Observer, 25 July 2017, https://mobserver.co.za/69733/middelburg-situated-popular-drug-route/ and Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 13 Also, many trucks carry cargo from South Africa to Mozambique and return empty, and some carry illegal cargo, including heroin, on the return trip. 44 There are no seizures on the Mozambican side of the border. Partly it is corruption. In late July the entire police force at Ponta do Ouro, the Mozambique side of Kosi Bay, were suspended, supposedly for corruption including harassing tourists and local traders with their demands for money45. But the President of the Mozambique Revenue Authority, Amelia Nankhare, told a team of the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group in July 2017 that a lack of funding meant there was a lack of scanners which made it impossible to implement border controls, so most illegal products were seized on the other side of the border.46 Johannesburg and beyond Most heroin that arrives in South Africa is in transit, but increasing amounts stay behind and this is increasing vigilance at the borders. Use of heroin itself exists but is not widespread in South Africa, although it may be increasing and may be responsible for the increase gang wars in Cape Town. The main concern is the growing use of nyaope (also called unga and whoonga) which is a mix of heroin and cannabis, and sometimes other drugs. It is smoked and use has grown substantially in the past five years. It gives a very short high but is very cheap, at less than $1 per hit. In the early years of the trade, heroin was sent directly to ports, notably Durban and, to a lesser extent, Maputo, where it was put into containers. This has changed and Johannesburg has become the warehousing and transhipment point. City Deep Container Terminal in Johannesburg is Africa’s biggest inland dry port, with a capacity of 400 000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) per year. Containers are carried by rail to the ports and shipped without further customs inspection, because City Deep is considered a port. However it is notoriously corrupt, so containers with heroin pass unnoticed. And even the police admit the extensive corruption at O R Tambo international airport.47 Thus it is easiest for heroin to go through City Deep and O R Tambo. Because of the secrecy of the heroin trade, apparently well-informed sources disagreed as to whether most heroin was shipped to Europe by sea in containers or by air. South Africa is mainly interested in stopping heroin entering the country (in order to reduce local use) and there are few checks on exports. There have only been two reported export seizures, one on each route. In 2009, 150 kg of heroin was intercepted in a shipment of tourist souvenirs at Heathrow airport, London, on a flight from South Africa; the trail was traced back to Durban and then Mozambique, where the South Africa organised crime unit, the Hawks, said the heroin had been packed with the curios.48 And in June 2017 police in Overberg, 250 km from Cape Town, seized 963 kg of heroin, one the largest seizures ever. It was in 253 packets of heroin in pallets of cases of wine destined for export. The seizure seems to have been entirely by accident. The container was being transported and the load shifted; farmworkers began to repack the container when they found some cases of wine had been replaced by heroin. The seizure was made on the Belgian-owned Eerste Hoop wine estate,49 and was intended for shipment to Antwerp, Belgium. https://www.facebook.com/policepicsandclips/photos/a.467274603397847.1073741829.440736009385040/5 35476389911001/?type=3&theater 44 Haysom, Gastrow & Shaw - Global Initiative 45 MediaFax 2 Aug 2017 46 Draft report of the ESAAMLG high level mission to the Republic of Mozambique, 26-28 July 2017, Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group. 47 Thando Kubheka, "Mbalula committed to fighting corruption at OR Tambo airport", Eyewitness News, 22 July 2017, http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/22/mbalula-committed-to-fighting-corruption-at-or-tambo-airport 48 "South African Hawks in drugs bust," BBC News, 16 Sept 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8259456.stm; "SA centre of £75 million drugs haul", New Zimbabwe, 18 Sept 2009, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-999- SA+centre+of+%C2%A375+million+drug+haul/news.aspx 49 Initially incorrectly identified in the media as cocaine. Aron Hyman, "Heroin-smuggling plot 'foiled by sharpeyed workers on Cape wine farm'," Sunday Times Live, 23 June 2017; Caryn Dolley, "Police make massive R500m cocaine bust in Overberg town" and "Inside SA's 'biggest' drug bust – 5 things that have emerged so Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 14 Heroin is shipped in containers of non-perishable solid goods - wine, stone, tiles, etc - which is easier to escape scanning and easier to leave for longer in a European port. Note that the Overberg seizure was of a container going directly to a port, and not via City Deep, suggesting some packing is done by the shippers and in some cases heroin is added to containers without the shippers knowing. Changing systems within Mozambique Mozambique's position in a trafficking route has not changed much in 25 years - heroin in processed in Afghanistan, goes mainly to Pakistan and by sea to northern Mozambique, overland to South Africa, and then to Europe. But since 2010, a number of external and internal factors have reshaped the trade, creating space for a new and more modern decentralized structure working in parallel to the MBS system. Other criminal activities In 2015, Mark Shaw, Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime in Geneva, noted that in southern Africa: "Name a prominent criminal market: drugs, endangered species, illegal mining or stolen vehicles, and there will be evidence of state support and protection. This is a critical development: it is the common feature of criminal commodity markets across the region." And he adds that "one of the reasons why a fuller picture of organised crime does not exist for the Southern African region is that the phenomenon is notoriously difficult to research. … Official state actors are also often nervous to provide information on 'real' organised crime, because that is almost always very close to political power."50 Mozambique's short post-independence period set high moral standards, but the war and then the post-war open market period brought a range of illegal activities: bringing in fuel and stolen cars, and exporting gemstones, precious wood, ivory and animal and marine products. There were a range of networks but most with links to both local officials and to high level Frelimo people. One of the most public changes in the crime scene was kidnapping, of at least 100 members of the Asian-origin community since 2011. Nini Satar (linked to earlier loan sharking and bank embezzlement and convicted of killing journalist Carlos Cardoso) has been linked to the kidnappings, and there are clear links into the police and judiciary. Mahomed Bakhir Ayoob, part of one of the drug trading families and son-in-law of MBS, was charged in 2012 with being involved in the kidnappings but was allowed to leave Mozambique for Dubai and then Hong Kong. Prosecutor Marcelino Vilanculos who was investigating the kidnappings was murdered on 11 April 2016. The kidnappings have generated millions of dollars in ransoms and some of that money must be coming from the drugs trade. It is unclear to what extent these kidnapping reflect division within the Asian business community, and the extent of the links between the kidnapping networks and the drug families.51 Changing expectations The discovery of one of the Africa's largest reserves of natural gas in 2010 seems to have counteracted the naming of MBS as a drugs kingpin in the same year. High oil and gas prices led to visions of previously undreamed of wealth and donors wanted to encourage foreign investment far", News24, 22 June 2017. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2017-06-23-heroin-smuggling-plot-foiled-bysharp-eyed-workers-on-cape-wine-farm/; http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/inside-sas-biggest-drugbust-5-things-that-have-emerged-so-far-20170626 50 Mark Shaw, "New networks of power: why organised crime is the greatest long-term threat to security in the SADC region", in Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and Catherine Moat (eds), Southern African Security Review 2015, Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015, pp 177, 181. http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/mosambik/12932-20170302.pdf 51 On 23 April 2018 a man admitted ordering the kidnapping of an Indian businessman and told a police organised press conference that he had done so because he hoped to obtain a ransom large enough to pay off a $110,000 debt to "the owner of Maputo Shopping Centre" - MBS. Paul Fauvet, "Kidnapper hoped to export money to pay off debt", AIM English, 24 Apr 2018. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 15 and continued to treat Mozambique as a favoured child. Oil and gas prices continued high until 2015. At the same time there were changes within Frelimo. First, President Guebuza seemed to be directing resources to an ever smaller group of cronies, and the Frelimo elite was angry at being excluded from the slush fund. Second, the slush fund seemed smaller. Total local income from the heroin trade could be up to $100 mn per year, but the Frelimo party share would be much less than that. Compared to the vast gas wealth, the drugs trade was beginning to seem less important. But in 2015 the house of cards was seriously shaken. The anti-Guebuza wave within the party led to the naming of Filipe Nyusi as the compromise presidential candidate. The way in which Guebuza concentrated money and power caused substantial discontent within the Frelimo elite, leading to more decentralization. President Filipe Nyusi took office in January 2015, and there are no reports of him having the same personal links with MBS; party links seem to now be at lower and more decentralised levels and it does seem that some of the protection has been withdrawn. There are indications that senior Frelimo people, including President Nyusi, want to curb some of the more rapacious illegal trading. There seems to be more willingness, albeit still limited, of the attorney general's office to be involved in anti-drug and anti-corruption activities. One marker is the ban on the illegal export of hard woods which had been controlled for a decade at high level.52 These changes are real, but still small. The gas price collapse partly triggered the 2015/16 discovery of $2 billion in secret loans that had been organised in 2013/14 by Guebuza on the assumption that gas profits would pay the debt. Donors were offended and angry and suddenly Mozambique was no longer the spoiled child; budget support aid was cut and donors started to look under the carpet. That, in turn, has created an economic crisis, with the government seriously short of money, and increasingly borrowing to pay its bills. It needs the drug dealers to use some their profits to buy government bonds. And Frelimo will be under increasing pressure to fund upcoming elections. Curbing MBS MBS and his network remain the biggest, but with their wings cut. Naming him as a drug kingpin seems to have had little immediate impact, and the 2015 changes seem to have been more important. After he was named as a kingpin MBS kept his head down for a while, but on 18 September 2014 he was at the head table, just a few seats away from Presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi, at a fund-raising dinner for Frelimo organised by the main business association, the CTA. As Africa Confidential (10 Oct 2014) commented, "Bashir's attendance sent a clear message: that he remains an important financier of the party." However this was the end of the Guebuza era, and it was interpreted as MBS having pushed his way in. He seems not to be publicly acceptable to the new Nyusi group. It appears that under the benevolent wing of Guebuza, MBS and his cohorts may have overextended themselves. A major blow came on 11 November 2016 when the Bank of Mozambique ordered the dissolution and liquidation of one of the country’s smaller commercial banks, Nosso Banco (Our Bank), saying it was under capitalized, had an “unsustainable economic and financial structure” and was suffering from “serious liquidity and management problems”.53 Nosso Banco was set up in 1999 under the name Banco Mercantil e de Investmentos, and changed its name to Nosso Banco in 2015. Its main shareholders were public institutions, the social security system (Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social, INSS, 77%) and the public electricity company EDM (16%). The Frelimo Party company, SPI, owned 4% and the Rwandan 52 Environmental Investigation Agency, "First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests", London, July 2014, https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/FirstClass-Crisis-English-FINAL.pdf 53 Paul Fauvet, "A second Mozambican bank fails", Maputo: AIM English, 11 November 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201611120110.html Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 16 businessman Alfred Kalisa, one of the bank’s founders and its first chair, owned 2%.54 Nosso Banco was one of two totally locally-owned Mozambican banks and thus was without international ties. Banks which do business in the US cannot have as clients anyone named as a drugs kingpin by the US, which meant that MBS and Maputo Shopping could not use most banks. Thus it was the only bank with an ATM in MBS's Maputo Shopping after two major banks closed their branches there in 2010. Nosso Banco received substantial deposits from MBS, who is said to have lost tens of millions of dollars in the collapse. But Momade Rassul was reported to be the biggest debtor to it, with a loan of $30 mn guaranteed against a building valued at less, and which had been questioned by auditors.55 It has been widely speculated, including by Savana (25 November 2016), that Mozambique may have come under pressure from the US to close the bank. This is plausible, because Mozambique had been able to resist donor and particularly US pressure because of mineral and gas revenues and investments (including by a US company, Anadarko), but this changed with the revelation of the secret debt in 2016. On 29 June 2017, Momade Rassul was arrested in Maputo and charged with money laundering, illegal enrichment, and tax fraud.56 He was later released on bail. At the same time there was a scandal about the South African Public Investment Corporation putting $83 mn into a nonoperating oil refinery owned by Rassul's S&S in Nacala.57 It does look as if he was over-extended and his protection was withdrawn. MBS still travels in and out of Mozambique. But the closure of Nosso Banco has forced him to use off-shore banks, which may also mean he spends less time at home. But he clearly is still controlling part of the south-east Africa heroin trade and remains the most important trafficker in Mozambique. Looser networks and the 'gig economy' The changes in Frelimo are happening when there are global changes in the structures of legal and illegal commerce and just at a time when heroin shipments are increasing, in part because crackdowns in Tanzania and Kenya have shifted a significant part of the East African heroin traffic south to northern Mozambique. This increase, and perhaps some of the trade previously controlled by MBS, have shifted to an entirely new channel running in parallel. One source called it a shift from organised crime to "disorganised crime"; I see it more as the adoption of the gig economy or Uber/Airbnb model. Two decades ago, drug barons across the world were public figures with political power, seen as beneficent and interested in developing their communities. MBS followed that model. When President Armando Guebuza opened Maputo Shopping on 22 June 2006, he was given 50 wheelchairs and 100,000 school notebooks.58 But that also left them exposed; slowly the public drug lords were captured. That led to a shift to clandestine drug barons. That came about at the same time as the main-stream economy was moving away from permanent jobs, toward short and zero hours contracts, and other forms of casualization. Within Mozambique, the generalised corruption in police and the state apparatus made ordinary bribes to police and others faster and easier than high level political protection. Finally smartphones and apps make electronic communication possible. The wide availability of good mobile telephone coverage in northeast 54 Rwandan President Paul Kagame on 2 August 2009 pardoned Kalisa, who has been serving a six-year prison sentence for corruption and abuse of office when CEO and Chair of the former Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry (BCDI) when he gave illegal loans to himself and his family. Ignatius Ssuuna, "Alfred Kalisa gets Presidential Pardon", New Times, 3 Aug 2010, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/22599/ 55 AIM English 26 November 2016, http://clubofmozambique.com/news/uba-bank-management-criticises-ctachief-mozambique/ 56 Procuradoria Provincial da República - Nampula, Comunidado de Imprensa n° 02/PPRN/2017, http://weeklyxpose.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mozambique-Prosecuting-Authority-release.pdf 57 Sello Theletsane, "R1bn Oil Deal Mess: PIC Boss Matjila Sued", Weekly Xposé, 26 July 2017. http://weeklyxpose.co.za/2017/07/26/r1bn-oil-deal-mess-pic-boss-matjila-sued/ 58 "Maputo Shopping Center: um exemplo de investimento", Noticias, 23 June 2006. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 17 Mozambique since about 2015 makes this a sensible model for the expansion of the heroin trade there. The MBS model was built on a basis of apparently legitimate trade operating through their official trading companies and using their own warehouses, hotels, and staff. The new model is looser and more flexible, using drivers, fishers and others for individual pick-ups and deliveries - just like delivery services in New York or London. People are contracted and paid for specific jobs, and often assigned by mobile phone using WhatsApp or BlackBerry, which are encrypted.59 Thus a driver of a boat owner may just receive a WhatsApp message telling them to go to a particular point to collect a heroin parcel - just like calling an Uber taxi. Sometimes those employed are already involved in the illegal trade of timber, ivory, fuel, liquor, and cigarettes. The network is controlled from abroad, particularly from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Dubai (following arrests of key figures in East Africa), and there are local controllers (at a lower levels than MBS or the Ayoobs), with fixers or facilitators below them, who are black Mozambicans or Tanzanians, particularly Muslim Kiswahili speakers (who are able to talk with local people and fit in). The controllers may be Pakistani and there are reports of small groups of young Pakistani men setting up car parts importing businesses in Quelimane and elsewhere. Both the old-style MBS network and the new gig economy are moving heroin through Mozambique, but our informants disagreed as to which system is now dominant. The criminal "gig economy" The Brookings Institution defines the gig economy "as the matching of freelance workers or service providers to customers on a digital platform or marketplace." 60 They use US census data on "nonemployer firms", that is, they have no employees. They are increasing rapidly and are mostly in the rooms and rides sector - in other words Uber, Lyft and Airbnb. In 2014 there were 145 mn payroll employees compared to 24 million nonemployer firms in the US (14% of the total). A study by McKinsey in October 2016 estimated that 20-30% of the labour force in both the US and EU was made up of independent workers who were self-employed or doing temporary work, and who often lack the unemployment insurance, workers compensation and disability insurance that traditional workers have.61 International criminal networks have adopted social media and the gig economy, in part because it allows network members to be isolated from each other and be coordinated without knowing many other network members. Messages are sent by encrypted services, notably Viber and Whatsapp62 , but also Signal, Wire, Telegram, Wickr and others. The drug trade has not been well studied in this respect, but there have been press reports. A US border patrol agent in San Diego County, California, was arrested in 2016 for picking up backpacks of drugs along the Mexican border fence and delivering them to another safe location. He was told of the drop locations on WhatsApp.63 The use of WhatsApp to send photos was shown by the 18 October 2017 conviction of Heathrow Airport, London, baggage handlers. A suitcase with 3 kg of cocaine was arriving on a flight to 59 Although both BlackBerry and WhatsApp are encrypted, some drug cartels do not trust the security of WhatsApp because it is owned by the US company Facebook, and there has been a return to Blackberry, which is owned by a Canadian company. 60 Ian Hathaway and Mark Muro, "Tracking the gig economy: New numbers." Brookings Institution, Washington DC, October 13, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-the-gig-economy-newnumbers/ 61 Elaine Pofeldt, "McKinsey Study: Gig-Economy Workforce Is Bigger Than Official Data Shows in U.S., Europe", Forbes, 10 Oct 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/elainepofeldt/2016/10/10/mckinsey-studyindependent-workforce-is-bigger-than-official-data-shows-in-u-s-europe 62 Whatsapp is owned by Facebook and there have been rumours that the encryption is not secure. John E Dunn, Thomas Macaulay & Tamlin Magee. "Best secure mobile messaging apps", Techworld, 12 Feb 2018, https://www.techworld.com/security/best-secure-mobile-messaging-apps-3629914/#r3z-addoor 63 Kristina Davis, "Border Patrol agent arrested on bribery, drug trafficking charges", The San Diego UnionTribune, 15 Dec 2016, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-border-bribery-20161215- story.html Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 18 Terminal 3. The baggage handler received a photo of the suitcase on WhatsApp and he picked up the bag; that evening after he left work he gave the bag to a taxi driver who was waiting just outside the airport for further delivery to Birmingham. The deal from Brazil to Birmingham was done by individual contractors given their jobs on WhatsApp.64 Whatsapp and the gig economy are used for other criminal activities. Islamic State (ISIS) raised substantial amounts of money selling historic artefacts, and even had an antiquities office in Manbij, Syria. Sales and exports were coordinated on Whatsapp.65 From a standpoint of encrypted social media and the gig economy, the best studied has been people smuggling.66 Smugglers advertise on Facebook and other social media with a telephone number that must be contacted by an encrypted message service such as Viber or Whatsapp. Europol estimates that "90% of migrants arriving in the EU use facilitation services at some point during their journey," and that "the criminal turnover associated with migrant smuggling to and within the EU is between €3-6 billion for 2015 alone."67 Danielle Hickman of the US Department of Justice reports that people smuggling organizations "do not have a traditional 'closed system' structure - these operations are more commonly composed of loose international alliances involving facilitators. Even if working in concert, they may not necessarily know each other or be in the same country. Also, the downstream infrastructure is not necessarily composed of components of one organization. Rather, it tends to be a network of freelance and independent contractors consisting of recruiters, money collectors, document providers, travel agencies, transporters, and in some cases, corrupt foreign officials." 68 Studies in Turkey confirm that the people smuggling business is carried out not by hierarchal and mafia-like organizations, but by "flexible organizations operating on the basis of division of labour," with "loose alliances of domestic groups working together".69 They are like multi-national companies using local subcontractors. There are higher level controllers, often of people of the same nationality as the migrants and who have built a reputation in that country or on Facebook. They then use a well developed network of facilitators along the smuggling route. Hickman notes that members of smuggling organizations use Whatsapp to notify arrival and coordinate fee payments (often the client gives the fee up front to an agreed banker and orders part to be released after each stage of the journey is successfully completed) and to communicate changes in smuggling routes. Smuggling involves many handovers at borders and to drivers, boat captains, and people with safe houses. The route from Pakistan via Turkey to Europe involves at least 19 handovers.70 Whatsapp photos make handovers easier. Facilitators use the photographs to immediately identify their 64 Nic Brunetti, "Heathrow Airport baggage handler Dev Anand of Langley plotted to smuggle drugs into UK with three others," Slough & South Bucks Observer, 20 Oct 2017 http://www.sloughobserver.co.uk/news/15609529.Heathrow_Airport_baggage_handler_plotted_to_smuggle_ drugs_into_UK/ 65 Joe Parkinson, Ayla Albayrak & Duncan Mavin, "Syrian ‘Monuments Men’ Race to Protect Antiquities as Looting Bankrolls Terror", Wall Street Journal, 10 Feb 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-monumentsmen-race-to-protect-antiquities-as-looting-bankrolls-terror-1423615241 66 Interpol says "A broad distinction can be made between people smuggling and human trafficking. In general, the individuals who pay a smuggler in order to gain illegal entry to a country do so voluntarily whereas the victims of human trafficking are often duped or forced into entering another country." https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/People-smuggling 67 European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC), "Migrant smuggling in the EU," 2016, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/migrant-smuggling-in-eu 68 Danielle Hickman, "Combatting Transnational Smuggling Organizations: An Introductory Overview", U.S. Attorneys' Bulletin 85, p 65 (2017) 69 Oguzhan Omer Demir, Murat Sever & Yavuz Kahya, "The Social Organisation of Migrant Smugglers in Turkey: Roles and Functions", Eur J Crim Policy Res 23, pp 371–391 (2017), DOI 10.1007/s10610-016- 9326-x 70 Elif Özmenek Çarmikli & Merve Umay Kader, "Migrant Smuggling in Turkey: The ‘Other’ Side of the Refugee Crisis", International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), Ankara, Report no. 45, April 2016. Hanlon Mozambique Heroin LSE 19 clients when they exit an aircraft, vehicle, or boat. In turn, the facilitators show the photographs to the client to prove they are the correct "contact" and will assist them in the next leg of the journey.71 The gig economy - the Uber economy - using local subcontractors and Whatsapp is being adopted by international smugglers of drugs, people and other goods. Mozambique's heroin transit traffic is part of a much larger global shift. Conclusion Mozambique is an important heroin transit country, with a heroin trail that goes AfghanistanPakistan-Mozambique-South Africa-Europe. An estimated 10-40 tonnes or more of heroin passes through each year. This could be adding $100 million per year in corrupt money to the local economy, and is clearly having an impact on an already corrupted state. The trade seems to be increasing as crackdowns in Kenya and Tanzania are diverting heroin through Mozambique. The trade was built up from the 1990s by Mohamed Bachir Suleman (MBS) and controlled at the highest level, including Presidents Chissano and Guebuza, with money going to the Frelimo party, senior Frelimo figures, and officials in the police and customs authorities. There has been a surprising silence by the international community, which has occurred until now because donors have wanted to treat Mozambique as a success story and because the regulation of the trade appears to work, at least domestically. This picture may be changing, because Mozambique's image has been tarnished by the $2 bn in secret loans, at least half of which has not been accounted for. Also there is growing concern about ivory and other natural resource smuggling. Donors are moving their aid away and no longer need to treat Mozambique as their success story and favoured child. Meanwhile the top of Frelimo and President Filipe Nyusi appear to be distancing themselves from the heroin trade and allowing some crackdowns. But mobile telephones and Whatsapp have allowed a second decentralised heroin traffic to emerge. Just like hiring an Uber taxi, the heroin traders can send a WhatsApp message and hire a boat to take their heroin to the beach and a bakkie to drive it to Johannesburg. And the widespread corruption means the new heroin traffickers can buy support at more local levels and do not need political patronage. It may now be too late for the corrupted state and ruling party to change. Corruption has become endemic, and Frelimo has become dependent on patronage for its support. Money for patronage comes from drugs, commissions on contracts, and money siphoned off aid projects. Opposition parties are not challenging corruption, and appear to want power only in order to eat as well. For their own reasons, the international community allowed Frelimo and the state to be corrupted.72 For the most part, they now appear to be willing to simply walk away - keeping only enough involvement to ensure access to natural resources. Joseph Hanlon is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, London. He is editor of the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin and co-author of several books on Mozambique, most recently Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique. j.hanlon@lse.ac.uk 71 Danielle Hickman. 72 Joseph Hanlon, 2017, ‘Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique’s US$2.2 billion secret debt deal’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 753–770.
This project is funded by the European Union Issue 04 | June 2018 POLICY BRIEF Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw Summary In recent years, the volume of heroin shipped from Afghanistan along a network of maritime routes in East and Southern Africa appears to have increased considerably. An integrated regional criminal market has developed; shaping and shaped by political developments. Africa is now experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use worldwide, and a spectrum of criminal networks and political elites in East and Southern Africa are substantially enmeshed in the trade. New policy approaches are urgently needed. Key points • Responses should address the challenge as a cross-border criminal system. • Progressive action should be targeted in major drug hubs along the southern route, focusing on vulnerable areas and potential sources of regional instability, such as northern Mozambique. • The relationship between politics, business and organised crime must be adequately researched and addressed. • Vetted private sector actors should be engaged to prevent or reverse the criminalisation of key ports. • Support must be increased for community-based initiatives that mitigate the effects of drug use. • Programming interventions to reduce violence in the most vulnerable communities affected by the heroin trade in Southern and East Africa should be considered. This brief focuses on: 2 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Since 2010, several large seizures of heroin by the Combined Maritime Force – a 32-member-state naval partnership that conducts maritime security operations aimed at countering terrorism and narcotics smuggling – have confirmed that the East African coast is now a significant geographical link in the global heroin trade.1 Heroin is being shipped from Afghanistan to the east coast of Africa along a maritime route known as the ‘southern route’. This is in reality a network of routes stretching along East and Southern Africa, with drug consignments eventually making their onward way to countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and, to a limited extent, North America. The southern route has gained popularity in recent years because the land-based drug-trafficking route to western Europe via the Balkans has become increasingly difficult for traffickers to navigate owing to conflict and increased law enforcement.2 This has diverted some illegal drug flows to the Indian Ocean and onwards to the east coast of Africa. Although traffickers using the southern route have their own challenges to contend with, such as piracy off the coast of Somalia and the anti-drug operations of the Combined Maritime Force, the volume of trade along this route appears to be increasing. Previous estimates have suggested that 22 to 40 tonnes of heroin a year were being trafficked through East Africa.3 However, although the actual volumes cannot be estimated with certainty, our research indicates that the figure may now be higher. Multilateral institutions and northern donors have tended to focus is on how heroin that transits the southern route enters markets in Europe4.This perspective, however, tends to downplay or even ignore the impact of the heroin trade on the transit countries in Africa. Our research has, instead, focused on the political economy of the southern route. It looks more closely at the characteristics of the heroin flows in the region and how the narcotics trade has become embedded in Kenyan, Tanzanian, Mozambican and South African society. This research is the culmination of four months of qualitative research based on over 240 interviews conducted in seven countries, the full findings of which appear in an ENACT research paper.5 This brief summarises this analysis and highlights several concerning conclusions, below. The southern route and criminal governance along the east coast of Africa In countries all along the eastern seaboard of Africa, from Somalia to South Africa, the heroin trade has become embedded in local communities and linked to political elites. The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy based on the transit of heroin from Afghanistan to the West, and with a spin-off trade for local consumption. The East African heroin market is best understood as forming an integrated regional criminal economy Along this trafficking route, much of the heroin is first shipped to Africa on motorised, wooden seagoing dhows built in the United Arab Emirates designed for fishing. The vessels are loaded with between 100 kg and 1 000 kg consignments of contraband off the Makran coast of southern Pakistan. The dhows anchor off the coast of Africa in international waters, and flotillas of small boats collect the heroin and ferry it to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload it into small commercial harbours. Dozens of such sites are used for landing the consignments along the entire eastern coastline – from north of Kismayo, Somalia, to Angoche, Mozambique. This route is used all year round apart from during the three-month monsoon period. While this dhow-based heroin trade has been identified for several years, significantly, the present research suggests that transit traffickers have also made use of containers at various deep-water container ports along the coast. Several ports have fallen under substantial criminal influence and are used to transship a number of other illicit goods, such as elephant ivory and timber. Most of the heroin that passes through East and southern African is destined for markets in the West, which are far more profitable than the African markets.6 The transit heroin trade is a bulk trade: though shipments are sometimes broken down into smaller consignments in an effort to avoid detection, much heroin transported this way is moved in units of Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 3 tens or even hundreds of kilograms at a time. As such, the transit economy relies on international ports and highways, and, to a lesser extent, air links. The trade also relies on high-level political protection, so that those involved can benefit from ready access to infrastructure, such as ports along the route, which are ostensibly important to national security and so should be well guarded and controlled by governments. Initially, the political protection secured for this trade seems to have emerged out of simple transactions between drug traffickers and political figures who exert control over ports, customs and law enforcement. Heroin traders using this transit route need to arrange for these ports to be permeable, and ensure their illicit goods are neither seized nor linked to criminal cases against them. Over time, these transactions have evolved in different ways along the coast. In Kenya, drug traffickers have decided to campaign directly for political office. In Mozambique, drug traffickers have consolidated their hold over the market in a remarkably resilient and longstanding quid pro quo with the political elite. In these countries, heroin profits play a discrete and identifiable role in providing campaign and patronage finance to political figures. Tanzania, meanwhile, is currently going through a series of reforms under President Magufuli that are substantially disrupting criminal-political relationships in the country, with signs that this is having the effect of displacing criminal figures to other parts of the region. In South Africa heroin has not been directly linked to political figures, although prominent figures in the broader drug trade have. Along this route, not all heroin is in transit, however. East and southern Africa have a much larger consumer market than is commonly acknowledged. This local market gets some of its supply from ‘leakage’ from the transit trade – through in-kind payments to drivers, fishermen, the police, etc. – and through small-scale theft from bulk consignments. But there is also some indication that bigger players arrange their own supplies directly from Pakistan or from the kingpins of the transit trade. In South Africa, in particular, the consumer market for heroin is large and growing, and this phenomenon is being driven by more organised local and international networks, which have spawned a secondary heroin trade. The 2017 World Drug Report noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally, and this has been attributed to Africa’s role in the southern route.7 In Kenya there are almost 55 000 people who inject heroin (the consumption method that carries the highest health risks associated with this drug), over 32 000 in Tanzania and over 75 000 in South Africa8. The numbers of people smoking heroin, which, for many, will lead to injecting later, are much higher. In most of these countries, the rates of HIV among people who inject drugs are several times higher than among the rest of the population, and there are astronomically high rates of hepatitis C in this group.9 Despite a heartening trend that is seeing drug users’ rights and their access to health services being placed at the centre of drug treatment approaches in several locations, there are nevertheless gaps in such interventions. Coverage rates of harm-reduction services in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, are still low, according to World Health Organization indicators,10 and neither South Africa nor Mozambique offers evidencebased treatment options, such as opioid-substitution therapy, through the public-health system. Regionally, there are also gaps in the collection of key data, while legal frameworks are punitive for drug users, with lawenforcement responses that are harsh on users and small dealers, but ineffective against major traffickers. The 2017 World Drug Report noted that Africa is currently experiencing the sharpest increase in heroin use globally Cities with the biggest consumer markets – like Mombasa, Cape Town and the Johannesburg–Pretoria metropolitan area – are also beset with violence associated with the drug trade. For example, residents in Mombasa say that local gangs have mushroomed over the last few years to give protection to heroin barons. Drug traffickers hire indiscriminately from among the unemployed in Mombasa’s slums. When job opportunities fall – such as after election periods, or when drug barons are imprisoned – these ‘violent entrepreneurs’, to use a term that seems apt, become predatory and turn to extortion and robbery in the local community.11 At the same time, and in the midst of widespread impunity for the people who organise and profit from the drug trade, lynching of drug users by anti-crime vigilante groups has also become commonplace. 4 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast In South Africa, nyaope and unga use has also led to an increase in crime, with addicts financing their habit by resorting to mugging, theft of electrical copper cables and other criminal activities.12 More significantly, however, in gang-controlled areas levels of violence have seen huge increases, related both to an influx of guns13 and dramatic gang wars over drug turf. The Cape Town murder rate spiralled upwards from around 2011 and has only recently stabilised – although at extremely high levels – making the city one of the most violent cities in the world, on a par with several Latin American capitals.14 The heroin trade is therefore linked, both directly and indirectly, to a number of serious developments in the East and southern African region. These include sustaining undemocratic political figures and parties, the role of the trade in making key ports porous, the empty hotels and undeveloped land that serve as fronts for laundering drug money, the spread of HIV and hepatitis C, and violence in the communities caught up in heroin consumer markets. This policy brief puts forward a number of recommendations, cautions and ideas on how best to respond to the heroin trade in southern and East Africa.15 The regional integration of the heroin trade raises several critical challenges for both civil-society and law-enforcement responses. There are also, however, important opportunities for action that must be grasped now. Policy recommendations Conventional wisdom would hold that the immediate response to the heroin trade should come in the form of decisive action from national political leaders and a crackdown by law enforcement. However, one needs to be aware of the inherent difficulty of working with government institutions that are heavily implicated in organised-crime activities, unless there is an internal faction motivating for change. Likewise, building capacity among law-enforcement agencies where there is deeply systemic corruption is often futile – and sometimes very counterproductive. Such engagements often rely for their success on timing related to political openings. Such openings may exist in South Africa in the medium term. Tanzanian law-enforcement officials have also expressed, at least informally, a desire for regional cooperation, but it is not clear what the position of their political leaders is. Even in these cases, caveats about engaging with security forces that are deemed to flout human rights must apply. The lack of success of militarised ‘war on drugs’ type strategies that have been applied in other contexts must also be taken into account. Lastly, given the integration of the coastal economy, the disruption and inevitable displacement of criminal networks in one country will only have the effect of shifting them to places that are unprepared to respond. Although these may seem like gloomy prospects, there is an argument that a better starting point to address the challenges would be to gain a sound understanding of where effort is likely to have the most impact, and then to design programmes that build powerful alliances between not just key elites and lawenforcement agencies, but also civil-society figures. Some recommendations for how to go about this are discussed in this brief; these are categorised into three areas: • Taking a regional approach • Tackling the links between the hidden economy and politics • Building coalitions for change around local effects Taking a regional approach Address the challenge as a regional criminal system A key objective of this brief is to highlight the crossborder nature of this coastal criminal economy and to emphasise the need to think holistically about responses. From a development perspective, this means thinking about cross-border illicit flows as part of an integrated regional system – one with jointly shared knock-on effects and impacts. One of the findings of this study is that the countries enmeshed in this system do not think about the challenge in this way. It should be a key aim, however, of development funding and partnership programmes to encourage such a regional approach. There are multiple ways to support such a conceptual shift: funding a single regional think tank or regional pressure groups, supporting the establishment of a coastal commission (similar to an initiative currently operating in West Africa) and drawing on the inputs of all the countries affected by the challenge. The point is to fashion a Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 5 SOUTH AFRICA KENYA Nairobi (Inland Container Depot) TANZANIA Dar es Salaam SOMALIA Mogadishu MOZAMBIQUE Maputo N © S Ballard (2017) Indian Ocean Pemba Nacala Lamu Mombasa Cape Town Johannesburg (Tambo International & City Deep Inland Container Port) Durban Arusha Angoche Nampula Tanga Stone Town (Zanzibar) Kismayo UGANDA Ras Afun Cape Guardafui Kampala Capital city Town Small port / town Border Zone Corridor km 0 600 ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE BOTSWANA NAMIBIA Corridor (uncertain) Dhow routes Entebbe Indicative overview of sea- and land-based heroin routes across the eastern African coastal states Source: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, based on interviews across the region, September 2017 6 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast response that draws on these linkages and uses the language of solidarity between affected parties and countries. In this sense, political developments in Tanzania (and potentially in the medium term in South Africa too) may provide new openings for such a wider regional anti-trafficking response. Leverage from within the region, for the sake of the region, will also be crucial Leverage from within the region, for the sake of the region, will also be crucial. At least two of the governments in this region, Mozambique and Tanzania, are highly resistant to Western intervention, especially in issues that cut so closely to politics and security. And, given that regional cooperation is in any case necessary to address these regional flows, attempts should be made to encourage cooperative efforts among the countries in the region. For example, South Africa wields hefty political and economic clout in southern Africa, and to a lesser extent in East Africa, and is also particularly hard hit by the downwind effects of the heroin trade. Exposing these effects in South Africa, and facilitating regional dialogue, might therefore encourage the South African government to apply pressure on other regional states to address the situation. But, to achieve this, networks that include both government and civil-society actors from the countries across the region must be built. Build regional (coastal) enforcement networks Interviews conducted with law-enforcement representatives at different points along the East African coast suggest that official forms of regional cooperation are extremely weak. South African officials, for example, suggested that they struggle to engage with their Mozambican counterparts. Despite these difficulties – and the fact that political protection often prevents effective law-enforcement responses to organised crime – it remains crucial to build networks of professional practice and solidarity across the region. Although these may lie dormant in some cases until political change allows effective action, they are an important investment for the future. Building regional solidarity among honest officials also provides a source of protection for their actions. At the same time, it is also crucial to ensure that bridges are built between civil-society and key members within the regional law-enforcement community. This is not to compromise actors on either side of the divide, but to recognise that civil society and the media are increasingly a spur to law-enforcement action. This is a trend that is likely to continue. Focus on the areas most vulnerable to instability One of the conclusions emerging clearly from this work is the vulnerability of northern Mozambique. Here, and largely off the radar, a significant local drug-trafficking economy has developed, facilitated by government corruption and indifference. In this context, there is much to gain by seeking ways to build better relations and networks, and to gather more information on the local political economy, including its connections to illicit markets. Many analyses have pointed to lack of development as the cause of organised crime, but, in fact, the opposite is true Many analyses have pointed to lack of development as the cause of organised crime, but, in fact, the opposite is true. Infrastructure, such as roads and ports, provides the physical means for moving and handling illicit commodities (in the absence of effective regulation and enforcement, that is). In that respect, northern Mozambique – with its potential for economic growth derived from its oil and gas reserves – is particularly vulnerable. With a shift in trafficking southward from Tanzania, this part of the region is increasingly becoming a major hub of illicit activity. Preventive action is required now if the area is not to become a wider source of instability and a regional platform for criminal activity. The problem is still manageable but early action is needed. At the most basic level, the first step would be to increase engagement with local communities and build stronger networks of civil society in the region. Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 7 Identify hubs and lever change within them At a macro-level a region-wide programme should identify geographic points, or key hubs, on which to focus. Hubs are choke points where multiple illicit flows merge to either leave or enter a political territory, to be processed (whether that involves physical adulteration or the transformation of hard cash into electronic transfers) or transferred from one transport mode to another (e.g. from sea to land, or truckloads being broken down into smaller packages for onward transport). Crucial hubs in this regional criminal economy are Mombasa (Kenya), Nacala and Nampula (northern Mozambique), City Deep (an area of Johannesburg) and the Port of Cape Town. Targeted investments to make these places less permeable to criminal elements may bear fruit in several areas, diminishing not only heroin flows, but also illegal trafficking of wildlife or other natural-resource commodities. However, these interventions should not necessarily take the form of improving state control or increasing state efficiency, as prominent state actors are often key players in illegal trade, and greater control and better technology may well only serve to facilitate their business. Instead, they should entail creative ways of empowering licit actors with an interest in ‘clean’ and functioning ports. Forming alliances with vetted privatesector agents is one possibility. Tackling the links between the hidden economy and politics Grasp the nettle of party-political funding The growth of the illicit economy in Africa, and particularly along its east coast, coincided with the establishment of a series of fragile democracies. Perhaps one of the most striking conclusions of this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a source of party-political funding in the various countries that are involved in the coastal criminal economy. Such funding is used not only for inter-party election campaigns, but also for positioning within political movements (intra-party). Illicit funds or grey funds have been a source of ‘easy money’ in several places. One direct result has been the alignment of political interests (and the interests of the political elite) and the illicit economy, including drug trafficking. One cannot overemphasise the impact of this hidden economy: interview after interview raised the issue directly or indirectly. Although much more needs to be understood about the relationships between party politics and illicit trade, the outlines of the challenge are clear. One of the most striking conclusions of this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a source of party-political funding Grasping the nettle of party-political funding may be very difficult, but it is of crucial importance in separating licit political activities from underworld influence. A response would need to encourage and sustain a debate on the subject, and build more effective civil-society coalitions in each country, and perhaps even across the region. Understand the nexus between politics, business and crime Linked to the issue of political party funding, current development approaches have amassed a large body of research pointing to the value of marketdriven interventions – including entrepreneurialism, innovation and the role of the private sector – in creating employment and alleviating poverty. Yet there is poor understanding of how the drive to create a business elite and to privatise state-owned enterprises has facilitated the growth of organised crime in Africa. In East Africa, figures who move between the spheres of business, politics and crime stand out as key to helping us understand which institutions facilitate illicit flows. Understanding how they sustain themselves may provide useful clues on how to better insulate government from the forces that promote corruption within it. Action here must include an engagement with legitimate business actors, provide support to financial journalism (where the market fails to do so) and exposing such ‘crossover’ actors to external scrutiny. 8 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Building coalitions for change around local effects Understand the impact of heroin at local level in coastal cities Across the region under analysis here there are significant gaps in the strategic information collected about drug use. Comprehensive surveys of drug users, drug prices and methods of drug use are not only necessary for mounting a proper public-health response, but also provide a powerful platform for national discussions of the role of the heroin trade in society. Therefore encouraging and supporting druguse surveys among these coastal communities would be crucial in raising awareness and acting as a lever to government action. The current momentum towards harm-reduction approaches in the region could be a starting point for building a broader civil-society response. Health activists and public-health professionals can use their networks to generate debate, and to develop a response that also includes the input and support of people who use drugs themselves. Community leaders as potential allies This study has uncovered the degree to which, in many places, the illicit economy has co-opted elected leaders, partly because of their need to raise money to finance their political parties, yet, across the region, the authors engaged with religious and community leaders who expressed their deep concern about the impact of drug use on, in particular, young people.16 The human face of heroin addiction is often visible in many places, with dirty and emaciated users conspicuous in several coastal cities. Addiction is seen to drive local crime and is disruptive of family and social life. Communities are taking their own initiatives with little external support, including setting up so-called ‘sober houses’ and running anti-drug campaigns. Support (including financial support) for such initiatives, which would build messages of solidarity across coastal communities and focus community leaders on best practice from elsewhere, would be a unique and timely regional response. It is important to instil the philosophy and practices of harm reduction into community drug efforts at an early stage. This is particularly the case in those initiatives run by local religious groups, which, while sometimes remarkably enlightened, have the potential for abuse without effective regulation or guidance. Reduce violence associated with illicit markets The levels of violence associated with these coastal markets vary considerably. Either way, focusing on violence directly linked to illicit economies will provide a way in which the immediate impacts, particularly for poor and excluded people, can be mitigated. Levels of violence have reached extreme proportions in Cape Town, and there have been few successful interventions As indicated, perhaps the most extreme levels of violence linked to this coastal criminal economy now occur at its most southern point – in Cape Town. Violence here is linked to developments much further north and this will be increasingly the case if the current influx of Tanzanian traffickers becomes a more established feature of the local drug economy. Levels of violence have reached extreme proportions in Cape Town, and there have been few successful interventions. There are numerous programming options available, one of which would be to build solidarity between community leaders in cities like Mombasa dealing with similar issues along the coast. A focus on the Cape gangs is also essential to cut off their connections to the wider regional economy and protect the poorest and most marginalised residents of the city. Promote public dissemination of information about criminal networks In conclusion, and most critically, there is a need for much greater understanding among the public of the nature and impact of organised crime in southern and East Africa, let alone how to identify it. Here, journalists are at the front line – exposing, through their investigations, the operations of organised criminal groups and their connections to politics. The work of the media plays an important role in educating the public about what organised crime looks like in their Policy Brief 04 – June 2018 9 country. This is key, as it is not always easy distinguish between corruption and legal business activities. Unfortunately, investigative journalism is underfunded and its practitioners are often poorly protected from the repercussions of their highly sensitive work. Media and civil-society action is almost always a catalyst for lawenforcement investigations Media and civil-society action is almost always a catalyst for law-enforcement investigations, or even, in the most serious cases, a political response. Raising the profile of organised-crime issues – and especially their impact on service delivery, the local environment, instability and levels of violence – elevates them in public discource, so that they cannot be ignored by political actors. Conclusion The growth of the heroin trade along the southern route has been driven, in part, by the growth in opium production in Afghanistan over the last 16 years. The most recent figure for the area under poppy production was estimated at 328 000 hectares in 2017, a 63 per cent increase against the previous year. This staggering rise in production is likely to increase the flow of heroin along all routes even further. It is a reminder, if one was needed, of just how ‘joined-up’ the global criminal economy is. And Africa is not immune. The heroin that passes through the countries of the southern route is not just in transit. The coastal criminal economy has been developing for about three decades, through some formative processes of economic liberalisation, globalisation, and shifts and transitions towards multiparty democracy. As such, it has both been shaped by, and in turn, shaped politics across the region. The city of Mombasa shows the dangers of neglecting this phenomenon any longer. There, drug traffickers have become so comfortable and free from scrutiny that they have run for political office – and won. Meanwhile, in marginalised slum areas where rates of heroin use are high and residents fear both men providing security for drug dealers and the impact of heroin use on their own families, people who use heroin are murdered by vigilante groups. Other places, most notably in our assessment northern Mozambique, have become particularly vulnerable. Prevention is much better than cure. If actors with a progressive vision for how to tackle the heroin trade do not lead a response, then actors with a harsher view will. At a recent meeting that the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime hosted, representatives from civil society, government bodies and law enforcement from around the region expressed firm views that approaches that strengthen democracy, the rights of people who use drugs and the needs of affected communities must be placed at the centre of the response. As our recommendations here suggest, it is time to bring together actors along the East African coast to begin to counter the harmful impacts of the heroin trade. 10 Tackling heroin trafficking on the East African coast Notes 1 A Cole, Heroin trafficking in the Indian Ocean: Trends and responses, Galle Dialogue, 1–2 December 2014. 2 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC world drug report 2015, Vienna: UNODC, 2015, Preface; UNODC, Afghan opiate trafficking through the Southern Route, Vienna: UNODC, 2015. 3 J Wright, Transnational organized crime in Eastern Africa: A threat assessment, Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 4 Herion transiting this route is also transported to other countries, including Asian markets and some Indian Ocean island states. 5 Six researchers were commissioned to conduct research locally between July and August 2017. An external expert team then visited several town and cities in the same areas over three weeks in September 2017, verifying and triangulating information with previously consulted sources, as well as conducting further interviews. Several return trips and telephone calls were made by the expert team to assess the work of the local researchers and to follow up with a range of interlocutors. In addition to the interviews in the core countries of analysis – Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa – some were also conducted in the Seychelles and Pakistan in October and November 2017 to gain a better understanding of the routes into Africa, and almost 50 were conducted in Uganda in an attempt to understand internal linkages. See our full report for more details. 6 The economics of this are evident: in Pakistan, a gram of heroin costs approximately US$3 and in Kenya around US$20, whereas in the UK it costs US$61 and in Denmark US$213. See drug prices listed on Havoscope. com. These prices are as of 16 November 2017. 7 UNODC, World drug report 2017 booklet 3, Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 8 Information provided by the countries in question to the UNODC as per reporting requirements for Annual Report Questionaires for the World Drug Report. 9 Several East African countries have shown some progressive leadership in their public-health responses to injecting drug use. Both Kenya and Tanzania (including Zanzibar) have placed harm reduction at the centre of their response. 10 S Larney et al, Global, regional, and country-level coverage of interventions to prevent and manage HIV and hepatitis C among people who inject drugs: A systematic review, The Lancet, 5:12, 2017, e1208–e1220. 11 This phenomenon was noted by respondents with direct experience of such attacks at our expert group meeting in Nairobi on 13 November 2017. See also M Schuberth, The impact of drug trafficking on informal security actors in Kenya, Africa Spectrum, 49:3, 2014, 55–81. 12 Nyaope is a cocktail of various drugs and other ingredients that has become widespread in South Africa; unga is a highly addictive heroin-based drug. 13 Reportedly, guns have been taken illegally from police armouries in the Western Cape and sold to gangsters since 2010. See C Dolley, Western Cape cop, gun dealer arrested in massive firearms probe, News24,10 October, 2017, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ western-cape-cop-gun-dealer-arrested-in-massivefirearms-probe-20171010. 14 The most recent homicide figures for 2016/17 show 63 deaths per 100 000 citizens – that against 42 per 100 000 in 2009/10. The Cape Town figure is double the national average. This data is from the Institute of Safety Governance and Criminology at the University of Cape Town. It draws on South African Police Service data but because city boundaries don’t match police ones, it has to be recalculated. 15 And, indeed beyond: many other countries along the southern route are also affected by these dynamics. 16 When visiting one religious leader, for example, we found his waiting room full of locals seeking support for family members who had become addicted to cheap heroin. publications infographics original analysis explainers trend reports Subscribe to ENACT ENACT works to enhance Africa’s response to transnational organised crime. Receive the latest analysis and research, delivered directly to your inbox: 1. Go to www.enact.africa 2. Click on ‘Connect’, then ‘Subscribe’ 3. Select the topics you’re interested in, click ‘Subscribe’ About the authors Mark Shaw is the director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GI TOC) and senior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics International Drug Policy Project. He was until recently National Research Foundation Professor of Justice and Security at the University of Cape Town’s Centre of Criminology, where he is now an adjunct professor. He formally worked in several capacities at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Peter Gastrow is a senior adviser at GI TOC. He lives in Cape Town and has practiced as an advocate of the Supreme Court, served as a parliamentarian, and as adviser to the South African minister of police. Organised crime has been his main research focus since he served as the Cape Town director of the Institute for Security Studies, and as a senior fellow at the International Peace Institute in New York. Simone Haysom is a senior analyst at GI TOC and a visiting academic at the Department of African Studies at the University of Oxford. She has previously worked as researcher at the Overseas Development Institute in London, and spent several years working as a consultant on issues related to forced displacement, urban development, organised crime and policing. About ENACT ENACT builds knowledge and skills to enhance Africa’s response to transnational organised crime. ENACT analyses how organised crime affects stability, governance, the rule of law and development in Africa, and works to mitigate its impact. ENACT is implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime. Acknowledgements ENACT is funded by the European Union (EU). This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. Cover image: © Africa Studio – Adobe Stock The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views or position of the European Union, or the ENACT partnership. Authors contribute to ENACT publications in their personal capacity. © 2018, ENACT. Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in ENACT, its partners, the EU and the author, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the author and the ENACT partnership. This project is funded by the European Union
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário